

Senri Ethnological Studies 109

Heritage Practices in Africa

Edited by
Taku Iida

National Museum of Ethnology
Osaka
2022

Published by the National Museum of Ethnology
Senri Expo Park, Suita, Osaka 565-8511, Japan

©2022 National Museum of Ethnology, Osaka
All rights reserved. Printed in Japan by Yubunsha Co., Ltd.

Publication Data

Senri Ethnological Studies 109
Heritage Practices in Africa
Edited by Taku Iida. p.227
Includes bibliographical references and index.

ISSN 0387-6004

ISBN 978-4-910055-02-2 C3030

1. community 2. cultural identity 3. globalization 4. intangible heritage 5. systemicity
I. Iida, Taku

CONTENTS

Introduction:

Heritage Practices in Africa Taku Iida	1
---	---

Part I: Refurbishment of UNESCO Heritage

Hidden Cultural Heritage: Tourism and Belief Concerning the UNESCO World Heritage of Kilwa Island on the Southern Swahili Coast in Tanzania Ryo Nakamura	21
---	----

Critical Changes in Djenné's Local Community after Its Nomination as a World Heritage Site: Issues of Preservation and Cultural Conservation Oussouby Sacko	41
--	----

Still a Sacred Void? Cultural Heritage, Sacred Places, and Living Spaces of the Mijikenda Kaya Forests along the Kenyan Coast in East Africa Katsuhiko Keida	55
---	----

“Adaptive” Heritage: Carving as a Cultural Icon and a Way of Life for the Zafimaniry of Madagascar Taku Iida	77
--	----

Part II: Globalizing Local Culture

“Traditional African Medicine” as Living Cultural Heritage: Conditions and Politics of Knowledge Transfer Jacqueline Grigo	101
--	-----

Visual Citizenship in Senegal: Contemporary Contests of Cultural Heritage Allen F. Roberts	125
--	-----

The Community Speaks with Many Voices: Representing Cultural Heritage in the Smithsonian's <i>African Voices</i> Exhibition Mary Jo Arnoldi	149
---	-----

Part III: Past in the Present, Present in the Future

Local Juridical Authority as Intangible Heritage Practice: A Case from Burundi Thomas Laely	165
Burial Communities and the Undermining of Royalty in Colonial Africa John Mack	193
Creating Festivals, Revitalizing Communities: Ongoing Cultural Movements in Zambia Kenji Yoshida	209
INDEX	221
List of Contributors	225

Introduction: Heritage Practices in Africa

Taku Iida

National Museum of Ethnology

As the World Heritage movement has been popularized by the mass media in the second half of the last century, certain aspects of cultural studies and art history have been incorporated into heritage studies (Harvey 2001), a field that has also branched into areas of tourism studies, sociology, and economics. Despite this interdisciplinary environment, the voices of cultural anthropologists remain a minority. However, it is important to recognize their potential to make a significant contribution to the heritage field as analysts of integrative cultural phenomena.

This introductory essay reviews recent movements concerning the topic of heritage, both internationally authorized and unofficial cultural assets. In doing so, it aims to underline the importance of integrating heritage with contemporary cultural practices and, by examining case studies from several African countries, to raise the profile of new perspectives and practices of cultural heritage in Africa today.

1. The Relational and Systemic Nature of Cultural Phenomena

In the 1980s, it was said that cultural anthropologists lost the right to lead or monopolize the discourse regarding culture (Clifford 1988). However, the anthropological way of thinking should still be regarded as an effective approach to analyze various aspects of a culture by exploring the topic within a variety of social, geographical, and historical contexts. For this reason, anthropologists may be acknowledged as “analysts of integrative cultural phenomena,” but should not be privileged as cultural “experts.”

Anthropologists’ contribution to the field of heritage studies offers a potentially valuable resource as it can assist in articulating the processes behind cultural phenomena. Such phenomena have often tended to be oversimplified, particularly by the mass media, journalists, and TV editors, who often reduce the term “culture” to merely a label describing the creative arts, such as paintings, sculptures, music, and performances.

Therefore, if we adhere to this configuration of the term “culture,” the concept becomes associated with a collection of works produced by artists or experts. In reality, however, culture is not limited to narrow definitions. In the 1970s, cultural anthropologists were accustomed to defining culture as a complex entity, comprising language, bodily techniques, subsistence technologies, the economy, social relations, beliefs, myths, and so on (Kluckhohn and Kelly 1945; Tylor 1958).

Although this functionalist definition became outdated because of the challenges of “liquid modernity” whereby components of culture were observed to be changing too rapidly before people became accustomed to them (Giddens 1991; Bauman 2000), culture was and still is, according to anthropological perspectives, something maintained and recreated by ordinary people through their daily lives and practices.

Even in cultural studies that have stressed the role of power and resistance, culture is regarded as relative to and contingent upon people’s political orientation and negotiation with those considered outside of that specific culture (Hall 2007). The relational and systematic aspects of culture or, in other words, cultural products and processes, should therefore be considered when we engage with the topic of culture in our daily lives.

The same is true for cultural heritage. The public still tends to view cultural heritage as representative of “great works” and tends to appreciate it only from its outward appearance (Nielsen 2011). Since the mid-1990s, however, its meaning has been undergoing rapid redefinition. The term “heritage” is now beginning to imply not only authoritative physical objects, but also intangible cultural products related to human practices. The interactive process of “heritage-making” is summarized in the following sections.

Music is a good example of this. It is not merely a certain sound, note, tune, or even piece, but a process produced by one or many instruments and actors, including players, composers, producers, and consumers (Small 1998). It is an organic web of objects and people acting around a tune that forms the core of its essence. “Safeguarding” this kind of heritage not only entails preserving musical scores and recorded sources, but also concerns the continuation of the processes surrounding its production.

In recent years, the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO), which has promoted the World Heritage brand, has popularized a new form of heritage under the term “Intangible Cultural Heritage.” However, this movement has been criticized for fossilizing and fragmenting aspects of culture. By referring to it as Intangible Cultural Heritage, it has been argued that this process of intended safeguarding results in the opposite effect, cutting up the web of objects and practices (Stefano 2012). The discourse regarding heritage, therefore, is in a process of radical redefinition and change.

In this context, anthropologists can play an essential part in reminding the public that heritage consists of organic ties between objects, practices, and people, forming a complex web of relations that feed into their daily lives and individual and collective identity. How such heritage objects and practices are organized and reorganized with respect to people is a matter for further anthropological inquiry. As Raymond Williams says, cultural heritage “can never be reduced to its artifacts while it is being lived” (Williams 1960: 343; quoted in Kirshenblatt-Gimblett 1995). For this reason, this volume deals with what will be termed “heritage practices” rather than with cultural heritage as a concept.

2. Primary Versus Secondary Heirs

Today, more than ever, the shift of focus from physical objects to intangible practices requires increasing reflection and deeper engagement. For example, if UNESCO designates a residential building as a World Heritage site, it would become difficult to change its physical appearance even when residents require modernization or refurbishment. When something is officially designated as heritage, there are imposed limits and restrictions that infringe on the proprietors' rights. From the proprietors' perspective, however, it is important to maintain and improve (sometimes making changes in a manner undesirable to others) to features of the property to suit everyday demands and requirements. If the proprietors' needs are to be fully respected, authorities may run into difficulties as they may be unable to perform their duty to preserve heritage *in situ*.

This example shows the multiple levels of heritage, with the local often at odds with, and competing against, the universal. Therefore, the value of heritage at the local level—as it is perceived by proprietors, residents, caretakers, and other individuals or organizations directly concerned with it—does not necessarily correspond to its value as perceived by those at the universal level, who traditionally regard heritage as a common property of all humankind. For the purposes of this volume, the former type of people who engage with heritage at the local level will be called the “primary heirs,” whereas the latter who respect its universal value will be called the “secondary heirs.”

It is important to stress, however, that primary and secondary heirs are not mutually exclusive categories, but represent the extreme poles of a spectrum. Nevertheless, making a heuristic distinction between primary and secondary heirs can highlight the way that heritage not only cuts across boundaries at different geographical levels, but also has multiple uses.

For secondary heirs, heritage is often interpreted as illustrative of the great achievements of humanity and is principally valued for its epistemological or esthetic qualities. For primary heirs, however, the value tends to be more multifaceted. For example, a heritage building might also be used as a residence or a community hall; however, the necessity of this building for the continuation of contemporary life and festivals is often an aspect outside of the secondary heirs' valuation. In the 1990s, the “cultural landscape” concept coined by UNESCO highlighted the fact that heritage is characterized by places where local people perform all manner of human activities over time.

Despite operating at multiple levels, conventional heritage practices have historically privileged the valuations of secondary heirs, particularly in the case of archeological heritage. After World War II, the World Heritage movement was limited to the conservation of physical monuments, which were considered to be edifying historical works for mutual public benefit. At that time, it may be seen that conflicts between primary (local) and secondary (universal) heirs were rare. However, in the 21st century, when the concept of cultural heritage gained popularity and diversity, it was met with increasing challenges to balance the demands of the local and the universal.

3. From Materiality to Communities: The World Heritage Case

A consideration of the origins of the World Heritage model can provide a good tool to highlight conventional materially-based classifications of heritage. Categorized into natural and cultural resources, World Heritage has traditionally been concerned with two types of heritage: natural reserves and historical monuments.¹⁾ The ecological values of the former were championed by environmentalists, while the historical and esthetic qualities of the latter were canonized by archeologists or art historians. In both cases, the ideal values were those identified by authorized or “expert” voices. Under this definition, people were led to believe that heritage was something that could and should not change, implying that in the past, ephemeral things such as oral traditions and music were not regarded as heritage (Isar 2011).²⁾

Attachment to preserving monuments forever *in situ* is said to have been derived from the intensive project of nation-state building, which gained momentum in the late 19th century to the beginning of the 20th century, such as John Muir’s pioneering activity to establish US National Parks (Meyer 1997; Dunlap 1999; Tsing 2005). Citizens’ lobbying thus empowered national symbols, and these symbols, in turn, unified the nation’s citizens. In this cyclic process, people and the government shared mutual goals.

In addition to the National Park movement in the USA, European and Japanese governments began to designate important historical monuments, such as the British Ancient Monuments Protection Act in 1882, the French Law for the Conservation of Historical Monuments in 1887, and the Japanese Law for the Preservation of Old Shrines and Temples in 1897. Thereafter, the US government implemented its Antiquities Act in 1906. Cultural heritage thus served as a symbol of eternity to inculcate a fixed concept of unified national identity. At that time, many Western countries were hotbeds of conservation activities, with the industrial revolution’s impact of radical modernization ironically drawing people’s attention to the past.

Thus, so-called modernity was believed to be a faultless project, which was simultaneously accompanied by growth in the heritage movement. In the first instance, people began to recognize the value of heritage as rapid changes in their lives gained momentum. In the second, the promotion of natural sciences encouraged people to objectify heritage and view it in relation to their general history. These popular trends connected with the mission of nation-state building converged into a stream of heritage-making. During this period, there was little conflict between people and national authorities or specialists, such as archeologists and art historians, who were seen as public servants acting in the interests of both the state government and its people.

It is unclear exactly when the breakdown between the people and the nation-state began, but it is believed to have been before the 1990s. In 1972, when the Convention Concerning the Protection of World Cultural and Natural Heritage (The World Heritage Convention) was adopted in the UNESCO General Assembly, there were very few signs that hinted at such a breakdown. Thus, for one or two decades after its adoption, the process of making the World Heritage List moved ahead with minimal conflict between primary and secondary heirs.

In 1993, the revised version of the Operational Guidelines for the Implementation of the World Heritage Convention proposed the term “Cultural Landscapes” for inclusion in the World Heritage List. According to the Guidelines, Cultural Landscapes are formed “under the influence of the physical constraints and/or opportunities presented by their natural environment and of *successive* social, economic, and cultural forces, both external and internal” (emphasis added). This statement, which describes the changeable, fluctuating essence of Cultural Landscapes, highlighted heritage as defined by a process, rather than a product of cultural practices (see also Silverman 2015). This refashioned concept of heritage modified the relationship between primary heirs and national/international agencies.

In 1994, the World Heritage Committee launched the Global Strategy for a Representative, Balanced, and Credible World Heritage List. This new vision aimed to further expand the definition of heritage to cover the full spectrum of cultural and natural heritage to balance the geographical biases of inscriptions weighted in favor of Western countries. The specialists involved in the report recommended focusing on “living cultures,”³⁾ which were envisaged to include both “intangible” and “tangible” heritage. From the perspective of African countries, which are historically poorly represented on the World Heritage List, the Global Strategy proposed to widen opportunities for the inclusion of every day, intangible cultural practices, and traditions as universally important cultural heritage. The launch of the Global Strategy initiated a comprehensive shift in the institutional focus of heritage from tangible to intangible, from universal to local, from historical to living, from monuments to practices, from eternal to ephemeral, and from products to processes. This movement aimed to encourage an increased understanding of valuing the perspectives of local primary heirs.

For the first time, in 1997, the nomination process for the inscription on the World Heritage List required collaboration with, and full approval of, local communities.⁴⁾ In 2007, enhancing the participation of local communities was included as one of the Strategic Objectives (5 Cs) of World Heritage along with Credibility, Conservation, Capacity-building, and Communication (World Heritage Committee 2007). All these events drew attention to the increasing trend of acknowledging the importance of engagement and dialog with primary heirs.

4. Impacts of Intangible Cultural Heritage

Currently, the World Heritage Committee has finally acknowledged that local practices should be considered, especially in the case of “heritage in the making,” as identified in Cultural Landscapes. However, in the text of the Convention there remains a clause that threatens to undermine the “community centered” approach. Article 1 stipulates that any candidates for the World Heritage List should possess “outstanding universal value.” However, as will be discussed in this volume, this is a criterion that is not necessarily relevant to primary heirs.

In this regard, the Convention for the Safeguarding of Intangible Cultural Heritage (ICH Convention) may be considered more appropriate. This Convention was adopted in

the UNESCO General Assembly of 2003 and went into effect in 2006. The major difference from the World Heritage Convention is that the ICH Convention covers “the practices, representations, expressions, knowledge, skills—as well as the instruments, objects, artefacts and cultural spaces associated therewith (Article 2).” Such a statement therefore logically requires the dismissal of universal values because “intangible heritage,” which by definition lacks a stable form, produces its value only for those who continually engage with and appreciate it. The ICH Convention leaves the estimation of relational value (rather than universal) to the responsibility of state parties, who collect information from communities and groups with whom it is concerned.

According to the Convention, cultural heritage is defined (as described above) as the intangible things “that communities, groups and, in some cases, individuals recognize as part of their cultural heritage (Article 2).” The ICH Convention thus sought to revolutionize and remedy the two deficits of the World Heritage Convention: a neglect of primary heirs, and an undervaluation of the practices that are foundationally important in linking together the physical and non-physical components of heritage.

If cultural heritage is not confined to monuments or objects and is something that does not need to fulfill one or more criteria of universal value, can one potentially term any cultural phenomenon as heritage? Yes, as far as the people with whom it is concerned value it as such. Based on this understanding, it may be possible to propose a tentative revision of the definition of heritage as the cultural products that were created in the past, and/or have been repeatedly used over time, as well as bodily sources, such as knowledge, memory, and body techniques, which are associated with the production of these products.

Although the author’s view may exactly differ from the authorized UNESCO definition, there are certain intended benefits of rewording the definition of cultural heritage, which will be discussed in further detail ahead. In this process, it will become clear that not only does heritage require input from anthropology, but that the development of anthropological knowledge is also contingent upon a deeper understanding of heritage.

5. Heritage as the Past Living in the Present

The only difference between the two words “heritage” and “phenomenon” is whether the speaker (or the writer) is conscious that something in the present has recourse to the past (Kirshenblatt-Gimblett 1995). For those who do not possess this consciousness of the past, the phenomenon would simply remain a part of everyday experience. The word “heritage” therefore implies an encounter between the past and present and, more significantly, somebody’s consciousness and recognition of this encounter.

This encounter, however, is not symmetrical: The past can influence the present—just as the legacy of the dead can affect living people’s behavior—but the reverse cannot occur. This is because there is a temporal gap between sending and receiving, which results in a one-way intervention in the past (Lowenthal 1985). However, it is common for people in the present to select and modify the past to channel it. Concern about this

process is apparent in the discussion of collective memory (French 2012). Many monographs on this matter have also been published in African studies (Werbner 1998; Cole 2001; Lambek 2002; Coombes 2003), some of which directly address heritage studies (Antheier and Isar 2011).

The first effect of reconfiguring cultural phenomena as heritage is that it highlights the focus on the past by those living in the present. Indeed, the meaning of the past for the present differs in different societies. On the one hand, there are societies that are comparatively isolated, where everyday life makes significant reference to the past, or where they undertake practices that directly engage with preceding generations. In this case, the past essentially lives on in “customary” behaviors that dominate the everyday lives of the people (Iida this volume). On the other hand, there are societies with a high degree of freedom in their behaviors, where creative individuals appropriate the customs and practices of former generations. For example, some artists become inspired by traditional crafts and paintings (Kawaguchi 2008), while others produce stories and performances to strengthen their group identity (Umino 2008), and some create touristic events by imitating traditional festivals (Yoshida this volume). However, neither type of society operates in independent spheres. Moreover, all types are commonly faced with the same external cultural pressures, which may be pro- or anti-UNESCO. This can be seen particularly in African societies, where colonial and post-colonial powers were historically dominant, establishing external standards that converge with, and diverge from, local ones in a complex way (Yoshida and Mack 2008).

The second effect of engaging with heritage through anthropology draws attention to the political processes involved in its formation. In many postmodern or “supermodern” examples, an awareness of the past is typically informed by the preceding cultural movement. When one gains an understanding of this trend, it is possible to see the numerous political frictions that occur on many levels. People who live in the present, who are directly connected to a particular heritage (i.e., as primary heirs), form a group or community to preserve their heritage (although the boundaries of said communities are not necessarily clearly defined; see Hirai 2015). The co-members of these communities can be said to be those who actively participate in upholding these shared values and/or collaborate in these cultural practices. For this reason, people are faced with two kinds of politics at both the internal and external levels (Tunbridge and Ashworth 1996; Rowlands 2002).

Internally, the members within the group can hold different opinions and disputes about what constitutes their heritage, and how it should be selectively transmitted and memorialized. At an external level, the primary heirs often aim to legitimize their heritage and must negotiate with outsiders who have historically paid closer attention to universal rather than local values (Bendix 2009). Heritage is thus a product of political and practical negotiation, in the same way that culture has been depicted in cultural studies (Hall 1980).

It is the past and politics, therefore, that need to be closely considered when we address concepts of heritage. Indeed, some cultural phenomena have at times been observed without consideration of their relationship to the past and politics, and have

thus been improperly labeled “heritage.” Although it is important to respect multiple forms of authorized/non-authorized, conventional/unconventional types of heritage, it is also important to be aware that any cultural phenomenon, whether it has an old tradition or not, has the potential to be heritage, but it must be transmitted to the next generation, politicized, and handed down over time with reference to the past to gain heritage status.

Despite the inherently political nature of their traditions, many people choose to identify with them as heritage rather than as isolated cultural phenomena. The most important reason is that through conversion and elevation to heritage status, this process can solidify and strengthen social ties with those who are seen to share the same basic values and appreciation of this phenomenon. Cultural heritage is, therefore, an important means for people to harness collective action in a globalizing world where the formation of culture is met with a fractious and politicized process.

In the anthropologists’ field, although heritage has been considered a significant component of their work, they often do not share the overall mission as UNESCO and other cultural authorities to encourage people to share in and celebrate a universal standard of World Heritage value. They are traditionally more conscious of the contributions and values that have been preserved by local and particularistic cultural traditions. Modern anthropologists often perceive their role as that of recording and describing people’s diverse cultures and circumstances; in identifying key issues, they look at how it is possible to achieve a future to overcome such challenges together. While some anthropologists might be opposed to the views of local people, recommendations for future action are often judged according to their perceived effects over the long term. The anthropological task, whether academic or practical, is to broaden the possibilities of people, particularly raising awareness of historically marginalized voices and considering how humanity can survive and thrive in a rapidly globalizing world.

6. Content of This Volume

Seven of the eleven papers that contributed to this volume were presented in the symposium “Can Cultural Heritage Forge Communities? Efforts in Africa,” which was held at the National Museum of Ethnology, Osaka, Japan on May 27–28, 2013 (Table 1). For several reasons, I could not include all the papers presented on this occasion. Instead, I included three papers presented on another occasion of the Fifth Biennial Conference of the Association of Critical Heritage Studies (ACHS2020), hosted online by the University College of London, where Thomas Laely and I organized a curated session titled “Local Values of Heritage in Africa: Swinging between the Universal and Local, as Well as the Tangible and Intangible” on August 26, 2020 (Table 2). All the chapters focus on sub-Saharan African cases, including Madagascar. In this region, where people often lack financial wealth, it is typical to find that, on the one hand, international authorities are actively encouraging heritage activities, while on the other, local people lack the resources and/or willpower to pursue these cultural initiatives to support “traditional” practices, rather than heritage authorized or consented to itself.

Table 1 Papers presented in the Symposium in Osaka on May 27–28, 2013

(May 27, 2013)

Allen F. Roberts (University of California, Los Angeles)*
 Visual Citizenship in Senegal: Contemporary Contests of Cultural Heritage

Itsushi Kawase (National Museum of Ethnology)
 Formation and Rediscovery of Cultural Identity through Ethnographic Films: A Case from Ethiopia

John Mack (University of East Anglia)*
 Burial Communities and the Undermining of Royalty

Kenji Yoshida (National Museum of Ethnology)*
 Creating Festivals, Revitalizing Communities: Ongoing Cultural Movements in Zambia

Mary Jo Arnoldi (National Museum of Natural History, Smithsonian Institution)*
 The Community Speaks with Many Voices: Representing African Cultural Heritage in the Museum

(May 28, 2013)

Oussouby Sacko (Kyoto Seika University)*
 Critical Changes in Djenné Community after Its Nomination as World Heritage

Katsuhiko Keida (Kumamoto University)*
 Cultural Heritages, Sacred Places and Living Spaces: The Mijikenda Kaya Forests Case of the Kenyan Coast in East Africa

Chantal Radimilahy (Université d'Antananarivo)
 Intangible Heritage, Memories and Local Communities: Madagascar Case

Taku Iida (National Museum of Ethnology)*
 From Decoration to the Ethnic Symbol: Zafimaniry Relief Pattern in Madagascar

Presenters marked with “*” are contributors to this volume

Table 2 Papers presented in ACHS 2020 on August 26, 2020

Taku Iida (National Museum of Ethnology, Osaka)*
 Re-embedding Museum Objects into Local Communicative Networks

Thomas Laely (University of Zurich)*
 Tangible vs Intangible? What West-Tanzanian Kihaya Calabash Lids Tell on Intangible Cultural Heritage

Abiti Adebo Nelson (University of Western Cape and Uganda National Museum)
 Tribal Crafts and Arts in the Museum versus Knowledge Systems Surviving among the Communities in Uganda

Kiyoshi Umeya (Kobe University)
 Local Practices around the Tombs of Buganda Kings at Kasubi

Jacqueline Grigo (University of Zurich)*
 Traditional Medicine as Local Heritage: Conditions and Politics of Knowledge transfer

Ryo Nakamura (Fukuoka University)*
 Local Belief at a Hidden Heritage Site on Kilwa Island in Tanzania

Keiyo Hanabuchi (Health Sciences University of Hokkaido)
 Historical monument and Nostalgia of Comorian Diaspora

Katsuhiko Keida (Kumamoto University)*
 A Sacred World Heritage or A Big Homestead? “The Mijikenda Kaya Forests” along the Kenyan Coast as Problematic Spaces

Presenters marked with “*” are contributors to this volume

All contributors are specialists in African studies, but not necessarily in heritage studies. Some argue for heritage designated by UNESCO, while others focus on a less recognized kind. Despite such differences, however, all chapters provide significant insights into general heritage studies. To demonstrate this clearly, I will summarize the chapters and specify their contributions to heritage studies.

The chapters in Part I “Refurbishment of UNESCO Heritage” concern the increasing emphasis on people being directly responsible for the maintenance of existing World Heritage sites, as well as cultural practices in the UNESCO Representative List of the Intangible Cultural Heritage of Humanity. In all cases, the inscription of sites and practices in the UNESCO list has brought about a significant change in local practices. This section deals with the ruins of Kilwa Kisiwani in Tanzania, the old towns of Djenné in Mali, Kaya Forests and related practices in Kenya, and carving production in Madagascar.

Analyzing the case of Kilwa Kisiwani, Ryo Nakamura argues that archeological sites have local values recognized by inhabitants, although they are invisible to culture practitioners or tourists. In the Djenné case, Oussouby Sacko questions the enforcement of “historical” methods of restoration and reliance upon traditional materials for the sake of heritage conservation. A monument of super-human size like a town cannot be maintained without appropriation of people’s everyday activities, and Sacko’s analysis is relevant at this point. In both cases, developing a firmer understanding of people’s contemporary needs, as well as their knowledge and practice to preserve (or safeguard) the heritage, seems to be a necessary solution to resolve the problem.

Katsuhiko Keida, who conducts his research on the sites of both World Heritage (Sacred Mijikenda Kaya forests) and UNESCO Intangible Cultural Heritage (Traditions and practices associated with the Kayas in the sacred forests of the Mijikenda), argues that the authorities have failed to demonstrate adequate sensitivity to the forest as a “sacred” place, which became a center of local politics due to the inscription on the two Heritage Lists. In the following chapter of the Zafimaniry woodcarving knowledge designated as a UNESCO Intangible Cultural Heritage in 2003, Taku Iida explains how a part of a lifestyle which used to be indispensable to survive in an inaccessible and remote area of Madagascar, was transformed into a politically and economically influential icon and heritage practice. Both chapters illustrate the necessity of careful examination of the local context in safeguarding intangible culture. In consideration of all the four chapters in this section, we can say that intentional maintenance of culture, whether tangible or intangible, requires a deep understanding of the local society and history with professionals’ help and primary heirs’ collaboration.

All four chapters in Part I focus on dissonance between inter-/national interests and local realities, which has been demonstrated theoretically (Tunbridge and Ashworth 1996) and empirically. The latter was especially achieved by anthropologists in both tangible (Brumann and Berliner 2016) and intangible heritage (Foster and Gilman 2015). Because heritagization is a type of global valorization and utilization of local resources, adjustment is essential. If the adjustment is not smooth, “the creation of heritage is also the creation of heritage conflicts” (Meskell 2015). In this context, the four chapters might

be regarded as showing no more than phenomena in a general current. The reason for my emphasis on such critics is twofold. First, an ethnographic description of a particular phenomenon is an urgent issue to improve the miscommunication between the inter-/national and the local, especially in cases of UNESCO heritage that keep growing in number. For World Heritage sites and Intangible Cultural Heritage elements, numerous follow-up projects have been conducted after their inscriptions into the UNESCO lists. Nevertheless, the number of primary heirs for one site or element is generally so large that secondary heirs cannot organize such a large project to cover all their ideas in a limited period. Ethnographic descriptions are, as the contributors show in this book, expected to fill this lack of information. Second, the four contributors' ethnographic strategy focusing on primary heirs' practices is a promising—possibly the best—way to elucidate the local realities. Tangible sites and monuments as well as Intangible Cultural Heritage draw attention to their forms and appearance: landscapes, rituals, statues, or carvings. Professional practitioners (secondary heirs) often tend to make their reports based on visual data and unavoidably focus less on invisible and in-real-sense intangible data on social (Sacko), religious (Nakamura), political (Keida), and economic (Iida and Sacko) practices. Given this kind of bias in global interests, ethnographers with fewer limitations are expected to mitigate the inter/national-local dissonance, which consequently provides both theoretical and descriptive insights.

Part II “Globalizing Local Culture” discusses external politics that often particularly affect primary heirs. Briefly, Jacqueline Grigo's chapter on traditional medicine in Ivory Coast seems to focus more on the local context, similar to Part I. However, while the chapters in Part I consciously consider international heritage schemes, Grigo considers the impacts of researchers and medical companies (secondary heirs) who prevent indigenous healers from maintaining their knowledge. Although the significant external factor in her case is not heritagization, but the global knowledge system, expansion of individuals' activities forces primary heirs to be conscious of the openness and secrecy of their culture. Ivorian people could model themselves after the Chinese government's heritage strategies, where the latter intentionally and successfully inscribed their traditional medicine in the UNESCO Representative List of the Intangible Cultural Heritage of Humanities in 2020. However, the Chinese government has a much greater financial capability than that of Ivory Coast. Both primary and secondary heirs will have to consider the Ivorian or African course of capacity-building.

Similarly, Allen F. Roberts discusses portraits of a religious leader Sheikh Amadu Bamba as Senegalese autogenic communal symbols, or “visual citizenship” in his term, which is copied and monetarily transacted among people with the help of external digital actors. According to Roberts, Senegalese visual citizenship, which was once extinguished by French colonization of the visual economy, is now exposed to re-colonization by Chinese digital companies. While the consequential similarity between colonialism and global capitalism is an interesting issue, let us focus on the issue of heritage. Copying, transmitting, and sharing of images contributes to the maintenance of community bonds, and this can be an alternative model of heritage irrelevant to the conventional perceptions of “authenticity” in tangible and intangible heritage.

Unlike traditional medicine, digital images and related practices do not seem to be inscribed in UNESCO's list. However, the ethnographic approach to cultural heritage has mutually influenced those of tourism, popular culture, and folklore (Meskell 2015). Roberts's chapter is also a respectable contribution to heritage studies. Imagine that you find myriads of postcards, picture books, key holders, and fridge magnets of World Heritage monuments whenever you visit there, or discover diverse national treasures whenever you visit national museums. Digital copying of images is already an important heritage practice that strengthens and amplifies personal affection for collective symbols. Interestingly, Sheikh Amadu Bamba's worshippers do not exactly correspond to Senegalese nationalities. Unlike World Heritage and Intangible Cultural Heritage, digital products circulate regardless of the nation-state's intentions. Although this movement would not have developed without the global distribution of Photoshop technology, it is not a global but a grassroots movement. In this regard, digital citizenship adapts itself to, and appropriates resources from, global circumstances, similar to traditional medicine.

The inseparability of local culture and global human activities is also the case with Mary Jo Arnoldi's article, which is based on her experience of curating two exhibitions on Africa in the USA at the National Museum of Natural History of the Smithsonian Institute in Washington D.C. She shows that while it was nearly impossible to fulfill all expectations and meet the demands of the "many voices" of the public, she is still committed to long term communication with all groups and communities who express connection to the work on display. She thus reinforces the concept of the exhibition as a process rather than a product (see also Silverman 2015), mirroring the revised definition and understanding of cultural heritage. This project demonstrated that while anthropologists are generally considered secondary heirs, they can nonetheless collaborate with primary heirs, making important contributions to support heritage as a practice that enables people to socially connect with objects, historical records, places, performances, and traditions.

As we have seen, there are many issues regarding cultural heritage and culture. However, these issues are not something to be avoided by withdrawing claims or reclaims from the arena. The support is for people or primary heirs, because many authorities begin to recognize the necessity of people's activities as a motive to safeguard cultural heritage, as well as to promote human abilities. In general terms, culture can be said to be a scaffold for the socially vulnerable to get even with the mainstream, resulting in human diversity against the monolithic industrial world. However, this possibility of "culture for the socially vulnerable" is demonstrated in three chapters in Part III, "The Past in the Present, Present in the Future," together with optimistic perspectives.

Laely reviews the heritagization of *Bushingantahe*, Burundian local juridical authority. Because the notion of culture includes every type of custom, people may naturally claim their customary political system as cultural heritage, as is the case with the Oromo *Gada* system in Ethiopia, which was inscribed in the Representative List of the Intangible Cultural Heritage of Humanity in 2016. Although *Bushingantahe* is not inscribed in any of the UNESCO lists, Laely illustrates its role at both the local and national levels. Cultural heritage is so deeply embedded in the global context that it must

change its form inevitably, as was shown in Part II. Laely's historical vision goes further, however, to suggest that an even political system of the socially vulnerable must be "detoxicated" into a cultural one to survive in the modern settings.

John Mack reviews two burials of African rulers Asantehene (King) Prempeh I, who resisted colonial powers in Ghana, and Ranaivalona III, who were exiled from Madagascar and died in Algiers. Both rulers were deprived of their titles by European colonists, but Prempeh I finally restored his title in part as a local chief. Ranaivalona III was, in contrast, not successful in regaining her right to take charge of royal rituals, thus influencing her power over the subjects. From the viewpoint of heritage studies, it is interesting that the two cases also show a contrast in the meaning of the past for the present. In the successful case of Prempeh I's dynasty, many royal rituals were formed as messages from the king or the royal family to the subjects, because a ritual is analogous to formalized performative language (Connerton 1989: 57–58).⁵ In a sense, it is quite similar to the 19th-century ceremony to commemorate national events. However, the rituals were not merely one-way communications. Through repetitive and synergetic rituals with the King, the subjects not only contributed to the reinforcement of the royal power but also promoted their mutual communications to form a ritual community. In contrast, in Madagascar, because of colonial intervention, a cyclic relationship in which people maintained ritual practices and the authority strengthened their domination was cut off. Instead, Malagasy people vitalized their burial and reburial practices, thereby recreating a sense of community without royal blessings. In both cases, one successful and the other unsuccessful in the reorganization of royal rituals, social practices were generated around the burial and gave rise to a sense of identity between people who were not historically members of the same community. Even if one cannot say that there are heritage forging communities, communities formed through practices may define heritage for their own utility.

The cyclic relationship between ritual practices and people's sense of community also explains modern phenomena. In the concluding chapter, Kenji Yoshida explores the case of festivals in Zambia that started in the 1980s and the 1990s. However, the focus here is not on the "invention of tradition" (Hobsbawm and Ranger 1983) but rather on active cultural movements, whose process seems considerably similar to what Mack described as local practices against colonial intervention. Although Yoshida does not conceal his reliance on people's power to strengthen their identities, he is also cautious in establishing a narrow identity or nationality. Cultural theory should, it seems to me, contribute not to exposing the inauthenticity but to forming open-minded cultural movements. This is not only an African issue, but also concerns the whole world. Domestication of culture and heritage seems, I dare say, a key to the future of humanity and its diversity.

Heritage management from the primary heirs' perspective is not merely an issue of human rights, but also of local empowerment and a dynamic way of maintaining human diversity. To make it work efficiently, we still have many issues to solve, such as internal conflict or global inequality. However, we do not have to withdraw claims or reclaims around these issues, as reconsideration of heritage can easily link them. Discussion of

cultural heritage obviously promotes our understanding of cultural others and the behavior of modern communities, more than history, esthetics, and material preservation.

Notes

- 1) Prior to inscription on the List, historical monuments (cultural heritage) are evaluated by the International Council on Monuments and Sites (ICOMOS), while natural parks (natural heritage) are assessed by the International Union for Conservation of Nature and Natural Resources (IUCN). Intermediate types of heritage (mixed heritage) are evaluated by both institutions, but this type is not clearly defined in the Convention.
- 2) Before the European and American authorities, the Japanese national government had already identified intangible cultural assets for conservation in 1950 (Miyata 2013). The Japanese system provided UNESCO with an important model for the concept of intangible heritage, although UNESCO added some essential modifications to it.
- 3) See Report on the Expert Meeting for the Global Strategy and thematic studies for a representative World Heritage List (UNESCO Headquarters, June 20–22, 1994, <http://whc.unesco.org/archive/global94.htm>). Almost at the same time, the notion of “living heritage” was also proposed as a concept in museum studies (Kirshenblatt-Gimblett 1998: 19–21). In this case, intangible contexts (cultural practices and social networks) within which movable objects were sourced were reappraised and emphasized as culturally important.
- 4) This criterion is stated in Article 41 of the 1997 version of the Operational Guidelines for the Implementation of the World Heritage Convention (<http://whc.unesco.org/archive/opguide97.pdf>) and was still valid in the 2013 version (Article 61; <http://whc.unesco.org/archive/opguide13-en.pdf>).
- 5) Concerning the communicative character of rituals, we have a classic anthropological work that analyzed the formation and formalization of a royal ritual of circumcision in Madagascar (Bloch 1986). In this work, Bloch focused on a ritual, circumcision, which used to be familial before the 18th century, tailored as royal in 19th, and turned familial again in the 20th century. In Bloch’s observation, the ritual process of circumcision in the 20th century was almost the same as that in the 18th. However, throughout the centuries, Malagasy beliefs, including circumcision and its symbolism, came to the fore in anti-Protestant movements during colonialization, and in the protest against urban elites just after independence (Bloch 1986: 155; 163). This historical fact is, therefore, an evidence that rituals can be a community symbol or cultural heritage to manipulate for political purposes.

References

- Antheier, H. and Y. R. Isar (eds.)
 2011 *Heritage, Memory and Identity* (The Cultures and Globalization Series 4). London: SAGE.
- Bauman, Z.
 2000 *Liquid Modernity*. Cambridge: Polity.

- Bendix, R.
2009 *Heritage between Economy and Politics: An Assessment from the Perspective of Cultural Anthropology*. In L. Smith and N. Akagawa (eds.) *Intangible Heritage*, pp. 253–269. London: Routledge.
- Bloch, M.
1986 *From Blessing to Violence: History and Ideology in the Circumcision Ritual of the Merina of Madagascar*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Brumann, C. and D. Berliner (eds.)
2016 *World Heritage on the Ground: Ethnographic Perspectives*. New York: Berghahn Books.
- Clifford, J.
1988 *The Predicament of Culture: Twenty-Century Ethnography, Literature, and Art*. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
- Cole, J.
2001 *Forget Colonialism?: Sacrifice and the Art of Memory in Madagascar*. Berkeley: University of California Press.
- Connerton, P.
1989 *How Societies Remember*. New York: Cambridge University Press.
- Coombes, A. E.
2003 *History after Apartheid: Visual Culture and Public Memory in a Democratic South Africa*. Durham: Duke University Press.
- Dunlap, T. R.
1999 *Nature and the English Diaspora: Environment and History in the United States, Canada, Australia, and New Zealand*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Foster, M. D. and L. Gilman (eds.)
2015 *UNESCO on the Ground: Local Perspectives on Intangible Cultural Heritage*. Bloomington: Indiana University Press.
- French, B. M.
2012 The Semiotics of Collective Memories. *Annual Review of Anthropology* 41: 337–353.
- Giddens, A.
1991 *Modernity and Self-Identity: Self and Society in the Late Modern Age*. Stanford: Stanford University Press.
- Hall, S.
1980 Cultural Studies: Two Paradigms. *Media, Culture, and Society* 2(1): 57–72.
2007 Cultural Studies and the Centre: Some Problematics and Problems. In the Centre for Contemporary Cultural Studies, University of Birmingham (ed.) *Culture, Media, Language* (Working Papers in Cultural Studies, 1972–1979), pp. 15–47. London: Hutchinson.
- Harvey, D. C.
2001 Heritage Pasts and Heritage Presents: Temporality, Meaning and the Scape of Heritage Studies. *International Journal of Heritage Studies* 7(4): 319–338.
- Hirai, K. (ed.)
2015 *Social Movements and the Production of Knowledge: Body, Practice, and Society in*

- East Asia* (Senri Ethnological Studies 91). Osaka: National Museum of Ethnology.
- Hobsbawm, E. and T. Ranger (eds.)
 1983 *The Invention of Tradition*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Isar, Y. R.
 2011 UNESCO and Heritage: Global Doctrine, Global Practice. In H. Anheier and Y. R. Isar (eds.) *Heritage, Memory and Identity*, pp. 39–52. London: SAGE Publications.
- Kawaguchi, Y.
 2008 Covering Heritages, Erasing Locals: Passing on History to the Next Generation. In K. Yoshida and J. Mack (eds.) *Preserving the Cultural Heritage of Africa: Crisis or Renaissance?* pp. 129–139. Woodbridge: James Currey.
- Kirshenblatt-Gimblett, B.
 1995 Theorizing Heritage. *Ethnomusicology* 39(3): 367–380.
 1998 *Destination Culture*. Berkeley: University of California Press.
- Kluckhohn, C. and W. H. Kelly
 1945 The Concept of Culture. In R. Linton (ed.) *The Science of Man in the World Crisis*, pp. 78–106. New York: Columbia University Press.
- Lambek, M. J.
 2002 *The Weight of the Past: Living with History in Mahajanga, Madagascar*. New York: Palgrave Macmillan.
- Lowenthal, D.
 1985 *The Past is a Foreign Country*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Meskill, L.
 2015 Introduction: Globalizing Heritage. In L. Meskill (ed.) *Global Heritage: A Reader*, pp. 1–21. West Sussex: Wiley Blackwell.
- Meyer, J. M.
 1997 Gifford Pinchot, John Muir, and the Boundaries of Politics in American Thought. *Polity* 30(2): 267–284.
- Miyata, S.
 2013 Intangible Cultural Heritage Policy in Japan. In L. Arizpe and C. Amescua (eds.) *Anthropological Perspectives on Intangible Cultural Heritage*, pp. 83–101. Cham: Springer.
- Nielsen, B.
 2011 UNESCO and the ‘Right’ Kind of Culture: Bureaucratic Production and Articulation. *Critique of Anthropology* 31(4): 273–292.
- Rowlands, M.
 2002 Heritage and Cultural Property. In V. Buchli (ed.) *The Material Culture Reader*, pp. 105–133. Oxford: Berg.
- Silverman, R. A. (ed.)
 2015 *Museum as Process: Translating Local and Global Knowledges*. London: Routledge.
- Small, C.
 1998 *Musicking: The Meaning of Performing and Listening*. Middletown: Wesleyan University Press.

Stefano, M. L.

- 2012 Reconfiguring the Framework: Adopting an Ecomuseological Approach for Safeguarding Intangible Cultural Heritage. In M. L. Stefano, P. Davis, and G. Corsane (eds.) *Safeguarding Intangible Cultural Heritage*, pp. 223–238. Woodbridge: The Boydell Press.

Tsing, A. L.

- 2005 *Friction: An Ethnography of Global Connection*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

Tunbridge, J. E. and G. J. Ashworth

- 1996 *Dissonant Heritage: The Management of the Past as a Resource in Conflict*. New York: John Willey & Sons.

Tylor, E. B.

- 1958 *The Origins of Culture*. New York: Harper Torchbooks.

Umino, R.

- 2008 A Backyard (Hi)story: Doing Geskiedenis among Griqua People in South Africa. In K. Yoshida and J. Mack (eds.) *Preserving the Cultural Heritage of Africa: Crisis or Renaissance?* pp. 27–42. Woodbridge: James Currey.

Werbner, R. (ed.)

- 1998 *Memory and the Postcolony: African Anthropology and the Critique of Power*. London: Zed Books.

Williams, R.

- 1960 *Culture and Society, 1790–1950*. New York: Anchor Books.

World Heritage Committee

- 2007 Convention Concerning the Protection of the World Cultural and Natural Heritage Thirty First Session. WHC-07/31.COM/13B; <http://whc.unesco.org/archive/2007/whc07-31com-13be.pdf> (viewed on 30 September 2015)

Yoshida, K. and J. Mack (eds.)

- 2008 *Preserving the Cultural Heritage of Africa: Crisis or Renaissance?* Suffolk: James Currey.

Part I

Refurbishment of UNESCO Heritage

Hidden Cultural Heritage: Tourism and Belief Concerning the UNESCO World Heritage of Kilwa Island on the Southern Swahili Coast in Tanzania

Ryo Nakamura
Fukuoka University

1. Introduction

This chapter discusses the reconciliation of tourism activities and religious practices concerning the UNESCO World Heritage Site of Kilwa Island (Kilwa Kisiwani) in the southern part of the United Republic of Tanzania. Based on cultural anthropology research results, this chapter raises specific issues for the coexistence of both local and universal values of cultural heritage.

Kilwa Island has stone ruins of mosques, palaces, fort, and cemeteries constructed from coral rocks, which were inscribed on the UNESCO World Heritage List in 1981. These stone ruins are precious cultural heritage that narrates the history of ethnic and cultural exchanges on the East African Coast (Swahili Coast) influenced by the Indian Ocean trade with Arab and Persian regions, as well as the European Age of Exploration.

My first visit to Kilwa Island was in 2001. At that time, it was the only place designated as a cultural heritage site on UNESCO's World Heritage List in Tanzania. However, the stone ruins were poorly managed and were nearly buried among bushes



(1a)



(1b)

Photos 1a and 1b Stone ruins had been nearly buried in bushes; Husuni Kubwa (1a) and Makutani Palace (1b) (by the author in 2002)

(Photos 1a and 1b). Less than 300 tourists annually visited the island at that time. Based on these impressions, I thought that the people of the island had few ties with the stone ruins. However, as my field research progressed, I found that some stone ruins were holy places on Kilwa Island. Secret practices and beliefs were passed down in the hidden cultural heritage shielded from the public eye.

The purpose of the Convention on the Protection of the World Cultural and Natural Heritage (the World Heritage Convention) is to protect cultural and natural heritage, or mixed heritage, considered to be of outstanding universal value to humanity. The people of Kilwa Island live within a World Heritage Site. In that case, what does it mean to live with outstanding universal value to humanity?

During my initial field research on Kilwa Island, I believed that the people were proud of the fact that their history and culture had gained worldwide recognition and the UNESCO World Heritage status could be used as a resource for regional promotion through tourism. However, up to the present, the management of the World Heritage property, including tourism development, has neither been well accepted by the people nor made them proud, while making little contribution to regional promotions. Conversely, people in a politically weak position suffer from various activities surrounding World Heritage sites.

The fundamental cause is that those working for World Heritage and the local people have different perspectives on stone ruins. In other words, those working for World Heritage see the stone ruins as a place of archaeological value to preserve eternally.¹⁾ However, the local people see some of the stone ruins as sacred places linked to their beliefs. For the inhabitants, the stone ruins are still a “living heritage.”

From the standpoint of protecting and preserving the World Heritage property, the people who perform rituals within stone ruins without permission or tolerate the intrusion of livestock animals do not respect the value of cultural heritage and must therefore be educated. The daily practices of the local people are even considered obstacles to the protection of cultural heritage. Consequently, the activities of these people have been restricted around the World Heritage site, and people’s knowledge and techniques regarding stone ruins have been ignored.²⁾ One of the values unique to the island was not included in the evaluation of its World Heritage status.

However, the way UNESCO thinks about cultural heritage has evolved recently; UNESCO initially put emphasis on the tangible aspect or universal value of cultures, but nowadays, they cover a wide range of intangible elements based on the value unique to the area. This is exemplified by the Convention for the Safeguarding of Intangible Cultural Heritage (the Intangible Cultural Heritage Convention) adopted in 2003 at the UNESCO General Assembly. The convention defines intangible cultural heritages, *inter alia*, as oral traditions and expressions; performing arts; social practices, rituals, and festive events; knowledge and practices concerning nature and the universe; and traditional craftsmanship practiced by communities, groups and, in some cases, individuals. UNESCO used to emphasize the relevance of universal value, but now they have started to value the bearers of cultures and their diversities.

Considering the philosophy of intangible cultural heritage, the practices and beliefs

of the people on Kilwa Island, which have been treated as obstacles to the protection of World Heritage, can now be acknowledged as a living heritage. However, the Intangible Cultural Heritage Convention and the World Heritage Convention are two different conventions. Therefore, the new philosophy of intangible cultural heritage has not infiltrated the activities surrounding the existing World Heritage property. If we look at the case of the management of World Heritage on Kilwa Island, the practices within the stone ruins have yet to be considered as a living heritage.

The difficulties and challenges of living with World Heritage caused by these differences in perspectives toward the stone ruins between the local people and those working for the World Heritage of Kilwa Island are discussed ahead. This chapter first provides an overview of the history of Kilwa Island and the significance of its stone ruins, followed by a description of how the people have protected their links with the stone ruins through practices and beliefs.

2. Livelihoods on Kilwa Island and the History of the Kingdom

2.1 A Small Islamic Seashore Village

Kilwa, at latitude 9°S, is a small island located at a short distance off the southern Tanzanian coast. The island is about 23km in circumference, 12km² in land area, and supports less than 1,000 inhabitants who live on the island with the World Heritage property. Most of the people there are pious Muslims who value the good deeds of Islam, such as worship, *zakat*, and fasting.³⁾ Situated offshore from where three rivers converge, Kilwa Island has a coastline covered with mangroves on the continental side, as well as fringing reefs on the side of the open sea (Figure 1).

Administratively, Kilwa Island belongs to the Kilwa district of the Lindi region in Tanzania (*Wilaya ya Kilwa, Mkoa wa Lindi*). Kilwa Masoko, where the administrative office of Kilwa district is established, is on the mainland, about 2km from Kilwa Island.

People there make a living primarily by farming and fishing, securing staple food through farming and earning cash through fisheries. Because there are no facilities for tourists, such as souvenir shops, accommodation facilities, or restaurants, almost no revenue has been generated from tourism. Although the island has a World Heritage property, the people who live there hardly gain economic benefits from it.

Lindi Region, to which Kilwa Island belongs, has been regarded as an area with the slowest economic growth in the country (Maghimbi 1997). The region was frequently isolated in the past because traffic was paralyzed and distribution channels were blocked during the period of heavy rain (*masika*: March to May). Kilwa Island is a small seashore village without electricity or water supply facilities; however, the island has a glorious history as a Muslim sultanate: the Kilwa Kingdom, which flourished due to the gold trade during the Middle Ages through the Indian Ocean trade network with the Arab/Persian regions.




Figure 1 Kilwa island and the natural environment in the Kilwa coastal region (Nakamura 2013)

2.2 History of the Rise and Fall of the Kilwa Kingdom

The history of the Kilwa Kingdom is closely linked with the Indian Ocean trade between the East African Coast and the Arab/Persian regions, for which people sailed in wooden plank-structured boats called Dhow, taking advantage of the monsoons. They headed south along the East African coast during the northeast monsoon season and stayed in trading ports until the southwest monsoon season. Male sailors married local women and had multiracial children, who later became the bearer of the culture along the East African Coast (Swahili culture). This is why the Swahili culture is called an “Afro-Asian mixed-blood culture.”

According to *Kilwa Chronicle*, written in Arabic by an unknown author around 1520, which narrates the story of the Kilwa Kingdom from its beginning to the 16th century, Husain bin Ali, the sultan of Shiraz (present-day Iran), migrated to the East African Coast in the middle of the 10th century with his six sons. During the voyage, the seven boats were separated, but one of them, the boat of Ali bin Husain (one of the sultan’s sons) arrived at Kilwa Island.⁴⁾ He became the first sultan of the kingdom.

From the middle of the 12th century onward, the Kilwa Kingdom flourished as the intermediate port of the Indian Ocean trade to export Great Zimbabwe’s gold from Sofala, located on the coast of present-day Mozambique.

In the first half of the 14th century, during the period of the 21st sultan Al-Hasan bin Sulaiman, the kingdom was at the peak of its prosperity owing to its monopoly on the gold trade. Ibn Battuta, a Moroccan Muslim traveler who visited the kingdom around 1331, wrote, “Kilwa is one of the most beautiful and well-constructed towns in the world” (Davidson 1991; Ibn Battuta 1998[1964]).

However, during the period of the 22nd sultan Daud bin Sulaiman, the gold market in Europe became saturated and the gold prices dropped, which triggered the decline of the kingdom. What made the decline more decisive was the Portuguese intrusion into the Western Indian Ocean. The Kilwa Kingdom was occupied immediately in 1505 by a Portuguese soldier, Francisco de Almeida. Sofala (in the south of the Zambezi and present-day Mozambique) had already been placed under Portuguese rule a year earlier, and Portugal wrested the control of the gold trade from the Kilwa Kingdom.

The Portuguese continued to invade trading ports successively, such as Mombasa and Malindi (in the present-day coastal area of Kenya). However, they withdrew from the sphere of Omani influence north of Zanzibar after their defeats against the allied forces of the Kingdom of Oman and trading ports in 1698.

Afterward, the Kingdom of Oman expanded its forces along the East African coast. At the beginning of the 19th century, the sultan of Oman, Sayyid Said, moved its capital to Zanzibar (off the coast of present-day Tanzania) in pursuit of commercial profits from tropical products, such as ivory, cloves, and slaves. Thus, the Omani monopoly of the Indian Ocean trade continued until Zanzibar became a British protectorate in 1890 (Tominaga 1992).

At the end of the 18th century, the Kilwa Kingdom experienced a brief revival through slave trade with Zanzibar and France (Mauritius and Reunion). However, Kilwa Kivinje, the port used for the slave trade, was located on the mainland (about 26km north of Kilwa Island), instead of the island kingdom. By that time, the island kingdom had lost its function as a trading port. When the last sultan was deported to Oman around 1843, the great history of the Kilwa Kingdom, which lasted for about 900 years, was brought to an end.

2.3 Complex Ethnic Composition of Kilwa Island Society

Reflecting its long history as an international trading port, Kilwa Island is an Islamic multi-ethnic society. During field research in 2005, a total of 573 individuals belonging to 28 different ethnic groups or identities, organized in 101 households were counted (Table 1). There are descendants of those from East Africa, including Tanzania, Kenya, Mozambique, and the Comoro Islands (Bantu-speaking people), as well as those whose origins can be traced to Arabia and Persia. Kilwa Island is a super-multiethnic society where around 28 ethnic groups live together (Nakamura 2011a). Although we refer to them as “inhabitants” of Kilwa Island, they are not a monolithic group. This becomes a problem when the government or international organizations such as UNESCO, World Wide Fund for Nature (WWF), and the World Bank operate on the island.

Table 1 Ethnic composition of Kilwa Island

Group	Identity	Original Place	Num.	% (people)		
Bantu-speakers	1	Mwera	Kilwa region	105	18.3	57.4 (329)
	2	Matumbi	Kilwa region	39	6.8	
	3	Myao	around lake Malawi	36	6.3	
	4	Nyasa	around lake Malawi	33	5.8	
	5	Ngindo	around lake Malawi	32	5.6	
	6	Machinga	Mtwara region	30	5.2	
	7	Msongo	Songo Mnara Island	17	3.0	
	8	Nbana	Pande region	16	2.8	
	9	Makonde	Southern Tanzania	13	2.3	
	10	Makua	Southern Tanzania	3	0.5	
	11	Ngoni	around lake Malawi	3	0.5	
	12	Mbisa	around lake Malawi	1	0.2	
	13	Zaramo	around Dar es Salaam	1	0.2	
	14	Malindi	Kenya coast	40	6.7	24.1 (138)
	15	Pande	Pande region	36	6.3	
	16	Kisiwani	Kilwa Island	20	3.5	
	17	Lamu	Northern Kenya coast	12	1.8	
	18	Somali	Southern Somalia coast	8	1.4	
	19	Rufiji	Rufiji region	6	1.0	
	20	—	Somewhere in the Northern Swahili Coast	5	0.9	
	21	Mafia	Mafia Island	4	0.7	
	22	Comoro	Comoro Islands	4	0.7	
	23	Mozambique	Northern Mozambique	2	0.3	
	24	Zanzibar	Zanzibar Island	1	0.2	
Others	25	Yemen	Yemen	54	9.4	13.1 (75)
	26	Shirazi	Persia (Iran)	9	1.6	
	27	Mshihiri	Hadhramaut	6	1.0	
	28	Dubai	U. A. E.	6	1.0	
Unknown			31	5.4		
Total			573 people			

n=573 person, 101 houses, based on the field research conducted in 2005
(Correction to Nakamura 2011a)

The inhabitants can be divided into the descendants of Bantu speakers (hereinafter “Bantu people”) and descendants of Arabians or Persians (hereinafter “Arab-descendants”). There is an evident economic gap between the two groups of Kilwa society. Depending on their occupation, some families are relatively wealthy, such as small shop owners, Islamic high school teachers, and government employees, the Arab-descendants who manage the salt industry, and Bantu people who are traditional healers (*mganga*). Families of Arab-descendants are generally wealthier because they are involved in more complex employment, such as fisheries, the salt industry, and sea transportation, while most Bantu people engage in self-sufficient livelihoods, particularly traditional fisheries and agriculture.

When international organizations or governmental agencies begin projects on Kilwa Island, the first people to contact, in most cases, are Arab-descendants. The opinions of Arab-descendants are more likely to be reflected in projects than those of Bantu people,

even though the latter comprise about 80% of the resident population. Furthermore, the elderly have a higher social status on Kilwa Island. Therefore, matters in the village are decided by the elders' council, which consists of male Bantu and Arab-descendant elders.⁵⁾ Opinions of young Bantu people and women are rarely reflected in the decisions made in the village.

Unless we fully understand that Kilwa Island is a super-multiethnic society and there are gaps among the ethnic groups, generations, and gender, the participation and cooperation of the inhabitants in the programs will be unbalanced.

3. World Heritage Property on Kilwa Island

While the Kilwa Kingdom went through its rise and fall, a number of coral rock structures were built. After the collapse of the kingdom, an excavation team led by British archeologist Neville Chittick discovered buildings that were half buried in the ground. The results of excavation surveys conducted on Kilwa Island from the 1950s to the 1960s were compiled in bulky two-volume books entitled *Kilwa: An Islamic Trading City on the East African Coast* (Chittick 1974a; 1974b).

These historical and archeological studies helped acknowledge the universal value of the stone ruins on Kilwa Island. Consequently, the ruins of Kilwa Island (Kisiwani) and Songo Mnara were inscribed on the UNESCO World Heritage List in 1981 as Tanzania's first cultural heritage.⁶⁾ However, this registration was requested by outsiders and not by the local people. Thus, one day, suddenly, the local people were forced to live with the outstanding universal value to humanity.

The stone ruins of Kilwa Island can be divided into four groups: mosques, palaces/houses, forts, and cemeteries (Table 2). The mosques, palaces, and forts were located near the village. The cemeteries were located around or outside the village (Figure 2). This section introduces some of the stone ruins designated as "principal monuments" by UNESCO.

Table 2 Classification of "Principal Monuments" on Kilwa Island

Builder	Kind	Name	Century	Location
Arabian or Persian	Mosque	Great Mosque	11	①
		Small Domed Mosque	15	②
		Malindi Mosque	15	⑦
		Jangwani Mosque	15	⑨
		Mvinje Mosque	15	⑪
		Husuni Ndogo	14–17	⑩
	Palace, House	Husuni Kubwa	14–17	③
		Makutani Palace	15	④
		Great House	14–15	⑧
	Cemetery	Shiraz	16	—
Malindi		18	⑥	
40 Shehe		18	—	
Sake		?	—	
Portuguese	Fort	Gereza	16	⑤

* The location number corresponds to the number shown in Figure 2.




Figure 2 Distribution of stone ruins on Kilwa Island (Chittick 1974a; Nakamura 2006)

*The number corresponds to that of Table 2.

3.1 Mosques: Great Mosque and Small Domed Mosque

There are a number of mosque ruins on Kilwa Island. The most impressive among them is the Great Mosque (*Msikiti mkuu*) with its arch structure and domed roof, which is considered one of the largest mosques in East Africa (Photos 2a and 2b). The mosque is 42m × 24m in size, and the highest point of the dome is 6m above the ground. It consists of the northern and southern prayer halls constructed in the 11th and the 14th centuries, respectively.

The Small Domed Mosque (*Msikiti mdogo*), which was built around the 14th century, is considered to be a mosque used by sultans. It is a nine-domed mosque with arched octagonal columns supporting the ceiling. The pillar sticking out from the top of the central dome is characteristic of the mosque (Photo 3).



(2a)



(2b)

Photos 2a and 2b Great Mosque

Well-constructed domed roof (2a) and arch structures (2b) (by the author in 2010)



Photo 3 Small Domed Mosque. A pillar protruding from the top of the central dome (by the author in 2009)

3.2 Sultan's Palaces: Husuni and Makutani

Husuni Kubwa is a palace built around the 14th century when the Kilwa Kingdom was at its peak. The term *husuni* is derived from an Arabian word *husn*, implying “fortress, forts or castles” (Johnson 1989[1939]). It was unrivaled at that time in East Africa for its scale and architectural sophistication. It has an auditorium, a domestic court, and an octagonal pool (Figure 3, Photo 4), indicating the power of the sultans.

The term *makutani* means “long wall or big wall” in Swahili. Makutani Palace was built around the 15th century. It was the residence of sultans, standing on about two hectares of land and surrounded by long walls (Photo 5). Because it was located at the point of Kilwa Island farthest from the outer sea and surrounded by long walls with watchtowers, we can see that this palace was built with a strong focus on protection from enemy invasions.




Figure 3 An expected completion image of Husuni Kubwa (Garlake 1966)



Photo 4 An octagonal pool in Husuni Kubwa
(by the author in 2012)



Photo 5 Makutani Palace, with big and long walls
(by the author in 2012)



Photo 6 Gereza, located at the harbor of Kilwa Island
(by the author in 2008)

3.3 Fort: Gereza

Gereza is a fort built in the 16th century when the Portuguese occupied the Kilwa Kingdom (Photo 6). It was extended in the 19th century after the Portuguese withdrew, and the Kingdom was ruled by the Kingdom of Oman in Zanzibar. It is the only structure of Portuguese origin among the stone ruins of Kilwa Island, while the rest are of Islamic origin.

3.4 Cemeteries

There are many cemeteries on the island, such as Shiraz, 40 Shehe, Malindi, and Sake. Usually, Muslims are buried with a headstone and footstone (thin plate-shaped gravestones) in such a way that the head faces Mecca in Saudi Arabia. However, the graves of the royal family, prominent Islamic teachers, and saints have stone structures, in addition to plate-shaped gravestones. For example, there is a grave modeled after the Small Domed Mosque in the Malindi Cemetery (Photo 7). The graves at Sake and 40 Shehe have rectangular enclosures. In the Shiraz cemetery, there are graves with a pillar protruding from the rectangular enclosure, considered to be male tombs (Photo 8).



Photo 7 A tomb in the Malindi Cemetery
The design resembles that of the Small
Domed Mosque
(by the author in 2013)



Photo 8 A tomb with pillars in the Shiraz Cemetery
(by the author in 2010)

3.5 Difficulties of Living with World Heritage

The stone ruins mentioned above are considered “principal monuments” by UNESCO. However, the structures from the kingdom period are described in cultural heritage documents as “ruins”; therefore, the remains buried underground are also included in the World Heritage property. To protect the potential of cultural heritage, Tanzania’s Ministry of Natural Resources and Tourism has designated the entire area where stone ruins are located as a World Heritage site and put restrictions on people’s activities within the site. However, as we can see from the distribution of stone ruins in Figure 2, the principal monuments and the communities are located adjacent to each other; thus, entire communities are included in the World Heritage Site. This has caused significant inconvenience to local people.

For example, they are forbidden to dig the ground without permission, even inside their properties, to protect the cultural heritage that might be buried underground from damage. They cannot freely dig toilet holes and must obtain rocks for house construction from remote locations. This angered some inhabitants, causing them to destroy stone ruins buried in the forest and use them for building purposes.

Moreover, some people were in the process of building a restaurant for tourists as a joint capital investment near the Gereza Fort, which is the gateway to Kilwa Island. However, just when it was almost completed, they were ordered to stop construction by the Antiquities Division of the Kilwa government and had to abandon it before its completion (Photo 9). It is also prohibited to build accommodation facilities for tourists on the island. Some inhabitants complain that tourists spend money on staying and eating in a town located on the opposite shore instead on the island itself. Tourists’ bad behavior also causes problems. For example, female tourists walking around in swimwear are intolerable to the Muslim community, and tourists taking pictures without permission is disrespectful to inhabitants.

People’s everyday lives are restricted, and their ideas for regional promotion have been eliminated. Although governmental agencies have emphasized tourism development,



Photo 9 An abandoned restaurant built near Gereza
(by the author in 2016)

they lack consideration for those who live with World Heritage sites and discourage regional promotion. Top-down tourism development brings no benefits to local people. Moreover, it is becoming a serious problem that interferes with the practices and beliefs of the island, as described next.

4. Links between Local People and World Heritage through Belief

According to the records maintained by the Antiquities Division of the Kilwa government, only 219 tourists on average visited the World Heritage Property per year between 1993 and 2001. However, the number of tourists has increased with development. For example, the transportation infrastructure connecting the Kilwa region with urban areas such as Dar es Salaam has been constructed, and several resort hotels have been built on the beach of Kilwa Masoko. The record shows that the number of tourists was 829 in 2005 and 1,334 in 2006 (Ministry of Natural Resources and Tourism 2007). Moreover, a further increase was observed: 2,112 in 2014 and 3,333 in 2015 (personal communication with the Ministry of Natural Resources and Tourism in 2016).

A significant increase in the number of tourists has led to a new issue surrounding World Heritage Sites. Important cemeteries and graves associated with people's beliefs are listed on the tourist map. After viewing the map, tourists have started to enter these places without permission. Because the official tour guides who show the tourists around are not from Kilwa Island, they do not understand the beliefs unique to the island, which is why they take tourists to cemeteries without any scruples. There is a complex world of beliefs about Kilwa Island. Those working around World Heritage Sites need to learn that some of the ruins are sacred places closely associated with local beliefs.

In societies located along the East African Coast (Swahili Maritime Society), Islam spread from early on, and currently, many Muslims live there. Nonetheless, Islam is not the only form of belief there. People also have other spiritual beliefs. This is an Islamic subculture, but it has taken roots culturally with a rich worldview and is practiced by people in a unified, structured manner (Nakamura 2011b).

According to the anthropologist John Middleton, non-living intermediaries in the Swahili maritime society can be divided into *jini* and *mzimu* (Middleton 1992). The term *mzimu* means “ancestors’ spirit” and the word *koma* is also used on Kilwa Island with a similar meaning. The term *jini* means “spirits” and their existence is acknowledged in the Koran as “a creation of God” similar to human beings. People also worship Prophet Muhammad (*Mtume*), Angels of Islam (*malaika*), Saints of Sufism (*Shehe*), and magic (*uchawi*). Some of the stone ruins on Kilwa Island are places linked with the worship of spirits and ancestors.

Many people have witnessed *jini*, who cannot usually be seen, at the palaces of the sultans and the Great Mosque. In particular, at Husuni Kubwa, many witnesses have seen *jini* at night, and people say that there is a town of *jini* underground.

Many of the stone ruins of Kilwa Island are located near the village, but Husuni Kubwa stands on a small hill far from the village, facing the Indian Ocean. When the rehabilitation project of Husuni Kubwa was about to begin, it was decided that night guards should be deployed there to guard the equipment. However, no one showed any interest in becoming a night guard because those who live on Kilwa Island believe that *jini* gather around Husuni Kubwa at night and were too scared to stay there at night. Consequently, a strong lock was installed on the warehouse, and the hut for the night guards was built at a distance from Husuni Kubwa. The people were so afraid of going near Husuni Kubwa during the night that no guards were necessary because even thieves would have been afraid of *jini*.

The people are tolerant about tourists going to the stone ruins where *jini* live during the day. However, they do not like tourists to visit without permission the cemeteries where they worship Allah through their ancestors’ spirits.

5. Cemeteries as Places of Worship

The people who live on Kilwa Island perform a ritual called *dua* to pray to Allah through their ancestors’ spirits for success before engaging in important tasks, such as boat construction or large-scale fishing (Photo 10). The ritual is usually performed under the guidance of an Islamic leader. It can occur anywhere, such as the house of the organizer. However, if one has a “big wish,” the ritual may occur at a cemetery. A “big wish” means a wish beyond human knowledge or ability, for example, immediate and extreme economic success or cursing a person to death. When people want to satisfy an intense desire, they avoid the public eye while they go to the cemeteries because they sometimes get involved in *uchawi* (a bad form of magic [sorcery] that intends to harm someone).

Cemeteries are usually called *kaburi* (pl. *makaburi*); however, the cemeteries where worship rituals occur are specifically called *tembe* (pl. *matembe*). Hereinafter, they will be referred to as “place(s) of worship.”

The places that the people on Kilwa Island use for worship are the cemeteries such as Shiraz, 40 Shehe, Sake, Shehe Ndembo, and Chani (on the southern part of the island). To use these places of worship, people must follow certain rules. For example, they must visit on a designated day of the week (e.g., Wednesday in the case of the Sake



Photo 10 A scene of *dua* ritual (by the author in 2013)

cemetery) or use certain clothes, offerings, or prayers. When the place of worship has a supervisor, they must obtain permission for use.

At places of worship, they first sweep the area clean. Then, they stay and sleep there for three days without eating any food. During that time, the Koran is read, and frankincense (*ubani*) or incense sticks (*udi*) are burned. A ritual called *kafara* for offering a sacrifice is sometimes performed using a chicken, goat, or sheep. Such practices vary from place to place, as shown in the following.

Shiraz Cemetery — Supervised by the Shiraz People

The Shiraz cemetery is considered to be the graveyard of the royal family of Shiraz, who established the Kilwa Kingdom. The people who call themselves the descendants of the royal family and live on or off Kilwa Island supervise the cemetery and use it as a place of worship.

40 Shehe Cemetery — Supervised by the Sharif

The cemetery of 40 Shehe is a place where 40 shehe (sheikh) who died on the same day at the end of the 18th century were buried. The Swahili word *shehe* is equivalent to the Arabic word *shaykh*, meaning “elder, old person,” especially an “important person/saint in Islam.”

A person of Arab descent who is given the title of Sharif, implying a descendant of Prophet Muhammad, supervises the 40 Shehe cemetery. Those who wish to use it as a place of worship must ask the Sharif for permission. Unlike the Shiraz cemetery, anyone can use it irrespective of their origin, as long as permission is obtained from the Sharif. People consider it a powerful place of worship, probably because as many as 40 shehe are buried there. Many people even from outside the island visit this place.

Sake Cemetery — Supervised by the Village Chief

The village chief of Kilwa Island, called *ubalozi*, supervises the Sake cemetery. The *ubalozi* is different from the village chair, called *mwenikiti wa kijiji*, who is in charge of administrative work. The *ubalozi* is a traditional chief who maintains order in the village

by advising in case of civil complaints, and so on. He used to be in a position to govern the representatives in charge of ten houses of the village, but now only gets involved in marital quarrels or disputes among the people. His status appears to have been lowered; however, he still assumes the important role of supervising the Sake cemetery. Those who wish to use the Sake cemetery for worship must ask the *ubalozi* for his permission. Upon doing so, they give him cash or chickens.

Shehe Ndembo Cemetery — Used by the First President Julius Nyerere

The person who supervises the Shehe Ndembo Cemetery is unknown. When I first visited the cemetery, it had been swept clean, and a plate used to burn incense was left behind. This suggests that someone had performed a worship ceremony a few days earlier. Existing archeological studies do not mention this cemetery, and the Antiquities Division of the Kilwa government also has no knowledge of it. However, it is known on the island as a place of worship used by Julius Nyerere, the first president of Tanzania.

While practices of worship are supported by local beliefs, even outsiders can potentially become worshippers through such mysterious experiences as I had. I began studying the world of belief on Kilwa Island around 2003, the third year of my field research on the island. During the process, I learned that some cemeteries were associated with ancestor worship and began visiting them with my friend M (name withheld for privacy reasons).

One day when I was out on field research, I visited the Sake cemetery with M without following the rules of the place of worship (visiting the cemetery on a specific day of the week, wearing the right clothes, obtaining permission from the village chief). That night, *wanga* came to M's house. *Wanga* are not spiritual beings. They are human (mostly old people), but rather peculiar people who wander around the village naked at night. They sometimes come in groups late in the night and make a strange noise in front of a house using flutes, whistles, and drums, trying to keep the people in the house awake and making them tired. *Wanga* may seem strange, but they serve as an indirect warning to those who break the rules of the village by making noise in front of their houses in the middle of the night. Therefore, M immediately understood that the reason for the *wanga*'s visit was their way of warning us for breaking the rules when we visited the Sake Cemetery, which is what he told me.

We followed the rules when we visited the Sake Cemetery for the second time. However, on the way back from Sake, M and I also visited the Shehe Ndembo Cemetery unintentionally. It was a day when visits were not allowed. That night, I could not sleep because many cats kept howling all night. When the morning came, I asked the head of my host family, "I could not sleep last night because the cats were howling so loudly. Did you hear them?" However, he said that he had not heard any cats howling, and he added that the cats' howling was a warning from *wanga* because of my visit to the Shehe Ndembo Cemetery without following the rules.

Even the villagers, as in the case of M, receive a warning if they do not follow the rules of the places of worship. Therefore, it is utterly unacceptable for non-Muslims and

foreigners, including tourists and myself, to visit these places without permission. I believe that *wanga* use warnings to try and protect the order of the holy places. At least, my friend M and the head of my host family interpreted it as such. By the way, that was the only night when I was tormented by the howling of cats.

6. Conclusion: Hidden Cultural Heritage

6.1 Coexistence between World Heritage and Places of Worship

The cultural heritage of Kilwa Island was inscribed on the List of World Heritage in Danger in 2004 because some of the stone ruins were on the verge of collapse. The rehabilitation project led by the Tanzanian government began with cooperation from Japan and France in 2001. The rehabilitation project, which included cultural heritage on the adjacent island of Songo Mnara, continued until 2013. During this time, between May and October 2008, a researcher consigned by UNESCO conducted field research on the intangible cultural heritage of the island. The rehabilitation of the principal stone ruins was completed in 2013, which led to their removal from the List of World Heritage in Danger in 2014.

The Frenchman Pascal J. Bacuez conducted a six-month field research on the intangible cultural heritage of Kilwa Island in 2008. Bacuez is a sociolinguist who began studies on Kilwa Island before me in 1998, and had finished a long-term field survey on Unguja Island, or Zanzibar, before he came to Kilwa Island. He is so proficient in the Swahili language that he wrote a novel in the language (Bacuez 2015), and he has a deep understanding of Swahili culture. I met Bacuez in 2003 on Kilwa Island and had a number of opportunities to conduct field research with him. He led me to study ancestor and *jini* worship.

In his report on the intangible culture of Kilwa Island (Bacuez 2009), Bacuez divided the cultural heritage of the island into those that are associated with local practices and beliefs and those that are not. The intangible cultural heritage associated with local practices and beliefs is the cemeteries used as places of worship. He pointed out that if tourists without permission enter the cemeteries that are strongly tied to the beliefs of the island, the local order will be destroyed. He suggested that “if we consider that ruins-related practices and beliefs might foster social cohesion in the communities, we should remove the holy places from the map available to tourists and classify them as ‘holy places not to be violated’” (Bacuez 2009: 22).

His suggestion aims to achieve a balance between the practices and beliefs that are of local value, and the World Heritage property, which is of universal value, by prohibiting tourists from entering the holy places while allowing them to visit other cultural heritage sites just as they have been allowed to so far. Considering how the World Heritage property has been managed on Kilwa Island, I also agree with his standpoint that the two should coexist through such separation. It suffices for tourists to visit the mosque, palace, and fort if they wish to learn the history of the Kilwa Kingdom. They do not need to go to cemeteries.

The places of worship have survived as a living heritage linked with ancestor

worship because they have been supervised and managed by the local people, separately from the operation of World Heritage sites. Cutting down the trees around the cemeteries or installing the information boards for tourism has nothing to do with the continued existence of the practices and beliefs of the island. Rather, it interferes with the intangible cultural heritage of the island by encouraging the invasion of outsiders.

To achieve the coexistence between the local value unique to the area and the universal value, I believe that “separation” is the best strategy at this point. Considering that living heritage is becoming the key to the operation of the World Heritage Convention, by a clear distinction between the two values, the possibility that the World Heritage on Kilwa Island will become a living heritage linked with local practices and beliefs can be left for the future.

6.2 Secret Places of Worship

The idea of keeping the holy places secret by removing them from the tourist map is not an extreme suggestion, because being “secret” is an important condition for the places of worship. There is a secret place of worship on the island, and most people know nothing about its location and rules. I heard a few years back that there was a place that had the strongest power among the many places of worship on Kilwa Island. However, even when I asked the older residents about it, they all said that they neither knew of any such place nor had they ever heard of such a story.

However, when I visited Kilwa Island in 2012, my friend M, with whom I used to visit cemeteries, said, “I finally found the secret place of worship.” M’s father did not tell him about the place even though he had asked several times, but he found the place by following his older brother, who is a *mganga wa jini* (a traditional doctor using the *jini*’s spiritual power for treatments and rituals), and was about to perform a ritual at the secret place of worship.

Early Wednesday morning (the same day of the week that M’s brother visited the place), M and I went to that place. To my surprise, the place was located only about a ten-minute walk from my house. I had walked around this area many times in the past, but never noticed the existence of a place of worship. After going off the path into the bushes, there was an open space, which was where the secret place of worship was located.

I found this place after twelve years of conducting research on Kilwa Island. It was a mosque-shaped grave constructed from coral rocks (3m × 1.8m, 1.5m high). Half of the ceiling had collapsed, but we could tell that it used to have two domes. It looked like the grave in the Malindi cemetery, which is considered to have been modeled after the Small Domed Mosque (see Photos 3 and 7). Rushed by M, who seemed anxious to leave the place as soon as possible, I took some photos and walked away quickly from this secret place of worship.

Afterward, I was able to find out the name and some rules of this place of worship; however, out of respect for the secret nature of the place, I will not reveal any photo, location, or name in this chapter.

6.3 Hidden Cultural Heritage

During my study on the beliefs of Kilwa Island, I was fortunate to be able to see the secret place of worship with the help of my friend. The existence of this place was shocking for me because I was fully confident that there were no places I did not know of on this small island, owing to my twelve years of experiences there. However, this should not have been a surprise, because people do not easily reveal what is really important. It is all the more true when it comes to worship practices involving secret rituals.

When I asked Bacuez about the secret place of worship, he said he knew about it, as I had expected. M's brother took him in 2008. To keep this place of worship secret, he did not write about it in his 2009 report. Under normal circumstances, I would not have written about this secret place, which the elderly of the island were trying to hide. However, I decided to write about it here because I wanted to show that there is a sacred place and worship practice that people try to hide even from their children.

On Kilwa Island, tourism development concerning UNESCO World Heritage began to disturb the order of places of worship where ancestor worship occurs. Although it was suggested that the holy places be removed from the tourist map and outsiders forbidden from entering them, no action seems to have been taken so far. Irrespective of such concerns, the people of Kilwa Island have protected their practices and beliefs in "hidden cultural heritage" without being captured by the values imposed by outsiders such as World Heritage and tourism developments.

If anthropological heritage studies respect and focus on the practice of its bearers, we need to value practices and beliefs in the hidden cultural heritage of Kilwa Island as a typical example of living heritage that has been protected autonomously by the local people, and keep them secret in accordance with the intentions of the local community.

Notes

- 1) According to the 1981 report by the International Council on Monuments and Sites (ICOMOS 1981), the ruins of Kilwa Kisiwani and Songo Mnara are two archaeological sites of prime importance to the understanding of the Swahili culture, the Islamization of the east coast of Africa and the extensive commerce of the medieval period and the modern era, and fall under Criterion (iii) of the World Heritage selection criteria, which is to "to bear a unique or at least exceptional testimony to a cultural tradition or to a civilization which is living or which has disappeared."
- 2) For example, when constructing a foundation or walls of a building by stacking coral rocks, the people there use a mixture of sand and calcined limestone of coral rocks called *chokaa* between the rocks as a fixative. By burying and setting down the calcined limestone underground for over a year, it becomes "old limestone (*chokaa ya zamani*)," which solidifies harder than the ordinary kind. Because this "old limestone" is used in the ruins, the people were advised to use the same type of limestone for repair, which was ignored.
- 3) The form of Islam practiced on Kilwa Island initially was that of the Khawarij, which was replaced by the Shafii school of Sunni Islam around the 13th century. The Shadhili and Qadiri

tariqa (Sufi order), which were introduced in the 20th century (Iliffe 1979), are what are currently found on the island.

- 4) When Ali bin Husain migrated to Kilwa Island, a man named Mlimba lived on the island as a lord who governed the Kilwa area (Freeman-Grenville 1962a). It has been said that Ali bin Husain obtained Kilwa Island by sending a cloth of the same length as the circumference of the island (about 23km) to the lord (Clarke 1960).
- 5) For example, the doors of Gereza Fort were replaced with new ones in 2013 by the World Monuments Fund (WMF), but the people, especially the youth, were opposed to it. However, the replacement of the doors with new ones was decided by the elders' council in an assertive fashion. Criticizing them, the youth said, "The elders sold our properties (doors) (*Wazee kauza mali etu*)."
- 6) Songo Mnara comprises two islands located about 4km south of Kilwa Island. The archeological sites on these islands are inscribed on the World Heritage List as "Ruins of Kilwa Kisiwani and Ruins of Songo Mnara."

References

Bacuez, P. J.

2009 *Intangible Heritage, Tourism and Raising Awareness on Kilwa Kisiwani and Songo Mnara: Findings and Recommendations*. Paris: UNESCO.

2015 *Raha ya Maovu*. Kampala, Tanzania: Nipetano Publishers. [in Swahili]

Chittick, N.

1974a *Kilwa: An Islamic Trading City on the East African Coast*, vol.1: *History and Archaeology* (Memoir No.5 of the British Institute in Eastern Africa). Nairobi: British Institute in Eastern Africa.

1974b *Kilwa: An Islamic Trading City on the East African Coast*, vol.2: *The Finds* (Memoir No.5 of the British Institute in Eastern Africa). Nairobi: British Institute in Eastern Africa.

Clark, P. H. C.

1960 *A Short History of Tanganyika*. Arusha: Longman of Tanzania Limited.

Davidson, B.

1991 *African Civilization Revisited: From Antiquity to Modern Times*. Trenton, NJ: Africa World Press.

Freeman-Grenville, G. S. P.

1962 *The Medieval History of the Coast of Tanganyika*. London: Oxford University Press.

Garlake, P.

1966 *The Early Islamic Architecture of the East African Coast*. London: Oxford University Press.

Ibn Battuta

1998 *The Travels of Ibn Battuta*. Edited by Ibn Juzayy, translated with notes by H. Yajima (イブン・ジュザイイ編, 家島彦一訳『大旅行記』), Tokyo: Heibonsha (東京: 平凡社). (in Japanese)

ICOMOS

- 1981 *Advisory Body Evaluation of the 149th Site of the World Heritage List*. Paris: ICOMOS.
<https://whc.unesco.org/document/152683> (viewed on 6 December 2021)

Iliffe, J.

- 1979 *A Modern History of Tanganyika*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Johnson, F.

- 1989[1939] *A Standard Swahili-English Dictionary*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Maghimbi, S.

- 1997 Demographic Change in the Coastal Zone of Tanzania: Focus on Artisanal (small-scale) Fishers. *University of Dar es Salaam Faculty of Arts and Social Sciences Demographic Training Unit 2*: 1–18.

Middleton, J.

- 1992 *The World of the Swahili*. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press.

Ministry of Natural Resources and Tourism

- 2007 Report on the State of Conservation of the Ruins of Kilwa Kisiwani and Ruins of Songo Mnara Endangered World Heritage Site, Tanzania, United Republic of Tanzania.

Nakamura, R. (中村亮)

- 2006 The Religious Attitude Concerning the Ruins of the Perished Kilwa Kingdom on the Swahili Coast (滅亡したキルワ王国の石造遺跡と遺跡をめぐる信仰) In Y. Shimada (ed.) *African Traditional Kingdoms Studies*, vol.3 (嶋田義仁編『アフリカ伝統王国研究Ⅲ』), pp. 313–338. Nagoya: Nagoya University (名古屋:名古屋大学文学研究科). (in Japanese with English abstract)

- 2011a Multi-Ethnic Coexistence in Kilwa Island, Tanzania: The Basic Ecology and Fishing Cultures of a Swahili Maritime Society. *SHIMA: The International Journal of Research into Island Cultures* 5(1): 44–68.

- 2011b Jini Belief among Swahili Maritime Societies: A Case Study of Kilwa Island (スワヒリ海村社会のジニ信仰——キルワ島の場合). In Y. Shimada (ed.) *Aspects of Shamanism* (嶋田義仁編『シャーマニズムの諸相』(アジア遊学141)), pp. 168–192. Tokyo: Bensei Publishing (東京:勉誠出版). (in Japanese)

- 2013 Direct and Environmental Uses of Mangrove Resources on Kilwa Island, Southern Swahili Coast, Tanzania. In H. Nawata, S. Ishiyama, and R. Nakamura (eds.) *Exploitation and Conservation of Middle East Tree Resources in the Oil Era* (Arab Subsistence Monograph Series, vol.1). Tokyo: Shoukadoh Book Sellers. (in Swahili, English, and Arabic)

Tominaga, C. (富永智津子)

- 1992 Zanzibar and Widespread Network (ザンジバルと広域ネットワーク). In Y. Itagaki and A. Goto (eds.) *Dictionary: Urbanism in Islam* (板垣雄三・後藤明編『事典イスラームの都市性』), pp. 215–216. Tokyo: Akishobo (東京:亜紀書房). (in Japanese)

Yajima, H. (家島彦一)

- 1993 *Civilizations created by the Sea: History of the Indian Ocean World* (『海が創る文明——インド洋海域世界の歴史』). Osaka: Asahi shinbunsha (大阪:朝日新聞社). (in Japanese)

Critical Changes in Djenné’s Local Community after Its Nomination as a World Heritage Site: Issues of Preservation and Cultural Conservation

Oussouby Sacko
Kyoto Seika University

1. Introduction

Heritage preservation or restoration is on the agenda in many African countries. Many aspects of West African culture are in danger of being lost due to cultural disruption as well as expansion of tourism. At risk are not only the well-known manuscripts of Timbuktu but also buildings, languages, beads, textiles, costumes, oral history, and traditional music, instruments, and dance. Therefore, there is an urgent need to preserve Africa’s cultural heritage and learn from the risks to this heritage, which are mostly undocumented in Africa.

Inhabited since 250 BCE, Djenné (also written as Jenné), the small city examined in this study, is historically and commercially important in the Niger Inland Delta of central Mali. It became a market center for everyday commodities such as rice and grains and an important link in the trans-Saharan gold trade in the 13th century during the Mali empire and later during the Songhai reign of the region in the 15th century. It was also a cultural



Photo 1 Townscape of Djenné (Bird view of Djenné).
(Source: the author, Djenné, May 2004)

center—of arts, science, and religion—from the 13th century.

Djenné is the site of earthen-brick (adobe) architecture and a large Sudanese-style mosque built in 1220 CE and rebuilt in 1907 (Gardi et al. 1995). According to oral tradition, Djenné used to have eleven mosques in different localities, but the Great Mosque was proposed to unify the diverse population and to develop the market. Djenné's Outstanding Universal Value was so well recognized that it was included in the UNESCO World Heritage List along with the archeological site of Djenné-Jeno and the surrounding old towns of Hambarketolo, Tonomba, Kaniana in 1988 (UNESCO n.d.). Since its inclusion as a World Heritage site, Djenné was considered as heritage in danger and many restoration projects have been conducted by cultural agencies and non-profit organizations, while some have been supported by foreign government aid.

Here, I discuss the restoration of Djenné's Great Mosque, a project that began in 2008, which has generated much debate concerning cultural conservation and building preservation (Photo 1). Through the restoration project, while some traditional techniques



Photo 2 House in Djenné
(Source: the author, Djenné, August 2011)



Photo 3 House facade
(Source: the author, Djenné, February 2007)

have been revitalized, others have been lost due to the precedence of modern preservation experts over more culturally experienced local craftspeople. There is also an ongoing dispute about whether Djenné should be restored as an earthen architecture town or renovated with new construction materials, which residents desire to bring in to clad buildings (Photo 2). Through the case study of Djenné and its Mosque, this paper examines the understanding of cultural heritage restoration in historical cities and underscores the importance of considering the local communities' perspectives, with respect to settling the social issues raised by such restoration projects.

2. Conservation Projects in Djenné

2.1 Definition of Cultural Conservation

Generally, cultural conservation is the process of examining, researching, maintaining, and preserving cultural heritage (Jokilehto 2011). It includes two elements: prevention and intervention (Feilden and Jokilehto 1998), with the latter being more common in cultural heritage conservation. In architectural conservation, intervention is the process of carefully planned works and activities to prolong the life of a building without damaging material, historical, and aesthetic integrity. Interventions are faced with challenges involving the following three aspects:

- 1) Physical condition: Condition of materials and structural systems; factors and mechanisms causing deterioration; technical feasibility of interventions; long-term efficacy of treatments, and so on.
- 2) Management context: Availability of resources including funds, skilled workers, and technology; political and legislative mandates and conditions; land use issues, and so on.
- 3) Cultural and social values: Why and to whom the object or site is significant; how the interventions are understood or perceived, and so on.

The aim of conservation is to maintain and shape the values embodied in cultural heritage (ICOMOS 1994; van Uytzel and Jurčys 2012).

2.2 Start of Conservation Projects

In 1995 and 1996, joint missions were constituted (Table 1). The missions, acknowledging the special quality of the built space of Djenné, also recognized that if the city had not suffered serious aggression from "modernity," it was in part due to its isolation and the stagnation of economic activity, which were simultaneous causes of the collapse of an alarming number of older structures. It was thus envisaged to undertake a short-term project with the goal of "conserving this unique monument for the present and future generations," which focused on the rehabilitation of 168 of the monumental houses considered to be the most representative of the "national cultural identity." (Joy 2008) The intervention ranges from minor repairs and wall rendering to total reconstruction, based on existing documents or relying on the descriptions of those who remember (Photo 3).

Table 1 Major Conservation Projects in Djenné

Dates	Description	Partnership
National Initiative Conservation Projects		
1996	Workshop and Training of West African Cultural Sites Management	UNESCO Financial Support
1995	Survey about Tourism Impact on Cultural Sites by Cultural Mission Agencies of Djenné and Bandiagara	UNESCO Financial Support
1993	Creation of Djenné Cultural Mission Agency by Ministerial Decision (93-203 P-RM of 1993 June 11th, review by Ord. No.01-032/P-RM of 2001 August 3rd).	Malian Government
1988	Inclusion of Djenné in the UNESCO World Heritage list	Malian Government World Heritage Committee
Djenné architectural conservation projects		
1996-2006	Djenné's Architecture Restoration Project. (Restoration of 130 Houses, Construction of New Public Projects, and valorization of Djenné's masons' know-how)	Funded by the Netherlands
1996	Rehabilitation of the inner city of Konofia, with the support of young participants in the international youth workshop	unknown
2008-2011	Rehabilitation and revitalization of the Youth House	Italian government Fund (Supported by UNESCO, DNPC-Mission Culturelle, CRAterre-ENSAG)
2008-2012	Great Mosque renovation and Training	Aga Khan Trust for Culture
Research and conservation projects for archaeological sites		
1998	Archaeological research project on the site of the future museum and of the old colonial dispensary	American Foundation named The Oliver Brunch
1998	Monitoring system for archaeological sites in the vicinity of Djenne	Funded by the Netherlands
1996-1997	Safeguarding and development project of the archaeological site of Djenné - Djéno (also called Djenné-Jeno)	Funded by the World Monument Fund
1989-1994	Surveys of archaeological sites in the inner delta of Niger ("Togué Project")	Institute of Human Sciences (ISH) of Mali and Institute of Bioarcheology (BAI) of Groningen in the Netherlands

Ref: Based on the country report (Plan de Gestion de Djenné 2008-2012, tableau 4) revised by the author

2.3 Background of the Project

The Djenné Great Mosque was restored as part of the World Heritage Earthen Architecture Program established between the Mali Ministry of Culture and the Aga Khan Trust for Culture (WHEAP 2011; AKTC 2012). This program facilitated the production of a technical guide for the rehabilitation of earthen architecture to assist in interventions at the ancient towns of Djenné, specifically the Mosque, houses, and buffer zone. Following the examination of the state of these towns, the UNESCO World Heritage Committee, meeting in Durban (South Africa) in 2005, requested "the World Heritage Centre, ICOMOS and International Centre for the Study of the Preservation and

Restoration of Cultural Property, ICCROM” undertake, in collaboration with the State Party, a joint evaluation mission of the property, during which will be studied alternative solutions to the pressure of urban development, and to make recommendations for examination by the Committee at its 30th session scheduled for Vilnius in 2006” (decision 29 COM 7B.36; DNPC 2008).

In the report of this joint mission, the World Heritage Centre and the Advisory Bodies (ICOMOS and ICCROM) noted the absence of town planning and construction regulations to control the growth of new constructions and poor rehabilitation of the property (Varissou et al. 2006). While applauding the support and intervention of the Aga Khan Trust for Culture (AKTC) in the restoration of the Mosque, they also asserted that all major projects should be tied into a management plan to set priorities. During the 2010 UNESCO meeting in Brazil, the World Heritage Committee reiterated its concerns about the absence of town planning tools and construction regulations in Djenné (World Heritage Committee 2010). It requested the State Party to submit the town planning and construction regulation as well as clarifications on the boundaries of the World Heritage property and its buffer zone to the World Heritage Centre. In 2012, the World Heritage Committee made further requests to the State Party to submit a report of the conservation state of the property and progress achieved in resolving problems in the modern town as well as at the archeological sites. The State Party submitted the report for examination by the World Heritage Committee at its annual meeting (Government Response and Planification 2018).

2.4 Development of the Project

Beginning in 2004, under a public-private partnership, the AKTC began to revitalize the center of Djenné. The Great Mosque as well as public spaces around it were repaired (Photo 4). The Mosque restoration became the most visible part of a multidisciplinary program aimed at improving the quality of life in the city. Efforts included the installation of new water and sanitation systems, street paving, early childhood education, training, health care, and economic development. The AKTC's work relied on close cooperation with local institutions and stakeholders and the participation of experienced local masons and specialists in restoration (WHEAP 2012). On October 26, 2008, technical field work was initiated by the AKTC at the request of Mission Culturelle de Djenné and a government body, the Direction National du Patrimoine Culturel (DNPC) in the technical documents (Diagnostic pathologique de la Mosque de Djenné). The local traditional authorities, religious, and administrative authorities had already consented to the project, and there was a publicity campaign for citizens to understand the project and accept the AKTC as the main sponsor.

To consider the problems surrounding restoration at the Djenné Mosque, I surveyed the site and conducted interviews with local masons, site experts, builders, and conservation leaders in Djenné. I also interviewed the UNESCO Representative in Mali and the Cultural Mission responsible. The field surveys were conducted from February to March 2010 and from February to March 2011. More general information about the city was gathered from 2004 to 2010 and in 2015.



Photo 4 The Great Mosque
(Source: the author, Djenné, March 2011)

3. The Great Mosque of Djenné

3.1 Traditional Masons Who Supported Djenné's Conservation

In this region, the construction process is undertaken by masons according to special ties with families and communities: A family has “their mason,” whereas a mason has “his family.” The relationship is inherited from father to son on both sides: The son of the house-owner’s mason is the mason of the house-owner’s son. The mason must ask his family and fellow masons for approval when he works for other clients.

Masons (*barey*) form a professional union, *barey ton* (Joffroy 2011), which guarantees their professional training and establishes oral and intangible codes of conduct and support with other professions. Apprenticeship begins at the age of seven. The apprentice goes through a clearly structured training in tools and materials, building techniques, building conception and the supervision of construction before he is officially accepted as a *barey* in his mid-twenties. Magic plays an important role both as a means of protection against professional risks and as part of the code of relations between all the participants in the house building. It is notable that most masons in the region start their work by “drawing” the facade. The type of facade is the first issue for the mason and the client to agree on, as it seems to determine the whole spatial organization of the house (Chabbi-Chemrouk 2007).

Recently with the lack of tourism activity which result crisis and change in building material, some masons have started to use baked bricks instead of earthen and natural dried ones. The new change and move toward modern building and diverse construction materials are affecting the profession. Some masons are even practically “specialized” in the technique of baked brick cladding. Although a large number of masons are now aware of the problems such as compatibility of earthen material and cement, weakness of building structure, caused by this practice, they often feel that they do not have a choice and must respect the wishes of their clients. These masons play a major role into the restoration project, as professional and cultural facilitators for heritage conservation.



Photo 5 Traditional mud bricks (Djenné Ferey) (Source: the author, Djenné, August 2009)



Photo 6 Framed mud bricks in fabrication (toubabou ferey) (Source: the author, Djenné, March 2005)

3.2 Building Material in Djenné

There are two types of adobe blocks used in Djenné's historical sites. The older type, no longer used except for specific restoration work, is called *Djenné ferey* ("blocks of Djenné") and consists of roughly cylindrical pieces (Photo 5). From the 1930s, it became common to shape the adobe blocks into rectangular forms (*toubabou ferey*, "foreign blocks") (Photo 6). During the dry season, builders transform the riverbanks into pits for the preparation of banco, the material (*labu* or *labou* in Djenné's local dialect *Djenné Chiini*) that forms construction blocks and rendering mortar. Wood is used for the construction of floors, ceilings, and roofs. This wood is also used for *toron*, a natural architectonic material specific to the region.

3.3 Mosque Restoration Process

For planning the restoration process and understanding the building and construction material problems, some architectural measurements and diagnostics were conducted (Photo 7). For the site installation some preliminary works were done such as bat exclusion, management and storage of material stock and construction of temporary storage space, and rehabilitation of surrounding zones.

For the drainage and cleaning of surroundings and sanitation improvement, the Mission Culture de Djenné raised some concerns about the use of space, which was contributing to the deterioration of the Mosque's structure. These concerns included the closeness of the ablution space to the Mosque's main wall, which could cause structural damage; difficulties in maintaining the ablution zones due to a lack of an enclosure; allowing dust and plastic bags or garbage to enter the space; lack of ablution space



Photo 7 Mosque roof before rehabilitation
(Source: the author, Djenné, August 2009)



Photo 8 Renovated roof
(Source: the author, Djenné, March 2011)

during festivities and Great Prayers events; low and uncomfortable ablution seats; poor evacuation of wastewater; stagnation of wastewater (which affects neighbors); and public use of spaces and toilets during the regular market day. Before restoration started, some preliminary works were done on these issues, such as cleaning up of ablution zones, organizing different ablution zones, and plastering them with cement mortar.

For woodworks and bat elimination, the site works replaced and restored doors and windows, replaced damaged bat nets, and conducted a progressive elimination of bats.

Special work in collaboration with local masons was done to identify material sources and fabricate olden style material. The *yellow banco* (earth material) used for block fabrication and mortar preparation (locally called *coreyndi*) was sourced from a carrier 2km north of the town of Djenné on the way to Senassa village. For *Djenné ferey* (“*blocks of Djenné*”) fabrication, banco was sourced from Camantale village. The Black earth (*yar labou*) for plastering was sourced from a site close to the archeological site of

Jenné-Jeno. Earth for pottery and tile works (*djammay labou*) was sourced from Camantale village on the bank of the river. Grass and rice husks were sourced from villages around Djenné. These works were important to review and understand the diversity of earthen material used in the construction of the Great Mosque.

For site preparation and installation, some zones and temporary spaces were constructed, such as material storage zones, mortar mix zone, wooden trays, and bins storage. Two scaffolding areas were set up north and south of the Great Mosque. For the roof restoration, all beams and *torons*¹⁾ were refurbished, repaired, and replaced (Photo 8).

4. Issues Arising from Mosque Restoration Project

The conservation site report and review mention, in several documents including government official ones, that the Mosque restoration will save Djenné's architecture, as well as justify conservation and collective action to the residents. The continuity of restoration and conservation projects is also said to contribute to Djenné's socio-economic and tourism development (Juma 2010).

But the restoration projects raise some problems, such as the gap between traditional and modern techniques or approaches in construction. Residents mentioned that the AKTC did not keep their promises of providing earthen material for subsequent annual Mosque re-covering festivals (Photo 9). There was also confusion between building workers (masons, *barey ton*) from different generations because younger masons who could read and write were favored, as they could communicate with the foreign experts on site and thus enjoyed more professional advantages than other workers. Another problem was how to respect the traditional procedure of renovation alongside more modern ones. For instance, some local techniques were not preserved during the restoration projects. The restoration and conservation of Djenné and its Mosque also raised the fundamental question of the roles and responsibilities of the local population,



Photo 9 Annual mosque recovering event
(Source: the author, Djenné, May 2004)

especially traditional and public authorities, in the process.

Recently new constructions in concrete and cement blocks at Djenné town's entrance and periphery have become popular. This is because this area is not included within the conserved area. Most of the buildings concerned are second homes of successful Djenné natives living in the capital city Bamako. The use of new materials and techniques can be discussed, but the design of those building does not reflect the essence of Djenné's architecture or building shapes. This means a lack of control in preserving the construction system by local and central government bodies.

According to the joint survey of the association of Djenné Patrimoine (Brunet-Jailly 1999) and Accroterre (Brunet-Jailly and Scherrer 2017) in September 2009 led by Olivier Scherrer, hundreds of houses in the conserved area have been recovered by fired bricks including a few municipal buildings. The survey reported that nearly 10% of the houses in Djenné are affected and that the phenomenon is growing exponentially: from 28 between 1973 and 1999 (average of one achievement per year) to 112 between 2000 and 2008 (an average of 10 times higher).

However, in addition to the esthetic damage and the degradation of the quality of architectural heritage leading to a loss of identity of the city of Djenné, the cladding of the fired brick facades presents major drawbacks from a technical standpoint (low durability, problems of infiltration, weakening of the building structure in the long term), as well as from an economic perspective (much more expensive than the best traditional plaster, less labor required, deprivation of regularly-paid masons).

Although the city has been classified as a "World Heritage site" since 1988, and several heritage development and rehabilitation projects have been conducted, the situation of the architectural heritage of Djenné continues to deteriorate. These poor results raise questions about the real will and capacity of national and international institutions to ensure the protection of this heritage.

Recently, the joint group has accomplished a new model of earthen construction, the Djenné Patrimoine House (*Maison du Patrimoine*), in which many new conservation techniques and improved building materials have been tested. As I was following the progress of this project as part of my research and was conducting field surveys, I interviewed some of the masons involved in the project as well as a few persons of responsibility of Djenné Patrimoine and Accroterre.. The project was a chance for Djenné masons to understand some of the construction material resistance, but without continuous follow-up by the ACCROTERRE team due to the insecurity in the region, some parts of unused buildings collapsed and the outside mortar deteriorated.

5. Conclusion and Discussions

In the case of Djenné, as described in this paper, foreign agencies and experts led the preservation project, and the local population was obliged to play the role of the audience. In some cases, new techniques were introduced for making mortars, and in others, old techniques were revitalized. The restoration projects in Djenné seem to have created a gap between cultural conservation and building preservation. This paper aimed

to rethink the conservation of cultural heritage, which is about to be lost in the process of building preservation (Joy 2008).

The question of why Djenné is being preserved—as well as for whom and for how long into the future—needs to be addressed. UNESCO feels that all of Djenné should stay the same. Attempts to de-classify some parts of the town for development while protecting others have been rejected by UNESCO. This occurred most recently in 2005 when the UNESCO delegation to Djenné stated that it was a World Heritage site due to its architectural integrity. How does freezing the town's architecture allow it to develop and change with shifting local needs? Are tourists coming to Djenné to look at a town frozen in time? Tourists, in fact, have a far more sophisticated understanding of the situation than they are given credit for. For example, a riot that broke out in Djenné in the end of 2006 was due to local anger at an unauthorized restoration project of the Mosque, which provoked several blogs on the Internet where tourists described their experience and revealed a good understanding of local tensions. I would argue that a sensitive way to move forward in this difficult situation would be to lay bare and understand the point at which tourists' expectations meet peoples' realities (Brunet-Jailly, and Scherrer 2017) —this border zone is at once the stage for tourist expectations and the backdrop to peoples' real lives, not a static situation based on UNESCO's model of discrete World Heritage. As a researcher visiting Djenné from outside, I would like to contribute to the residents' understanding of outer actors' ideas, as well as outer actors' understanding of the residents' ideas.

Hindering the achievement of this goal, however, are the rebellion in the north of Mali, the series of foreign kidnappings by several groups of bandits, and the decrease in the number of tourists. The number of tourists had already begun to decrease prior to 2012. Comparison of my two visits to Djenné in 2003 and 2007 convinced me of this fact, even though Djenné was one of the most visited tourist sites in Mali and tourism was the main business goal for local youngsters. In my recent visit after 2015, I saw a lot of empty hotels, guesthouses, restaurants, and bars, as well as ruined hotels that was once supported by government but had few foreign guests and public workers for seminars. The travel guides and young people, whom I have known for many years, lost their jobs; some of them are currently in the capital Bamako, and others in neighborhood countries continuing the same jobs, while some have returned to their villages. Tourist facilities also suffer from the same problem because people do not feel the need to maintain them, even if many buildings become dysfunctional. This clarified how big the tourist industry was. People have lost their courage to conserve their heritage. We should further discuss the question of for whom world heritage should be preserved.

6. Future Challenges

If the future project I plan as hope comes true, I would like to conduct further research, in collaboration with the residents on conservation problems, which they face at different levels and which is regarded by international agents as World Heritage in Danger. The problems in Djenné come from different aspects of the cultural, social, and economic

changes that affect the entire region. Changes in building materials have occurred because Djenné-born politicians and wealthy people want to make it a city with a modern look and economic potential. Djenné's people are very proud of their city, but why do they have to keep it as only a tourist attraction? In addition, building maintenance is increasingly expensive in relation to the average standard of living. For instance, the cost of labor is also rising due to the lack of available young workers or apprentices on construction sites. Traditional materials are also becoming difficult to obtain. For these reasons, new construction projects have decreased in number and many young people have moved out of Djenné. The lack of use of the essence of Djenné's housing plan or construction spirit needs to be pointed out. The local group of Djenné Patrimoine researched new conservation and building techniques and said that conservation is needed in this town in a cultural evaluative context.

One other problem in Djenné that needs further investigation and consideration is the sustainability of the masons' group, *barey ton*. Djenné is facing a loss of transmission of tangible and intangible expertise. Traditionally, transmission was carried out within a rigorous framework, from the elders to the youngsters, mostly within the same family or in a hereditary system, through a system of apprenticeship, sometimes starting at the beginning of adolescence. With schooling, crisis, and the gap between generations, many master masons in Djenné have failed to fully transmit their knowledge and expertise to the next generation. This knowledge and abilities need to be urgently archived and documented as part of the World Heritage conservation project.

Note

- 1) *Toron* are bundles of palm-tree trunks that project out some 60cm from the facades of taller buildings; they serve simultaneously as decoration and as scaffolding for the periodic rendering of the walls. In this case, *toron* are half embedded and rhythmically arranged on the wall surfaces. These sticks are needed on higher positions as scaffolding when replastering the whole surface of the Great Mosque, which takes place once a year. They are not necessarily required at lower positions, but gradually these sticks have come to be used as decorative elements even for smaller mosques.

References

Aga Khan Trust for Culture (AKTC)

- 2012 Mali: Earthen Architecture Programme Presentation, website, Geneva: AKTC. <https://www.akdn.org/akdn/akdn/ms/where-we-work/west-africa/mali/cultural-development/mali-earthen-architecture-programme> (last viewed on 4 May 2021)

Brunet-Jailly, J.

- 1999 *Djenné: D'hier à demain*. Bamako: Edition Donniya.

Brunet-Jailly, J. and O. Scherrer

- 2017 Protecting Architectural Heritage in Djenné: A Civil Society Point of View. *Journal of*

African Cultural Heritage Studies 1(1): 72–94.

Chabbi-Chemrouk, N.

2007 2007 On Site Report Review: Conservation of Djenné, Djenné Municipal Office. http://ghn.globalheritagefund.com/uploads/documents/document_1192.pdf (last viewed on 4 May 2021)

DNPC (Direction Nationale du Patrimoine Culturel du Mali)

2008 *Plan de Conservation et de Gestion des “Villes anciennes de Djenné” — Mali. 2008–2012* (préparé par Klessigué Sanogo, Directeur National du Patrimoine Culturel, et Yamoussa Fané, La Mission Culturelle de Djenné, avec le soutien du Fonds du Patrimoine Mondial et le Bureau Multi-pays UNESCO à Bamako). Bamako: Ministère de la culture du Mali. <https://whc.unesco.org/en/documents/102566> (last viewed on 4 May 2021)

Feilden, B. M. and J. Jokilehto

1998 *Management Guidelines for World Cultural Heritage Sites*. Rome: ICCROM.

Gardi, B., P. Maas, G. Mommersteeg, and B. Sanankoua

1995 *Djenné, il y a cent ans*. Amsterdam: KIT Publications.

Government Response and Planification

2018 “*Villes Anciennes de Djenné*”: *Plan de Gestion et de Conservation (2018–2022)*, La Direction Nationale du Patrimoine Culturel du Mali (DNPC).

ICOMOS

1994 *The Nara Document of Authenticity*. Charenton-le-Pont: ICOMOS. <https://www.icomos.org/charters/nara-e.pdf> (last viewed on 4 May 2021)

Joffroy, T.

2011 *Réhabilitation et revitalisation de la Maison des jeunes*, rapport final du projet financé par le Gouvernement Italien dans le cadre de WHEAP (Programme Architecture de terre du Patrimoine Mondial) et Centre du patrimoine mondial de l'UNESCO réalisé en partenariat avec la Mission Culturelle de Djenné, Villefontaine, CRATERRE-ENSAG.

Jokilehto, J.

2011 *A History of Architectural Conservation*. New York: Routledge.

Joy, C. L.

2008 *Enchanting Town of Mud: The Politics of Heritage in Djenné, a UNESCO World Heritage site in Mali*, Ph. D. Thesis submitted for University College London.

Juma, M.

2010 *Rapport de mission: Villes anciennes de Djenné-Mali*, Mission du 26 juin au 06 juillet 2010. Rome: La Cooperazione allo Sviluppo, Ministero degli Affari Esteri. <https://whc.unesco.org/uploads/activities/documents/activity-21-16.pdf> (last viewed on 4 May 2021)

UNESCO

n.d. *Old Towns of Djenné*, World Heritage List. Paris: UNESCO. <https://whc.unesco.org/en/list/116/> (last viewed on 4 May 2021)

van Uytsel, S. and P. Jurčys

2012 ‘Heritage and Societies: Toward the 20th Anniversary of the Nara Document and Beyond’ Conference Report. *Journal of Japanese Law* 34: 309–316.

Varissou, S., Bakonirina Rakotomamonjy, and Lazare Eloundou Assomo

- 2006 *Mali, les Villes Anciennes de Djenné* (Site du patrimoine Mondial, BIEN: C 116 rev., Année 1988, Critères iii & iv), Mission de suivi réactif 13–17 Mars 2006. Bamako: ICOMOS, World Heritage Committee, and ICCROM. <https://whc.unesco.org/archive/2006/mis116rev-mar06.pdf> (last viewed on 4 May 2021)

WHEAP (World Heritage Earthen Architecture Programme)

- 2011 Values of Earthen Architecture: Achievements 2010–2011, Project Progress Report. UNESCO. <https://whc.unesco.org/document/107099> (last viewed on 4 May 2021)
- 2012 World Heritage Inventory of Earthen Architecture, 2012.
https://unesdoc.unesco.org/query?q=Author:%20%22Gandreau,%20David%22&sf=sf:*
https://unesdoc.unesco.org/query?q=Author:%20%22Delboy,%20Leticia%22&sf=sf:*
(last viewed on 4 May 2021)

World Heritage Committee

- 2010 Agenda for the Thirty-Fourth Session (Brasillia, Brazil). <https://whc.unesco.org/archive/2010/whc10-34com-7B.Adde.pdf> (last viewed on 4 May 2021)

Still a Sacred Void? Cultural Heritage, Sacred Places, and Living Spaces of the Mijikenda Kaya Forests along the Kenyan Coast in East Africa

Katsuhiko Keida
Kumamoto University

1. Introduction

On the evening of Thursday, January 16, 2014, “Mzee Gunga was seated at his verandah listening to the 7 pm news” at his home in Canan Village in Watamu, Kilifi County, when “two unknown men walked in and shot him in the mouth killing him on the spot.”¹⁾ Headlines carried in *Daily Nation*, one of Kenya’s major newspapers, read “Kaya elder shot dead” and “Assassins killed top Kaya elder, say detectives.” Until his death, the victim, Mr. Gunga Thoya Baya (75),²⁾ popularly known as Mzee Katana Kalulu, had been “a committee member of the Coast Kaya elders and the chairman of the Malindi District Cultural Association.”³⁾

Two months after the incident, on March 5, 2014, I visited Kalulu’s home at Watamu with Emmanuel Munyaya, Kazungu wa Hawerisa, and Simone Grassi, members of the same Malindi District Cultural Association (MADCA), to perform a private *kulaza koma*, a traditional ritual ceremony to grieve Kalulu’s ill-fated death and to pray for the safety and good fortune of his family (Photo 1). The ceremony was conducted in front of a small gravestone where Kalulu’s spirit (*koma*, Photo 2) could listen to our prayers. On this occasion, Kalulu’s relatives and those who knew him told us that 1) one of the ten or so people who had sent the assassins had been Kalulu’s own son, and 2) it was rumored that Kalulu’s large family and status as a famous elder had provoked his murder as a witch (*mutsai*) due to witchcraft envy (*kidzitso*, lit. “little eye”). Even so, the members of MADCA flatly denied such rumors, noting that all Mijikenda elders were being targeted and killed as “grey-haired” witches by the younger generation. Kalulu was simply the latest victim among the elderly Mijikenda.⁴⁾ From other people and media reports, I learned that 3) a “family dispute over the land might have been the cause of the killing,”⁵⁾ and discovered that 4) although Kalulu’s remains should have been interred in the Kaya Fungo in honor of his status as a Kaya elder, he had instead received a common burial at his homestead.

The Katana Kalulu murder case highlights the contestability of identity and authority among the Mijikenda and Kaya elders, as well as the tenuous nature of “sacredness” of the Kayas along the Kenyan Coast. To begin with, as experts of the Mijikenda tradition,



Photo 1 Two Kaya elders performing a private *kulaza koma*, a traditional ritual ceremony, to grieve Katana Kalulu's ill-fated death and to pray for the safety and good fortune of his family, Watamu, Kenya. (Photograph by Katsuhiko Keida 2014)



Photo 2 Installed *koma* (small wooden memorial statutes of ancestors) near the gate of Kaya Giriama/Fungo. (Photograph by Katsuhiko Keida 2010)

Kaya elders have emerged to a certain degree as media figures at home and abroad. How does this affect local people's regard for these elders? Why was Kalulu's murder linked with witchcraft?⁶⁾ Second, following discussions by Willis (2009) and McIntosh (2009) on the uncertain position of Kaya elders, Kalulu's death also provides an important case study for considering claims of authenticity among Kaya elders. Why were Kalulu's remains not interred in the Kaya? Finally, we might ask whether the Kayas remain a "sacred void" (Parkin 1991) for the Mijikenda, or whether the sacred character of the Kaya has been transformed from that of a "void" to something entirely different.

In 2008, the Mijikenda Kaya Forests were officially inscribed as a UNESCO World Heritage Site, collectively designated as "The Sacred Mijikenda Kaya Forests" of Coastal Kenya in East Africa (Photos 3 and 4). The following year, the "traditions and practices associated with the Kayas in the sacred forests of the Mijikenda" were also inscribed as a UNESCO Intangible Cultural Heritage. Arguably, these factors have led to the current generation of Kaya elders to become "expertized" as the "sacred" custodians of a globalizing Africa.

In this chapter, I situate UNESCO as a powerful global actor with the ability to define global heritage and conservation sites as "good" for humanity's cultural and ecological diversity, an issue that "from the outset [...] was placed at the core of UNESCO's doctrine" (Stoczkowski 2009: 7). The Mijikenda Kayas have also been (re)invented as unique sites benefitting twenty-first century human diversity through the imagination of global actors such as UNESCO, which has imposed its vision of ecological and cultural diversity on local actors (Stoczkowski 2009). From this viewpoint, I contextualize the Mijikenda Kayas as a very interesting case amid the emerging dynamics and tension related to the local and global cultural heritage of the twenty-first



Photo 3 UNESCO World Heritage, Kaya Kambe, hinterland of Mombasa, Kenya. (Photograph by Katsuhiko Keida 2010)



Photo 4 UNESCO World Heritage, Kaya Giriama/ Fungo, Kaloleni, Kenya. (Photograph by Katsuhiko Keida 2010)

century. For instance, in a book entitled *World Heritage on the Ground: Ethnographic Perspectives* (Brumann and Berliner 2016), Probst (2016) presents Prickly Prestations: Living with (World) Heritage in Osogbo (also known as the *Osun Grove* in Nigeria), which provides a deep insight into my paper in terms of tension and reciprocities between global and local strategies and actors.

For intangible cultural heritage, in *UNESCO on the Ground: Local Perspectives on Intangible Cultural Heritage* (Dylan and Gilman 2015), the case of the Malawi *Vimbuza* dance form, written by Gilman, helps compare the intangible cultural heritage of Kenya and Malawi. In addition, I will compare the case of the Mijikenda Kayas with examples of cultural heritage in Japan, such as the case of Koshikijima Island in Kagoshima Prefecture presented by Foster (2015).

However, I will not make further detailed comparisons between the Mijikenda Kayas and other cultural heritage sites. Henceforward I intend to explore the dynamics and intersections of the Mijikenda Kayas in an ethnographic manner between local and global actors in both contexts of UNESCO World Heritage and intangible cultural heritage.

The Mijikenda are made up of nine closely related but linguistically and culturally distinct tribes: the Giriama, Chonyi, Kauma, Kambe, Ribe, Jibana, Rabai, Duruma, and Digo. These groups live in the hinterland along the Kenyan Coast from the border of Tanzania in the south to the border of Somalia in the north. Katana Kalulu was a Giriama elder.

If one accepts the legends of the Mijikenda and scholarly accounts such as Spear's *Kaya Complex* (1978), the Mijikenda migrated south in the sixteenth century from an area in southern Somalia, known as *Singwaya* or *Shungwaya*, to settle in the Kenyan coastal hinterland. The Mijikenda established fortified villages surrounded by dense small-scale forests as homesteads and politico-religious centers. These centers, known as Kayas, spread across approximately 200km of the Kenyan Coast, from the seventeenth to nineteenth centuries. As each of the various tribes that make up the Mijikenda (which literally means “the nine villages”) has its Kaya, the Mijikenda are sometimes referred to as the Kayakenda (“nine Kayas”). The Kayas began to be abandoned as living spaces by

the 1940s, becoming uninhabited except for by a handful of “Kaya elders” (*atumia a kaya*), whose traditional culture and practices were thought to confer spiritual and magical protection on the Kayas.

In his lifetime, Katana Kalulu became widely known as a Kaya elder in the context of the rapidly changing conditions of globalizing Africa. Over the last few decades, the Mijikenda Kayas have also become an important focus for anthropological studies of East African society. David Parkin’s insightful ethnography, *Sacred Void* (1991), is one of several significant sociocultural and historical studies focusing on the “odd” sacredness of the Mijikenda Kayas, especially Kaya Fungo (e.g., Brantley 1981; Giles and Gearhart 2013; McIntosh 2009; Parkin 1972, 1991; Spear 1978; Willis 1993). Parkin characterizes the Kayas as a “void,” namely a “point at which memory is revived and recreated, but also allowed to think what was previously unthinkable. Insofar as it is kept alive against all apparent odds, I would see this as sacred space, to which people then periodically give material form, boundaries and a centre, thereafter cleansing and re-imagining it again in due course” (Parkin 1991: 229).

In this chapter, I reflect on whether the Mijikenda Kayas can still be considered as a “sacred void” in the context of a globalizing Africa. Central to Parkin’s study is Kaya Fungo near Kaloleni in the hinterland of Mombasa, which he discusses in the context of contrasting spaces between the east and the west among the Giriama. I intend to trace the transformations of the Kayas from the time of Parkin’s (1991) ethnography up to the present day with reference to my own ethnographic fieldwork in the hinterland of Malindi District.

Parkin argues that the Mijikenda’s “traditional capital or centre, called the Kaya, is a fixed, central place with inviolable boundaries and unquestionable sacredness.” For these people, “the west is ‘traditional’ and the east is ‘modern.’ The west comprises the Giriama sacred centre while the east merges and mixes boundaries and peoples and lacks a definite centre. The Kaya is a centre while the east and west are defined relationally, just as, internally, the east comprises different peoples and places standing in cross-cutting relationships to each other” (Parkin 1991: 8; see also Parkin 1991: 36).

Some historians, notably Spear (1978), have argued a historical basis for a consistent Mijikenda self-identity rooted in the Singwaya/Shungwaya origin myth. “Now, a Mijikenda historiography which bases the unified and direct Mijikenda identity in a history of shared migration from Singwaya is an accepted truth, taught in schools and widely published, its veracity confirmed by constant repletion” (Willis 1993: 202). However, Willis cautions that this “is a history, and an identity, of recent origin: a truth whose ambiguity is constantly reflected in historical presentation” (Willis 1993: 202).

Willis (1993: 201) focuses on “the meaning of identity, and the nature of history” among the Mijikenda and the Swahili, noting that the contestable identities of both groups of people have been constructed through the historical experience of Coastal Kenya. He points to “the apparent invention of the Mijikenda in the 1930s and 1940s” and argues that “in the continuing redefinition of being Swahili, and in the invention of the Mijikenda, the state was by no means the only player, nor was tribalism simply an ideology in the service of the state” (Willis 1993: 13). According to him, before the

“invention” of the Mijikenda, these people were known in the colonial era as “*Nyika*” (bush or wild peoples), a collective name for a mixed group of smaller tribes along the Kenyan Coast with their distinct origin stories, rooted variously in indigenous traditions or ex-slave narratives arising from trade along the Kenyan Coast. As Parkin noted in the previous quoted text, the Mijikenda have been represented as a distinct cultural group with links to the west and as a dynamic constructed group linked historically with Swahili groups to the east.

Kaya Fungo, located in the western area, is now an empty space (a “void,” to use Parkin’s term). Despite this emptiness, the Kaya remains nominally sacred. Even so, the daily lives of the Mijikenda do not involve prayers to the Kayas, nor do they constitute a destination for any sort of religious practice or pilgrimage. Most Mijikenda live their entire lives without ever entering the Kayas. As Parkin remarks, “the empty sacred place [...] looks very strange from the western point of view” (1991: 10–11). Before revisiting Parkin’s notion of the Kaya as a sacred void, the next section describes the contemporary context of the Kayas as natural forests and a cultural heritage.

2. Invention of Natural Forests and a Cultural Heritage

While “approximately 60 Kaya forest patches [...] have been identified in Kwale, Kilifi and Malindi districts” (Nyamweru et al. 2008: 62; see also Tinga 2004: 9), the Sacred Mijikenda Kaya Forests World Heritage Site consists of just eleven separate forest sites in a “serial” designation.⁷ The association between the various Mijikenda groups and these approximately 60 Kayas remains unclear (e.g., whether each group has a distinct affiliation with one or more sacred Kayas). Despite this lack of clarity, as Willis has remarked, “this tension between singularity and multiplicity may seem curious, but it [is] not novel” (Willis 2009: 236).

Nevertheless, during the process of the Kayas’ nomination, the forests have been re-envisioned as a cluster of small-scale natural forests rich in biodiversity, including landscapes that are unique from a botanical and ecological point of view. In other words, the Kayas have come to be regarded as a preserved environmental heritage that should be collectively protected from the threat of modernization and development.

At the initial stages of the nomination process, the Kayas were proposed by the Kenyan government to UNESCO as a “complex property (a natural and cultural property)” in view of their dual natural and cultural value. While the Kayas eventually received World Heritage designation as a “cultural property,” their natural forest landscapes are regarded as being integral to their Outstanding Universal Value (OUV), as evidenced by the text of UNESCO decisions.

For example, in Decisions Adopted at the 32nd Session of the World Heritage Committee, Quebec City, 2008 (World Heritage Committee 2009), it was resolved that UNESCO would adopt “the following Statement of Outstanding Universal Value: Spread out along around 200km of the coast province of Kenya are ten separate forested sites,⁸ mostly on low hills, ranging in size from 30 to around 300ha, in which are the remains of fortified villages, Kayas, of the Mijikenda people. They represent more than thirty

surviving Kayas.⁹⁾ The Kayas began to fall out of use in the early twentieth century and are now revered as the repositories of spiritual beliefs of the Mijikenda people and are seen as the sacred abode of their ancestors. The forests around the Kayas have been nurtured by the Mijikenda community to protect the sacred graves and groves and are now almost the only remains of the once extensive coastal lowland forest” (World Heritage Committee 2009).

The Kaya’s OUV corresponds to items (iii), (v), and (vi) of the World Heritage Selection Criteria:¹⁰⁾

- (iii) The Kayas provide focal points for Mijikenda religious beliefs and practices, are regarded as the ancestral homes of the different Mijikenda peoples, and are held to be sacred places. As such they have metonymic significance to Mijikenda and are a fundamental source of Mijikenda’s sense of “being-in-the-world” and of place within the cultural landscape of contemporary Kenya. They are seen as a defining characteristic of Mijikenda identity.

- (v) Since their abandonment as preferred places of settlement, Kayas have been transferred from the domestic aspect of the Mijikenda landscape to its spiritual sphere. As part of this process, certain restrictions were placed on access and the utilisation of natural forest resources. As a direct consequence of this, the biodiversity of the Kayas and forests surrounding them has been sustained. The Kayas are under threat both externally and from within Mijikenda society through the decline of traditional knowledge and respect for practices.

- (vi) The Kayas are now the repositories of spiritual beliefs of the Mijikenda and are seen as the sacred abode of their ancestors. As a collection of sites spread over a large area, they are associated with beliefs of local and national significance, and possibly regional significance as the sites extend beyond the boundaries of Kenya.

(World Heritage Committee 2009; emphasis added)

The advisory bodies (International Council on Monuments and Sites (ICOMOS), and the International Union for Conservation of Nature and Natural Resources (IUCN)), who were responsible for carrying out the evaluation, described the natural environments surrounding the Kayas as follows:

...the communal protection of these sites by the Mijikenda elders and descendants of those who used to live there, through forbidding the cutting of trees, banning grazing, and placing restrictions on the hunting of certain animals in the Kayas, has had the effect of protecting almost all that remains of the once extensive coastal lowland forest in Kenya. Within the forest, a number of critically endangered and vulnerable species have been recorded. These remnants of forests are now surrounded by intensive plantations of cashew, mango, and coconut and are near some of the fastest growing coastal development areas.

(UNESCO 2008, emphasis added)

These descriptions offer a glimpse of the aspects seen to be most salient in UNESCO's evaluation of the Mijikenda culture. Most importantly, it was seen that certain cultural restrictions or regulations on the Kayas and surrounding natural forests could sustain their inherent biodiversity. The traditional restrictions of the Mijikenda culture could preserve these valuable natural forests, which had developed, if not deliberately, then "as a direct consequence" of these restrictions. In this understanding, according to one observer, "the transition from fortified settlements to the current sacred sites, however and whenever it occurred, must have been linked to a change in the use of forest products in the surrounding areas, possibly including an increased formalization of taboos and controls on the use of certain species and certain localities" (Nyamweru et al. 2008: 83–84). However, even now, most Mijikenda may not recognize the botanical or ecological value of the Kayas. This is suggested by the concerns, voiced by one of Willis's interlocutors, that "many people possibly may not know the true value of the work" performed by local conservation groups (Willis 2008: 238).

In the context of World Heritage designation, the National Museums of Kenya (NMK) has become the main actor in managing the Mijikenda Kayas by mediating their global and local interfaces. However, the NMK was not always interested in the Kayas, and the museum's comparatively recent involvement attests to the motivating agency of globally imagined actors such as UNESCO in the invention of local heritage and conservation sites. In the case of the Kayas, the re-imagination and re-creation of the Kayas by local actors only began to be mobilized later. As a state actor, the NMK has interposed itself as an interface to mediate the Kayas to global organizations such as ICOMOS (a UNESCO World Heritage advisory body) and to local Kaya elders, now "expertized" as the guardians of Kaya tradition.

When I began my fieldwork in the hinterland of Malindi in the 1980s, the Kayas received only a vague mention as sacred centers for the local Giriama. At the time, the current Kaya exhibition at the NMK in Nairobi, featuring photos of wooden memorial statues (*vigango*, Photo 5), had yet to be curated, despite the museum's "conservation and heritage remit [to embrace] both human culture and 'natural history'" (Willis 2008: 237).

Willis describes how "in 1981, a 'university expedition' to the Kayas from Oxford made clear the association between botany and human culture in calling for conservation." It was through this expedition (the Oxford Ethnobotanical Expedition) that "the Kayas were identified as repositories not only of human culture but also of biology [...] As a UN Environment Programme document suggested in 1998, the interests of 'cultural heritage' and 'environment and conservation' came together in the Kayas" (Willis 2008: 237).¹¹ It was, therefore, only after the Kayas' re-invention as valuable natural forests that NMK first applied to the UNESCO World Heritage Centre for their recognition as a complex property.

For the Mijikenda today, the Kayas are neither objects of worship nor places for pilgrimage. Moreover, "the Kaya elders are not regarded as themselves sacred or divine but as subject like any other persons to greed, unjustifiable anger, and feelings of revenge" (Parkin 1991: 24). The fact that the Kaya elders, as traditional healers and



Photo 5 *Vigango* at Fort Jesus Museum, Mombasa, Kenya. (Photograph by Katsuhiko Keida 2005)

politicians, possess knowledge of traditional medical and secret cultural practices does not amount to a sacred or divine status.

ICOMOS and IUCN, the advisory bodies of the World Heritage Committee, have come to regard the Kaya elders as cultural experts in their roles as spiritual guardians of the Kayas. Therefore, they feel that the Kaya elders should be empowered in their respective Mijikenda communities. UNESCO explicitly states that “there is a need for formal acknowledgment of the key role of the elders in protecting the Kayas to strengthen traditional practices and give respect to traditional knowledge.” It supports an approach whereby “NMK has adopted a collaborative approach with the Kaya elders [and feels that] continuing efforts by NMK to strengthen partnership with Kaya elders is commendable,” adding that “ICOMOS further considers that there is a need to formalize arrangements with the Kaya elders to further empower local communities” (UNESCO 2008). In addition, the 32nd session of the World Heritage Committee held in Quebec in 2008 repeated that, “management needs to respect the needs of individual Kayas and to integrate the conservation of natural and cultural resources and traditional and non-traditional management practices; the authority of the Kaya elders should be established.” The Committee requested that the representative of the Kenyan state, NMK, should “enter into agreements with Kaya elders to establish them as the guardians of the Kayas” (World Heritage Committee 2009). However, these requests on the part of UNESCO and its partner agencies are rooted in western notions of “tradition” and elder-based “authority,” and are not necessarily sensitive to the uncertainty and ambiguity inherent within the “authenticity” of the Kaya elders.

In his analysis of the reign of the recent king, Karisa wa Maitha,¹²⁾ Willis (2009, see

also McIntosh 2009) refers to powerful Kaya elders as the “kings” of the Kayas. Maitha emerged as a famous politician who entered the Kaya Fungo to receive the blessings of the Kaya elders. Through this action, he was conferred with special powers from the Kaya and then installed as a Kaya elder. Unfortunately, he died of a sudden heart attack on a visit to Germany in 2004 at the peak of his political career. When I visited Malindi in 2013, an old Giriama friend of mine reported a curious story about this deceased elder. He told me that “Maitha is still alive someplace; when Maitha’s dead body arrived at Malindi, his real mother saw and touched her son’s face and body, then pronounced that the corpse was not her real son! Most Giriama believe that Maitha uses some special medicine from Kaya Fungo to hide himself away, and that he will return as the true king of the Mijikenda in Kenya in the near future.”

Despite the political power of the Kaya elders as forest kings, they have never been sacred men among the Mijikenda. This may explain why the Mijikenda people abandoned the Kayas and their biological diversity. While the traditional restrictions on the Kayas have often been transgressed by modernized and Christianized people, the forests have enjoyed a certain measure of protection by the fact that most Mijikenda have allowed their culture to remain regulated by the Kaya elders, leaving the Kayas undisturbed since they were abandoned as living spaces. This has proved to be a unique and remarkable way to protect natural forests and their rich biological diversity against the threat of modernization and development in East Africa. However, this status quo has begun to change with the recruitment of Kaya elders as holy “experts” and “guardians of the Kayas” in the context of World Heritage and Cultural Heritage as imagined by global actors such as UNESCO. Willis remarked that “the politics of heritage and conservation came to the Kaya” (Willis 2008: 237).

In the discourse that treat the Kayas as natural forests, the Mijikenda are identified with the Kayas, which are not only their former homesteads but also considered to be under the stewardship of elders now considered “experts,” in light of their status as traditional medical practitioners, guardians, and forest kings. The Mijikenda, as “sons of the Kayas,” identify themselves with the sacred forests. In other words, the Mijikenda are seen to be a part of the Kayas—their relationship is constructed metonymically. In a recent study focused on the Kaya elders’ tenuous authenticity (cf. Parkin 1991: 42–47) and “frauds” such as Simba Wanje, McIntosh highlights “the treatment of the Kaya as a synecdoche for Mijikendanness itself” (McIntosh 2009: 50).

Returning to the case mentioned at the outset of this chapter, Katana Kalulu presents us with a curious case in connection with the questionable or even fraudulent authenticity of Kaya elders. As described earlier, while Kalulu was widely known as a Kaya elder, his remains were not interred in Kaya Fungo. After his death, it was reported that “Kaya committees from Kilifi and Kwale counties were making arrangements on how the ritual for the fallen elder will be conducted during his burial.” The chairman of Coast Kaya elders, Mr. Abdalla Mnyenze, stated that “[Kalulu] was an elder and the ritual should be followed until he is buried.”¹³ However, I was told that while MADCA had argued for Kalulu’s burial in the Kaya, some Kaya elders argued that they were not permitted to do so because he had died outside of the Kaya.

Kalulu's case raises the question of who can be considered as a "real" Kaya elder. Who decides who will be an elder? Was Katana Kalulu a Kaya elder? Narratives among the Mijikenda about Kaya elders move between "trust talk and alienable talk" (Parkin 2011).

In the semantic zone of narratives about the Kayas, however, the forests articulate the Mijikenda not only metonymically or synecdochically but also metaphorically. As mentioned earlier, recent narratives about the Kayas have shown a growing tendency to adopt metonymical or synecdochical aspects between the Mijikenda and the Kayas in terms of historical, sociocultural, and political identities combined with biodiversity.

In fact, who controls the Kayas? For his part, Willis frames this question by posing two alternatives: "Does it belong rightly with all elder men? Or is it the preserve of individuals with special knowledge?" Willis concludes that the "histories of the Kaya may express both models of authority. Although people are aware of a reality in which Kayas multiply, and esoteric knowledge is paramount, people can still talk about the Kaya in a way that evokes an ideal of a united, benevolent gerontocracy controlling all aspects of life" (Willis 2008: 245–246).

Nevertheless, in every Giriama homestead, there are elders (*atumia a mudzi*) who command respect as heads of the homestead. Although the current Kaya elders have been empowered by their re-imagination by global actors as "sacred" custodians and politicians, I believe that it is important to return to the relationship between Giriama homestead elders and the Kaya elders.

While Parkin's ethnography (1991) highlighted the metonymical linkage between the Mijikenda and the Kayas, he also focused on the Kayas as a metaphor. In the discussion below, I emphasize the metaphorical relationship between the Giriama homesteads and the Kayas to clarify why these are important to understanding the present-day Kayas.

3. Cultural Heritage or Living Spaces?

As the Kayas were conferred with new values through their designation as UNESCO World Heritage (2008) and Intangible Cultural Heritage (2009), two actors may be seen to have emerged with the goal of protecting the Kayas and thereby facilitating the economic situation for the Mijikenda. One of these is the NMK, which has become the state's representative for handling issues surrounding the Kayas as a matter of cultural heritage. However, the MADCA,¹⁴ a community-based organization, quickly became an influential local actor in the sphere of civil society. Most members of MADCA are Giriama, and the group includes several Kaya elders. In 2008, MADCA played an important role in the Mekatilili Cultural Festival held at the Mekatilili Cultural Centre (Photos 6 and 7), located in the Bungale hinterland along the Sabaki/Gallana River in Malindi District. Mekatilili was a famed national heroine who fought against British colonial rule in 1913–1914 in what is known as the "Giriama Rising" (Brantley 1981).

After the post-election violence that swept Kenya in 2007, the Mekatilili Cultural Centre became a site for the reconciliation between the Kikuyus and other ethnic groups due to the conflict and violence that had ensued. When I attended the Mekatilili Festival

in 2008, the “oath”—a blessing for peace and harmony—taken in front of Mektatilili’s grave was a key event at the festival, and it was clear that the ritual and political direction of the festival was being steered by MADCA and its member elders. That year, the now late Katana Kalulu was also very active, and he blessed all participants of the festival in his role as a Kaya elder. His example shows how some Kaya elders are active outside of the Kayas as messengers and creators of peace, pursuing a traditionalized political strategy through the instrumental re-imagination of the memory and spirit of Mektatilili as a culture-heroine.¹⁵⁾

More recently, on September 5, 2015, Joseph Karisa Mwarandu, the lawyer who now serves as MADCA’s secretary-general, commented on an emerging coalition “being propelled by Prof Chenje Mwachiru and 40 other professionals. It enjoys support from Taita Taveta, Tana River, and Kwale counties where it has sold its agenda of changing the region’s political image” and “the President (Uhuru Kenyatta) said he was ready to work with the coalition. ‘He was impressed by the newfound unity of purpose and he was ready to work with the outfit as equal partners,’ sources said.”¹⁶⁾ In this context, Mwarandu’s comments to *Daily Nation* (September 5, 2015) are significant:

But Malindi District Cultural Association secretary-general Joseph Mwarandu said many coastal politicians were uninspired when it comes to dealing with youth employment, land issues, or security.

“As Kaya elders, we want to follow the Mektatilili strategy of working with other



Photo 6 *Kigango* in the Mektatilili Cultural Centre, Bungale, Malindi, Kenya. (Photograph by Katsuhiko Keida 2005)



Photo 7 Mektatilili Cultural Festival in Bungale, Malindi, Kenya. (Photograph by Mariko Kuga 2008, Copyright Katsuhiko Keida 2008)

communities to fight a common enemy—the colonists,” he said.

Mekatilili got help from other communities after she escaped from Kisii to the Coast region. Mekatilili wa Menza was a leading light in the Coast in the fight for freedom. The Kaya elders, according to Mr. Mwarandu, went to State House to meet President Kenyatta because they believed he was in a better position to resolve various issues.

“It will be foolhardy of us to wait for five years for our problems to be solved by those in the opposition when they can be solved now,” he told the Sunday Nation.

In his view, most of the elected leaders have lost direction and their “houses are dirty” because of misappropriation of public funds.

“We have decided to work with the government of the day to get *ugali* on our tables rather than wait for *ugali* that we are not sure of,” he said.

In my own view, this situation highlights the distinct differences between how the Kayas are mobilized by the state on the one hand and the Mijikenda community on the other. As the state’s representative, NMK is tasked with protecting natural forests as a cultural heritage identified by a global consciousness regarding nature conservation. For NMK, the Kayas are not a “homestead” but a “heritage” to be protected by the state in line with global perspectives. The Kaya elders are regarded as not only kings of the Kayas, but also custodial guardians imbued with a unique spiritual character.

In contrast, MADCA wants to make the Kayas a “homestead” rather than “heritage.” In a recent initiative, MADCA reorganized the relationship among Kaya elders (interview with Joseph Mwarandu in 2013). MADCA’s plan divides the Kayas into three regional zones (Galana, Godoma, and Weruni), with 14 elders selected by local representatives from each zone. This organizational concept thus limits the total number of “authorized” Kaya elders to 42, and requires that all new elders sequester themselves in the Kayas for a period of a few months. MADCA’s long term ambition is to re-establish the Kayas as the “real” homesteads of the elders and the Giriama. As Mwarandu emphasized in this comment, MADCA’s activities in connection with the Kaya elders are oriented toward the immediate benefit of the people by metaphorically providing *ugali*, the “daily bread” of maize flour, which is the staple diet for many Kenyans.

Another illustration of divergent priorities between NMK and MADCA is provided in the issue of ancestral Mijikenda memorial statues, known as *vigango*, that have been stolen from Mijikenda lands since the 1980s. In 2003, the American anthropologists Monica Udvardy and Linda Giles reported that 294 stolen *vigango* had been found among the “African arts” collections of US museums such as Hampton University Museum, Denver Museum of Nature and Science, and Illinois State Museum (formerly at Illinois State University)(Udvardy et al. 2003: 294). Since then, Udvardy and Giles have collaborated with NMK to repatriate *vigango* from the US into the hands of the Mijikenda (Udvardy et al. 2003; Udvardy and Giles 2008). Despite the ongoing return of stolen *vigango*, many cannot be easily reunited with their original owners, and since 2010, the repatriated *vigango* have been housed at Fort Jesus Museum in Mombasa, a branch of NMK.

As I was told in 2010 by Jimbi Katana, the chief curator of the Fort Jesus Museum,

“We have a plan to reinstall those *vigango* at a new Malindi Museum in the near future, to be known as the Malindi Cultural Complex.” However, MADCA insists that the stolen *vigango* should be returned to the Kayas. While viewing the *vigango* in such a museum would entail the necessity of entrance fees, their restoration to the Kayas—the “big homesteads” of the Mijikenda peoples—would mean that Mijikenda citizens could be admitted to view the *vigango* for free.

The matter of the *vigango* is still a hot potato, politically speaking,¹⁷⁾ and it is not clear how the situation will develop. However, through the debate from both sides over how best to reinstall the *vigango*, we can see that local narratives revolve around the intertwined yet opposing interpretations of the Kayas as “homestead” and “cultural heritage.”

4. Conclusion: The Kayas’ Autochthony as *Kivuri* (Living Soul/Living Shadow)

The notion of homesteads (*mudzi*) is becoming an important notion in discussions of the Kayas. The question of whether the Kayas are still homesteads or have some characteristics of homesteads, may seem to be a relatively simple question. As UNESCO mentioned above, “since their abandonment as preferred places of settlement, Kayas have been transferred from the domestic aspect of the Mijikenda landscape to its spiritual sphere.”

This background is a good starting point for understanding the current position of the Kayas. The Kayas, in fact, might best be described as “once and future” homesteads—simultaneously no longer and not yet spaces for living. The Kayas are empty or void; nobody lives in them except a few Kaya elders, with no livestock such as cattle, goats, or sheep. One would therefore be hard pressed to argue that the Kayas still serve as homesteads for the Mijikenda. Despite this, the Mijikenda often refer to the Kayas as “our homestead” or “big homesteads.”

Even if the Kayas could still be considered homesteads to some degree, as living spaces, they are both excess to and under-equipped for the requirements of contemporary daily life. Thus, could we say that the Kayas have been shifted from the domestic to the spiritual sphere? Certainly, the spiritual sphere is recognized as an aspect of cultural heritage in terms of UNESCO’s global vision of OUV. However, what may be considered a source of spiritual character? Might we point to ancestral spirits such as those reified in the wooden memorial statues (*vigango*)? Alternatively, could we cite magical charms such as the *fingo*, considered to have been brought from the original homeland of Singwaya and buried in the earth beneath the Kayas? Alternatively, medical plants for traditional healers? The fact is that most of these exist outside the Kayas, in the real homesteads that serve as living spaces among the Mijikenda. Considering the metonymical link to Singwaya as the source of the Kayas’ power, it is perhaps best seen as a matter of degree. As Parkin has said, “the Kaya is, indeed, the Giriama homestead par excellence and embodies them all” (Parkin 1991: 225).

To my mind, the Kayas have maintained some aspects of their homestead character. They are not simply abandoned homesteads (*gandzo*) and cannot be reduced to heritage

because of the contemporary importance of their unique spirituality. In conclusion, I would therefore like to argue that despite their abandonment as *preferred* places of settlement, the Kayas have retained a sense of being a homestead that is integral to the self-identity of the Mijikenda.

In my fieldwork among the Giriama, I found that this sense of homestead attributed to the Kayas is very similar to the Mijikenda notion of *kivuri* (living soul or living shadow). Like the Kayas' relationship to the Mijikenda people, a *kivuri* and its owner are imagined not only as metonymically the same (each part representing the whole) but also imagined as metaphorically other.

When I was conducting anthropological fieldwork along the Sabaki/Gallana River in the 1990s, an elder told me, "I met you a couple of months ago. I enjoyed talking with you—you looked happy in your red jacket, talking about your girlfriends, ha-ha-ha!" This was confusing to me, as I did not have any red jacket or girlfriends, not to mention the fact that I had been in Japan at the time. I knew, however, that the Giriama sometimes discussed dreamed incidents without distinguishing them from reality. I guessed that the elder had met my "living soul" or *kivuri* in a dream. Parkin summarizes the notion of *kivuri* as follows:

Kivuri, living soul, is sometimes referred to also as *peho* (as when a diviner might say to a victim, "a witch has taken your soul/life force," using either the phrase *wahalwa peho ni mutsai* or *wahalwa kivuri ni mutsai*). But the "whole person" is only a condition of temporary balance and, in the course of life itself, personal vulnerabilities continue. [...] The repetitive form, *kivurivuri*, means "shadow." It can only exist as part of a visible object. Similarly, only visible, living persons can have a *kivuri*, soul. [...] By the same token, the *kivuri* does not survive a person after their death. At that point, they become, instead, a *koma*, or ancestral spirit. Thus, while *kivuri* can only exist as an aspect of a visible human being and is, for witches, also tangible and material, the ancestral spirit or soul, *koma*, is the opposite. [...] The contrast between *kivuri* and *koma* nicely summarizes that between the material transitoriness of human life and the immaterial permanency, in principle at least, of ancestral life. (Parkin 1991: 214)

The Giriama believe that the owner of *kivuri* cannot know the nature or actions of their *kivuri*-self because the *kivuri* only emerges when the owner is asleep. Thus, the *kivuri* is not only a metonymically essential part of a person but also an independent entity that is metaphorically detached from the original. It seemed that my *kivuri*-self had donned *his* favorite jacket and talked about *his* girlfriends.

Drawing on the notion of the *kivuri* as metaphor, we might consider the Kayas as the "living soul" or "living shadow" of actual Mijikenda homesteads. If the Kayas are contaminated, the Mijikenda are also endangered. The spiritual world of the Kayas parallels the real world of the Mijikenda. The two worlds are mutually influential in the same way that a person's body is interrelated with its *kivuri*, but not the same. The Kayas are void but they are alive, and in that sense are symbols of the transitoriness of Mijikenda life. Although as "heritage," the Kayas are framed as the spiritual world of the

ancestors (*koma*), it is more important to the Mijikenda that the Kayas remain in a living state. We are told that the Kayas should be restored to re-establish the real Mijikenda homestead in a moment of crisis. Is this not similar to how someone whose *kivuri* is stolen by a witch is advised to repatriate his or her *kivuri* through ritual? For a Mijikenda to enter the Kaya is akin to a person meeting his or her own *kivuri* in the shadow world. In this way, the Kayas and *kivuri* may be seen as congruent notions in terms of the semantic aspect of transitoriness.

Here, it is worth remembering Parkin's ethnographic observation that after their abandonment as real homesteads, the Kayas continued to be imagined as homesteads both metonymically and metaphorically. While I accept that protecting natural forests in a globalizing world is important not only for the Mijikenda but for all of humanity, I believe that what is most critically vulnerable in this situation, as much as if not more than the forests as natural environments, is the very sociocultural imagination of the Mijikenda. How this imagination can best be preserved for future generations remains an open question.

Finally, I would like to return to the case of Katana Kalulu's death (Photos 8 and 9). In January 2015, a year after his death, MADCA held a small celebration in honor of the murdered man's memory. At this ceremony, a member of the semi-secret society to which Kalulu had belonged (the *Gohu* or the *Vaya*)¹⁸) humorously and sorrowfully imitated the appearance and voice of the deceased man. Kalulu had already become a *koma*, an ancestral spirit, after his death, but this young follower performed as a "living" Katana Kalulu in front of the other participants. He made all participants laugh and cry, and recalled Kalulu's memory as a warm and humorous grandfather (*tsawe*) and elder (*mutumia*) for the homestead and wider Giriama community, as well as a Kaya elder (*mutumia wa Kaya*). The young Kalulu follower imitated Kalulu as though he was Kalulu's *kivuru*. This was a metaphorical expression, as imitation or mimesis are based not on a metonymical but a metaphorical relationship between the imitator and imitated. This metaphorical sense of the Giriama homestead may thus be seen as rooted not only in the daily meal as *ugali* but also philosophical notions such as *kivuri*.

Are the Kayas still a sacred void under the conditions of a globalizing Africa? To answer this question, I would like to refer to Parkin's phrase, "But in so cleansing the Kaya, its imagined void becomes filled again with content, including many old metonyms, contrasts, and associations, but also some new ones ... The void is, then, that point at which memory is revived and recreated, but also allowed to think what was previously unthinkable" (Parkin 1991: 229). It seems that the more that the Kayas are leveraged as resources for eco-tourism, biodiversity, nature conservation, and the exhibition of cultural heritage, the more the Kayas will be repatriated and reclaimed as homesteads for the Kaya elders and the Mijikenda. The Kayas remain a sacred void that simultaneously articulates "previously unthinkable" notions such as UNESCO's global vision of cultural heritage, while retaining their autochthonic sense as a living shadow, *kivuri*, of the traditional homestead.



Photo 8 Katana Kalulu blessing people in front of Mekatilili's tombstone at the Mekatilili Cultural Festival in Bungale, Malindi, Kenya. (Photograph by Mariko Kuga 2008, Copyright Katsuhiko Keida 2008)



Photo 9 Katana Kalulu (left) dancing in front of Mekatilili's tombstone at the Mekatilili Cultural Festival in Bungale, Malindi, Kenya. (Photograph by Mariko Kuga 2008, Copyright Katsuhiko Keida 2008)

Acknowledgments

Funding for this research was provided by the Japan Society for the Promotion of Science (JSPS), Grants-in-Aid for Scientific Research (A): Anthropological International Research on Spirituality and Religions in Kenyan Coast (Project Leader: K. Keida), No. JP23242055. The initial idea for this chapter, "Still a 'Sacred Void?': The Invention of Natural Forests and Rethinking of Semantic Aspects of the Kayas of the Kenyan Coast," was presented on *An Africanist's Legacy — A Workshop in Celebration of the Work of David Parkin* (at the Pauling Centre for Human Sciences in Oxford, July 8–9, 2010). A revised version of the paper, "Cultural Heritages, Sacred Places and Living Spaces: The Case of the Mijikenda Kaya Forests along the Kenyan Coast of East Africa" was delivered as a part of the *Core Research Project, Anthropology of Cultural Heritages: Communities and Materiality in Global Systems: Do Cultural Heritages Forge Communities? Cases from Africa* (held in the Fourth Seminar Room, National Museum of Ethnology in Osaka, May 27–28, 2013).

Notes

- 1) "Kaya elder shot dead," *Daily Nation*, January 17, 2014. <http://www.nation.co.ke/counties/Kilifi/Kaya-elder-shot-dead/-/1183282/2149828/-/view/printVersion/-/12oh56i/-/index.html> (accessed September 12, 2015)
- 2) His age is reported variously from 75 to 95 in different sources.
- 3) "Assassins killed top kaya elder, say detectives," *Daily Nation*, January 19, 2014. <http://www.nation.co.ke/counties/Assassins-killed-top-Kaya-elder-say-detectives/-/1107872/2152080/-/view/printVersion/-/2uutie/-/index.html> (accessed September 12, 2015)
- 4) According to the *Daily Nation*, "Kaya elders in collaboration with a human rights group have launched a campaign against the killing of elderly people on suspicion that they practised

witchcraft. The ‘Mvi si uchawi; Uzee ni hekima’ (grey hair is not witchcraft; old age is wisdom) initiative is aimed at creating awareness on the rights of old people in society. The campaign, through the MADCA, targets the youth said to be behind the attacks on old, grey-haired men” (in “Kaya elders, rights group work to end lynchings,” *Daily Nation*, May 29, 2014. <http://www.nation.co.ke/counties/Kilifi/-Elders-step-in-to-stop-lynchings/-/1183282/2330990/-/view/printVersion/-/yew4w/-/index.html> (accessed September 21, 2015))

- 5) “Assassins killed top kaya elder, say detectives,” *Daily Nation*, January 19, 2014. <http://www.nation.co.ke/counties/Assassins-killed-top-Kaya-elder-say-detectives/-/1107872/2152080/-/view/printVersion/-/2uutie/-/index.html> (accessed September 12, 2015). Additionally, Joseph Mwarandu, Secretary-general of MADCA, commented in 2014 that “We are working closely with the police. In the event an elder is lynched, family members would be the first suspects since they are the ones who perpetrate it just because of greed for land and property and not witchcraft as claimed” (In “Kaya elders, rights group work to end lynchings” *Daily Nation*, May 29, 2014. <http://www.nation.co.ke/counties/Kilifi/-Elders-step-in-to-stop-lynchings/-/1183282/2330990/-/view/printVersion/-/yew4w/-/index.html> (accessed September 21, 2015)).
- 6) As there is no space to focus on this question in depth here, I limit my discussion in this article to an outline of the incident. I intend to explore the question in more detail elsewhere.
- 7) According to Barbara Engels, “The concept of serial World Heritage properties has gained much popularity during recent years. This is reflected in the increasing number of nominations and inscriptions of serial properties on the UNESCO World Heritage List. [...] The contribution of serial properties to the Global Strategy for a Representative, Balanced and Credible World Heritage List, with its aim of ensuring that the List reflects the world’s cultural and natural diversity of outstanding universal value, could be one of these benefits” (Engels 2010: 79).
- 8) The reference to ten rather than eleven forests suggest that Kaya Kinondo is not included as a designated cultural property due to its somewhat exceptional status among “the Mijikenda Sacred Kaya Forests” (World Heritage Committee 2009).
- 9) As noted above, over 60 Kayas are generally thought to remain in existence.
- 10) The Selection Criteria (<http://whc.unesco.org/en/criteria/>) for a property to be included on the World Heritage List are as follows (underlined Criteria are those that relate specifically to the Mijikenda Kayas);
 - (i) to represent a masterpiece of human creative genius.
 - (ii) to exhibit an important interchange of human values, over a span of time or within a cultural area of the world, on developments in architecture or technology, monumental arts, town-planning, or landscape design.
 - (iii) to bear a unique or at least exceptional testimony to a cultural tradition or to a civilization which is living or which has disappeared.
 - (iv) to be an outstanding example of a type of building, architectural or technological ensemble or landscape which illustrates (a) significant stage(s) in human history.
 - (v) to be an outstanding example of a traditional human settlement, land-use, or sea-use, which is representative of a culture (or cultures), or human interaction with the environment, especially when it has become vulnerable under the impact of irreversible change.
 - (vi) to be directly or tangibly associated with events or living traditions, with ideas, or with

- beliefs, with artistic and literary works of outstanding universal significance. (The Committee considers that this criterion should preferably be used in conjunction with other criteria)
- (vii) to contain superlative natural phenomena or areas of exceptional natural beauty and aesthetic importance.
 - (viii) to be outstanding examples representing major stages of earth's history, including the record of life, significant on-going geological processes in the development of landforms, or significant geomorphic or physiographic features.
 - (ix) to be outstanding examples representing significant on-going ecological and biological processes in the evolution and development of terrestrial, fresh water, coastal, and marine ecosystems and communities of plants and animals.
 - (x) to contain the most important and significant natural habitats for in-situ conservation of biological diversity, including those containing threatened species of outstanding universal value from the point of view of science or conservation.
- 11) David Parkin has also remarked on the alarm among members of this expedition at their discovery of a tendency for "Giriama knowledge as a commodity to be sold at negotiable and therefore ever-increasing monetary value." However, he also notes that this trend "may or may not have been arrested by the purificatory action of the Kaya elders in 1988" (Parkin 1991: 46).
 - 12) According to the *Daily Nation* (June 20, 2005, "Long line of visionaries", <http://www.nation.co.ke/magazines/-/1190/66018/-/view/printVersion/-/yag0jtz/-/index.html> (accessed January 10, 2004); see also Willis 2008: 235), "Maitha was the fourth leader since independence in 1963. The first was Ronald Ngala, who was installed during the freedom struggle [...] He died in 1972 and was succeeded by Matano. Later, trade unionist Juma Boy took the mantle. When Boy died, Matano held the post again, until Maitha's installation (April 20, 2003). However, Kahindi Jogolo (who claims to be spokesman of Kaya elders) says the first leader was Bambaulo, who was crowned in 1857. In 1913, Mekatilili wa Menza took the mantle. The leadership was handed over to Ronald Ngala in 1960, and to Maitha in 1993 [...] Due to poor land ownership at the Coast, some kayas have been grabbed by private developers, causing tension in the community. Lately, many leaders have been initiated as elders. They include Tourism and Wildlife minister Morris Dzero, Likoni MP Suleiman Shakombo, former Kisauni District Officer Ngumbao Nyule, and Kisauni politician Mohammed Mwandugu."
 - 13) "Assassins killed top kaya elder, say detectives," *Daily Nation*, January 19, 2014. <http://www.nation.co.ke/counties/Assassins-killed-top-Kaya-elder-say-detectives/-/1107872/2152080/-/view/printVersion/-/2uutic/-/index.html> (accessed September 12, 2015)
 - 14) Although usually written "MADCA," the group's members pronounce the name "madica" (mædɪkə). For a detailed discussion of MADCA and Mekatilili, see Nymweru and Carrier (2011).
 - 15) MADCA's organization of the 2008 Mekatilili Festival was a success, which has led to its continuing coverage in the mass media. See, for example, "Malindi honours Kenya freedom heroine," *Daily Nation*, August 18, 2009. <http://www.nation.co.ke/news/regional/-/1070/641820/-/view/printVersion/-/ih0snlz/-/index.html> (accessed September 20, 2015); "Home of cultural diversity," *Daily Nation*, June 27, 2012. <http://www.nation.co.ke/counties/Kilifi/Home-of->

- cultural-diversity/-/1183282/1437492/-/view/printVersion/-/lp072m/-/index.html (accessed September 20, 2015); and “‘Mad Woman’ who rattled the British,” *Daily Nation*, June 6, 2013. <http://www.nation.co.ke/lifestyle/DN2/Mad-woman-who-rattled-the-British/-/957860/1873784/-/view/printVersion/-/91326z/-/index.html> (accessed September 20, 2015)
- 16) “Uhuru seeks new ties in ODM region,” *Daily Nation*, September 5, 2015. <http://www.nation.co.ke/news/politics/Uhuru-seeks-new-ties-in-ODM-region/-/1064/2859936/-/view/printVersion/-/dy38e4/-/index.html> (accessed September 21, 2015)
- 17) For example, “A colourful ceremony marked the return of two memorial statues to a village in Kaloleni District on Wednesday. Known locally as *vigango*, the statues had been stolen from a family in Chelani village and taken to two separate American museums” (in “Pomp as two statues are returned,” *Daily Nation*, June 22, 2007. <http://www.nation.co.ke/News/-/1056/192934/-/view/printVersion/-/116fbrbz/-/index.html> (accessed September 21, 2015)); “The principal curator of the museum, Phillip Jimbi Katana, travelled to the remote village in the coastal region to hand over the two statues. ‘We are handing over two *vigango*, which were stolen here in 1985 and they found their way all the way to America,’ Mr Katana said” (in “Kenyan fete repatriated relics,” *Story from BBC NEWS*, June 6, 2007, <http://news.bbc.co.uk/go/pr/ft/-/1/hi/world/africa/6231134.stm> (accessed January 10, 2012)); “the elders, who were drawn from the three Giriama zones of Galana, Weruni and Godoma, unanimously agreed that the artefacts should be preserved at Kaya Fungo, which is the community’s biggest sacred forest and also a World Heritage Site” (in “Artefacts sold abroad recovered,” *Daily Nation*, accessed March 2, 2010. <http://www.nation.co.ke/News/-/1056/872004/-/view/printVersion/-/vwr713/-/index.html>, March 5, 2010); “Some Kilifi leaders have opposed the Nairobi County Assembly officials’ planned trip to the US to repatriate 30 Mijikenda artefacts to Kenya. The leaders argue that the artefacts, *vigango* (wooden burial poles), are of cultural value and attachment to the Mijikenda alone” (in “Nairobi accused of hijacking return of Mijikenda artefacts,” *Daily Nation*, February 18, 2014. <http://www.nation.co.ke/counties/Nairobi-accused-of-hijacking-return-of-Mijikenda-artefacts/-/1107872/2211966/-/view/printVersion/-/xoqbkaz/-/index.html> (accessed September 13, 2015)).
- 18) McIntosh (2009: 40) provides a concise explanation of the *Gohu* and the *Vaya*, “the Gohu society, for instance, have special roles and privileges associated with conspicuous consumption, redistribution and fertility. [...] The society considered the ultimate ruling group is the exclusive Vaya, who have a judicial and policing function in the community, and are seen as custodians of especially potent herbal medicine and incantation, including the fearsome *fisi* hyena oath which is often used in trials of witchcraft.”

References

- Brantley, C.
1981 *The Giriama and Colonial Resistance in Kenya 1800–1920*. Berkeley: University of California Press.
- Brumann, C. and D. Berliner (eds.)
2016 *World Heritage on the Ground: Ethnographic Perspectives*. New York: Berghahn Books. (ebook, Kindle)

- Engels, B.
 2010 Serial Natural Heritage Sites: A Model to Enhance Diversity of World Heritage? In D. Offenhäuser, W. Ch. Zimmerli, and M.-T. Albert (eds.) *World Heritage and Cultural Diversity*, pp. 79–84. Bonn: German Commission for UNESCO.
- Foster, M. D.
 2015 Imagined UNESCOs: Interpreting Intangible Cultural Heritage on a Japanese Island. In M. D. Foster and L. Gilman (eds.) *UNESCO on the Ground: Local Perspectives on Intangible Cultural Heritage* (Chap.4), Bloomington and Indianapolis: Indiana University Press. (ebook, Kindle)
- Foster, M. D. and L. Gilman (eds.)
 2015 *UNESCO on the Ground: Local Perspectives on Intangible Cultural Heritage*. Bloomington and Indianapolis: Indiana University Press. (ebook, Kindle)
- Giles, L. and R. Gearhart (eds.)
 2013 *Contesting Identities: The Mijikenda and Their Neighbors in Kenyan Coast Society*. Trenton: Red Sea Press.
- Gilman, L.
 2015 Demonic or Cultural Treasure? Local Perspectives on Vimbuza, Intangible Cultural Heritage, and UNESCO in Malawai. In M. D. Foster and L. Gilman (eds.) *UNESCO on the Ground: Local Perspectives on Intangible Cultural Heritage* (Chap.3), Bloomington and Indianapolis: Indiana University Press. (ebook, Kindle)
- Nyamweru, C. K. and N. Carrier
 2011 The (Re)creation of a Heroine: The Case of Mekatilili wa Menza (a presentation paper), The Open University Symposium, “Commemorating the Past, Creating the Future: Kenya’s Heritage Crossroads,” September 9, 2011, London. www.open.ac.uk/Arts/ferguson-centre/memorialisation/events/london-symposium-2011/Celia_Neil_Mekatilili.pdf (accessed September 21, 2015)
- Nyamweru, C. K., S. Kibet, Mohammed Pakia, and J. A. Cooke
 2008 The Kaya Forests of Coastal Kenya: ‘Remnant Patches’ or Dynamic Entities? In M. J. Sheridan and C. Nyamueru (eds.) *African Sacred Groves: Ecological Dynamics and Social Change*. Oxford: James Currey.
- McIntosh, J.
 2009 Elders and ‘Frauds’: Commodified Expertise and Politicized Authenticity among Mijikenda. *Africa* 79(1): 35–52.
- Parkin, D.
 1972 *Palms, Wine and Witnesses*. San Francisco: Chandler.
 1991 *Sacred Void: Spatial Images of Works and Ritual among the Giriama of Kenya*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
 2011 Trust Talk and Alienable Talk in Healing: A Problem of Medical Diversity. *MMG Working Paper 11–11*. Göttingen: Max Planck Institute for the Study of Religious and Ethnic Diversity.
- Probst, P.
 2016 Prickly Prestations: Living with (World) Heritage in Osogbo, Nigeria. In C. Brumann and D. Berliner (eds.) *World Heritage on the Ground: Ethnographic Perspectives*

(Chap.10). New York: Berghahn Books. (ebook, Kindle)

Spear, T. T.

1978 *The Kaya Complex: A History of the Mijikenda Peoples of the Kenya Coast to 1900*. Nairobi: Kenya Literature Bureau.

Stoczkowski, W.

2009 UNESCO's Doctrine of Human Diversity: A Secular Soteriology? *Anthropology Today* 25(3): 7–11.

Tinga, K. K.

2004 The Presentation and Interpretation of Ritual Sites: The Mijikenda Kaya Case. *Museum International* 56(3): 8–14.

Udvardy, M. L. and L. L. Giles

2008 Groundbreaking Repatriation of Two Kenyan Memorial Statues. *Anthropology News* 49 (1): 30.

Udvardy, M. L., L. L. Giles and J. B. Mitsanze

2003 The Transatlantic Trade in African Ancestors: Mijikenda Memorial Statues (*Vigango*) and the Ethics of Collecting and Curating Non-western Cultural Property. *American Anthropologist* 105(3): 566–580.

UNESCO

2008 Advisory Body Evaluation (The Mijikenda Kaya Forest, Kenya, No.1231rev.), UNESCO. http://whc.unesco.org/archive/advisory_body_evaluation/1231rev.pdf (accessed September 14, 2015)

Willis, J.

1993 *Mombasa, the Swahili and the Making of the Mijikenda*. Oxford: Clarendon Press.

2009 The King of the Mijikenda and Other Stories about the Kaya: Heritage, Politics, and Histories in Multiparty Kenya. In D. R. Peterson and G. Macola (eds.) *Recasting the Past: History Writing and Political Work in Modern Africa*, pp. 233–250. Athens, OH: Ohio University Press.

World Heritage Committee

2009 Decisions Adopted at the 32nd Session of the World Heritage Committee, QUEBEC CITY, 2008, WHC-08/32.COM/24Rev, UNESCO. Paris: UNESCO World Heritage Centre. <http://whc.unesco.org/archive/2008/whc08-32com-24reve.pdf> (accessed September 24, 2015)

“Adaptive” Heritage: Carving as a Cultural Icon and a Way of Life for the Zafimaniry of Madagascar

Taku Iida

National Museum of Ethnology

1. Introduction

The Zafimaniry people are a small population of swidden cultivators who inhabit a mountainous region in the highlands of Madagascar (Coulaud 1973). Due to the inaccessibility of this area and the relative scarcity of factory-made tools and wares, they have traditionally relied upon making their handicrafts from materials such as wood or grass.

Of note are their wooden houses, which are decorated with geometric engravings. The techniques and tools used to produce such work are easily reproducible, and many inhabitants have mastered the craft over time by imitating other practitioners. In 2003, the wood-crafting knowledge of the Zafimaniry people was designated as “a masterpiece of the oral and intangible heritage of humanity” by UNESCO, and since 2008, it has been inscribed on the Representative List of the Intangible Cultural Heritage of Humanity.

Although Zafimaniry skills and knowledge have developed in an isolated setting, the community is increasingly impacted by modernization resulting from global advances in transportation and telecommunication. There are deep concerns expressed, particularly by local authorities, that Zafimaniry “intangible heritage” will lose its UNESCO inscription as it gradually succumbs to the increasing availability of manufactured goods and information.

Based on this contention, this chapter first aims to describe the changeable situation of Zafimaniry culture. Second, it aims to highlight how this “adaptive” heritage is shaped by inter-related changes occurring within and outside the Zafimaniry culture itself. The discussion concludes by weighing up the effects of modern-day rapid change on Zafimaniry traditional skills and comparing these impacts with the natural variation that has occurred in crafting practices during the period when the community was in relative isolation. Finally, this chapter concludes with an appeal for a reworking of the definition of “intangible heritage” to incorporate its intrinsically “adaptive” nature, both shaping and being shaped by those who practice it.

As “intangible heritage” has often been regarded as separate from and opposite to “tangible heritage” (Smith and Akagawa 2009; Arizpe and Amescua 2013), a redefinition

of the term could raise awareness of the changeable nature of skills and cultural practices over time. In this way, by breaking down the perceived dichotomous relationship between the tangible and intangible, it is hoped that this will result in a wider appreciation of heritage as a combination of co-dependent physical and non-physical elements, and as a product of a process of adaptation to forces of changes both within and outside of a community.

In this chapter, it may be noted that the concept of “adaptive heritage” is similar to current anthropological definitions of culture, which are often configured as a composite of symbols, practices, and knowledge systems that are shaped by both past and present events and circumstances. Concurrently, therefore, cultural anthropologists should tackle the subject of heritage not as a secondary theme, but as a core part of current debates in anthropological and cultural studies.

2. The Zafimaniry as Forest Dwellers

Although there is no official census for the Zafimaniry community, it is estimated that their population does not exceed 10,000 people. Compared to the Malagasy national population of 20 million in neighboring areas, the population is so small that very few people even regard the Zafimaniry as an independent ethnic group, particularly in regions far from the Zafimaniry residential area. In fact, many Zafimaniry people identify themselves as members of the neighboring Betsileo or Tanala ethnicity. However, due to increasing competitiveness with other Malagasy people, it has been observed that the Zafimaniry have been asserting a stronger cultural identity in recent years (Uchibori 2013).

After my initial visit to the Zafimaniry community in 2007, the following data and analysis are based on fieldwork that was undertaken at regular intervals from 2009 through 2012 over a total of 87 days for the purposes of research and museum collection. The conclusions are based on experiences and impressions gained during this period and supplemented by additional short research trips made in 2013, 2014, and 2015.

One of the most distinctive features of Zafimaniry material culture is their dwellings (Photo 1). In the 19th century, wooden houses of this type were common in the central highlands of Madagascar, exhibiting wide variations in design (Decary 1958). However, in modern times, this number has decreased dramatically owing to the widespread adoption of bricks as the standard building material. Nowadays, wooden houses of this size are said to be concentrated only in the residential areas of the Zafimaniry community, which has led to all such wooden houses in the region being referred to as “Zafimaniry houses” (*trano Zafimaniry*). It is possible that this term was first coined by those outside of the community, but it has since been adopted by the Zafimaniry.

One of the most distinctive features of this type of house is that it is principally constructed without the use of nails. Some Zafimaniry have described this characteristic as representative of their people’s character: supporting each other not with enforcement, but with love. Research participants also explained that for them, the traditional wooden house is an expression of the Zafimaniry ideal of mutual love and help, a cultural value



Photo 1 A house in the Zafimaniry style (*trano Zafimaniry*, taken by the author in 2010)

expressed as important to many communities all over Madagascar. The Zafimaniry house is therefore a powerful object that embodies this paradigm (Iida 2013a).

In earlier research, Bloch (1993; 1995a) highlighted that the Zafimaniry house is also an expression of “durability” or *teza*, as it is called in Malagasy, a value that is prized both materially and socially. This is represented by the construction of the walls of the house: When a young couple begins their life in a new home, the walls are constructed by combining flattened pieces of bamboo. This bamboo is split vertically and smoothed down to create rectangular flat pieces, which are then joined in a woven grid to make wall panels. At first, these panels are often see-through due to the gaps between the woven pieces. However, over time, the married couple gradually strengthens this wall by inserting more wooden boards and, as the durability (*teza*) of the walls increases, the house also acquires this virtue. The process whereby a house gains in physical size and hardness coincides with the growth and strengthening of the family. For the Zafimaniry, therefore, who communicate a deep respect for durability, this cultural value is embodied and materialized in their homes.

Another characteristic trait of Zafimaniry homes is the geometric patterns (*sikotra*) carved on the wooden shutters of the windows (Photo 2). Some people have questioned whether these patterns are representative of family crests, or perhaps have a magical function.¹⁾ During the course of fieldwork, however, it was observed that these patterns are a decorative feature marking the completion of a long process of building a house when it has achieved *teza* (durability and hardness).

Bloch has stated that in the past, people outside of the Zafimaniry community often mistakenly interpreted Zafimaniry patterns, which were seen to be exotic, so-called “primitive art,” as being latent with mysterious symbols (Iida 2013b; see also Bloch 1995b). However, before modern building materials and paint became available, carving was used as one of the few techniques available for decorating a house. There are several basic patterns for Zafimaniry geometric carvings; their characteristic style is produced by



Photo 2 Geometric patterns carved on window shutters (taken by Itsushi Kawase in 2012)

a combination of these patterns that fill a round or rectangular frame (Iida 2013b).

According to tradition, the construction of the house, along with engravings on it, is highly regarded by Zafimaniry people, as they usually build a house only once in their entire life. Therefore, for at least a few generations, house owners were accustomed to hiring skilled carpenters to complete their houses. When there was insufficient money to finish a task, the carpenter took on the responsibility of producing and fixing tenons (wooden joints) into mortises (slots for the joints), while the remaining work was completed by the owner's family. This is often the case with engraved patterns, which are carved not only by skilled carpenters but also by house owners themselves. It is easy to see how such elaborate and ornate patterns on these houses attracted attention from non-Zafimaniry tourists, which finally led to the inscription of the knowledge and craft on the UNESCO Intangible Cultural Heritage list.

In contrast to the production of houses as luxury objects, more routine and everyday objects are also commonly produced. Due to the mountainous and comparatively isolated region in which they live, members of the Zafimaniry community traditionally had to make tools and wares for their own consumption. These items included honey containers, which used to be considered an indispensable item during seasons when food was scarce (Photo 3a); stools, which are kept aside for guests in the house (Photo 4a); and flint-carrying cases, which are used for lighting fires to clear the swidden fields (Photo 5a).

The carving skills to produce everyday necessities possess some noteworthy characteristics: (1) use of readily available natural resources; (2) application of rich natural-historical knowledge to manipulate such materials; (3) minimizing the number of tools required by employing various bodily techniques; and (4) daily opportunities for ordinary people to harness and master woodcraft skills through observation and imitation of other craftsmen.

Such characteristics rarely feature in the typical range of carpentry skills found in the West. In addition, all Zafimaniry tools and wares are traditionally carved from a single block of wood; that is, the craftsmen seldom make tools by joining together



(3a)



(3b)

Photos 3a and 3b (3a) Honey container of the older style; (3b) honey container with a geometric pattern (both taken by the author in 2009)



(4a)



(4b)

Photos 4a and 4b (4a) A stool of the older style (taken by the author in 2009); (4b) stools with geometric patterns (National Museum of Ethnology 2013: 62)



(5a)



(5b)

Photos 5a and 5b (5a) Flint-carrying case of the older style; (5b) flint-carrying case with a geometric pattern (both taken by the author in 2009)

multiple wooden pieces. These techniques are also applied to the construction of their homes, which are made from complementary jointed pieces of wood without the use of nails or screws.

3. Commercialization of Wood-crafting

Although the description of the status of Zafimaniry culture in the previous section can be considered representative of wood-crafting practices in earlier times, in recent years, the community has been undergoing a process of rapid change due to the shift from a comparatively cashless, agrarian society to an increasing participation in the global market economy.

The first major change seems to have occurred in the 1960s when Zafimaniry farmers started to sell their woodwork to foreign visitors: a trend initiated by a French Catholic priest who had begun to collect their work as art. He aimed to alleviate the suffering of farmers who were particularly affected by poor harvests (Peltreau-Villeneuve 1991). In a similar way, the museum associated with the University of Antananarivo in the country's capital was also collecting cultural artifacts from villages in Madagascar, focusing on the artistic traditions passed down in mountainous areas. This subsequently led to a substantial collection of woodcarvings currently in their museum (Vérin 1964). Consequently, Zafimaniry sculpture achieved wider recognition for their craftsmanship through the appraisal of foreign visitors and art collectors, and their work began to gain status among the wealthy classes of Madagascar.

The spread and adoption of a cash-based economy in the Zafimaniry community resulted in the following changes to craft making.

a) Professionalization

Before commercialization, wood-crafting was an occasional activity to produce tools and wares for personal use. As farming was the Zafimaniry's major livelihood, people only engaged in woodcraft when they were not at work in the fields. As the demand for woodcrafts from external buyers increased, so did the potential for a greater cash flow to the household, meaning that farmers began to devote more time to wood-crafting as a source of income.

This change occurred at variable rates in each village, depending on their accessibility to the outside world. In 2012, it was possible to find craftsmen working full-time in Antoetra, a town that offers an advantageous location with a road to bring many foreign tourists to the area; while they were absent, they hired somebody else to farm their fields. It was observed, however, that not only foreign tourists were buying the craftsmen's products, but Zafimaniry themselves were also purchasing furniture from professional craftsmen. This point is discussed in further detail below (see c).

b) "Iconicization" of Patterns

Traditionally, geometric patterns were not considered necessary for practical items, such as containers, stools, and flint boxes. Today, however, in the souvenir shops in Antoetra,

it is possible to find many such woodwork items containing decorative patterns (Photos 3b, 4b, and 5b). As it is difficult to carry away carved house parts, woodworkers began to carve similar motifs on small portable objects and items of furniture that could be taken home as souvenirs. For visitors, therefore, such decorated objects represent proof of their contact with the Zafimaniry people.

It is not possible to definitively say that portable objects did not have patterns before the 1960s. When the University of Antananarivo collected many samples of Zafimaniry woodworks in 1963 and 1964, quite a few objects, as well as window shutters, which were made before the growth of the tourist industry, had geometric patterns (Vérin 1964). It seems that such patterned objects were primarily used for interior decoration, rather than as practical household items. As a result of visitors’ preferences for decorative products, most portable goods in shops today exhibit a range of patterns, considered “iconic” of Zafimaniry culture.

c) New Forms and Styles

As the fame of Zafimaniry crafting skills gained recognition at a national and international level, this gave rise to a wave of new forms for tools and wares. The most popular product was a detachable deckchair made of two boards (Photo 6). This type of chair is commonly sold not only in Antoaetra, but also in Antananarivo, the capital city. It is called the “Zafimaniry chair” (*seza Zafimaniry*), even though such a type was not historically produced in Madagascar, but was traditionally found on the African mainland.

According to people in the village of Ambohimanjaka, the elders began producing such chairs, acting on the orders of a Catholic priest, whom they referred to as Michael Peltier, a mutation of his French name, Michel Peltreau-Villeneuve. Zafimaniry craftsmen thus began to create new designs to suit the tastes of foreign consumers. Although a comparatively recent innovation, it is not entirely inappropriate to call it a “Zafimaniry chair” because it is now widely used in Zafimaniry houses, especially in those houses where they expect to welcome many guests. Therefore, the modification of traditions for tourists’ consumption, such as the development of practical wares with patterns, flows back into and simultaneously influences Zafimaniry culture.

Another new craft that gained popularity was the clothes chest (Photo 7). It is made by combining multiple pieces of wood, a technique that was previously exclusively used for building houses. It is said that there are few Zafimaniry craftsmen, if any, who have the skill to make such chests at present; other producers simply carve the chest from blocks of wood and fix them together with iron nails. Moreover, producers of these chests are usually based in villages with better access, and thus, typically have a higher demand for production. It can be presumed that it has been quite some time since a traditional, skilled chest maker lived in Ambohimombo, as it is the only Zafimaniry village, except Antoaetra, which is accessible by car. In this village, it is no longer possible to find examples of the chests produced in this way.

Other types of “new” products include wooden boxes for Bibles, spice containers, knife sheaths, and decorated disks. The last item on the list, the decorated disk, is typically 20–30cm in diameter with geometric patterns on both sides. Zafimaniry



Photo 6 A deckchair made of two boards (*seza Zafimaniry*, taken by the author in 2009)



Photo 7 A clothes chest (taken by the author in 2009)

craftsmen call it *sous-plat*, meaning saucer in French, but few buyers expect to use it practically in this way. Rather, it is designed to be hung from a wall or placed on a stand as a tableau, serving as an icon of artistic Zafimaniry patterns.

Of these crafts, a Western-style chair with four long legs is most likely the oldest invention (Photo 8). At first glance, it looks like an ordinary chair, but on closer inspection it is possible to see that it is carved from one large block of wood. When Zafimaniry people began to produce woodworks for Europeans, they were not familiar with the technique of joining wooden pieces together for furniture, and as a result, they



Photo 8 A Western-style chair carved from one piece of wood (taken by the author in 2009)

began to produce works by carving from a single piece of wood. This means that the volume of waste material was greater than that of the finished product, a method that demanded high material and labor costs.

This may be the main reason that the chair is seldom seen nowadays, as the greater numbers of foreign visitors coming to the Zafimaniry region mean that it is more profitable to sell small and inexpensive things in larger quantities, rather than expending a lot of time and energy on single luxury items.

d) Innovation in Tools and Materials

The commercialization of woodcarvings has also increased the diversity of tools used for producing crafts. Photo 9 shows a set of tools that carvers typically used in their workshop at the time of fieldwork. It should be noted that this image may not exhibit the complete range because of the absence of tools required for rough processing. It is important to note that many tools are so small that local ironsmiths likely had difficulty in making them, meaning that some carving tools may have been manufactured by machines. It is not possible to conclude this issue until more extensive research is completed to clarify the forms of ancient carving tools used, but it is important to take this point into consideration.

Another important feature of this image is the presence of a black circular can at the top. This is an example of a shoe polish used to give wooden products a glossy finish. Although craftsmen have often given preference to products with a more pleasing esthetic




Photo 9 A set of a carver's stock-in-trade (taken by the author in 2009)

to appeal to consumers, the desired natural materials to achieve this appearance are rapidly decreasing. Therefore, they began to use shoe polish to make more common, readily available woods look attractive. They call the shoe polish *lida*, a corruption of *lude*, the commercial name of the polish, and it is made in China, a country with which Madagascar has especially focused on promoting trade since the 1990s. It is interesting to observe that imported modern supplies are increasingly needed for the continuation of local craftworks undertaken in remote local villages in Madagascar.

e) From Professional Craftsmen to Artists

It was observed that the word “professional craftsmen” was often used by outsiders to refer to Zafimaniry woodworkers; however, such craftsmen often prefer to call themselves “artists.” To sustain a career in woodworking, it is necessary for these practitioners to seek out and secure good buyers. In Antoetra, where foreign tourists gather in the largest numbers, there are several souvenir shops that exhibit artists’ works, and some have a relatively long connection with buyers from outside.

As activities that rely on cash-based transactions have diversified, this has led to a growth in the number of artists who have chosen not to produce three-dimensional objects, but prefer to focus exclusively on carving geometric patterns on the surface of antique wares. Such wares include rice containers from remote non-Zafimaniry villages, such as the Tanala people, who live in lowland rain forests. The Tanala region is home to many trees with a wide girth, and the rice containers used in their daily life are made by hollowing out large pieces of wood that are then adorned with decorative Zafimaniry patterns. A source of contention is whether such rice containers should be identified as Zafimaniry or Tanala woodcrafts.

4. “Heritagization” of Zafimaniry Crafts

The 2000s witnessed a sharp rise in the number of foreign tourists visiting Madagascar on account of the liberal diplomatic policies encouraged by President Marc Ravalomanana. Accordingly, there was a marked increase in tourists in this area, the majority of which were from foreign countries (Mancinelli, 2014). Consequently, more Zafimaniry people gained employment as guides and porters in Antoetra,²⁾ and concurrently, the volume of carvings sold commercially also increased.

In addition, the weekly market in Antoetra began to attract traders from other villages in the area who sought to sell agricultural and handmade products and purchase factory-made goods for themselves, meaning that the overall population of the area also increased. In 1998, for example, a crew from the National Museum of Ethnology, Japan recorded a film in Antoetra to document textile weaving. It is possible to see in the film that there were far fewer houses at that time than during more recent fieldwork in 2012.

In 2003, UNESCO designated Zafimaniry wood-crafting knowledge as one of the masterpieces of oral and intangible heritage of humanity and is now inscribed on the Representative List of the Intangible Cultural Heritage of Humanity.³⁾ This designation has since stimulated further demand for Zafimaniry woodcrafts, attracting even more tourists to the area. Consequently, the Zafimaniry community is more than ever dependent on a cash-based economy, which has brought about significant changes to traditional Zafimaniry knowledge and heritage practices.

f) Canonization of “Traditional” Knowledge and Patterns

As discussed previously, Zafimaniry patterns on window shutters and other items were not intended to possess special meanings. However, it was observed that people visiting from outside the community were keen to derive symbolism from these designs. Consequently, local Zafimaniry guides began to provide commentaries surrounding the origin and meaning of these patterns to satisfy the curiosity of outsiders.

It seems that international organizations, such as the Madagascar branch of UNESCO, have authorized these accounts by publishing a chart (Figure 1) of these commentaries in an official booklet (Ny Birao Mpandrindra UNESCO 2008), largely based on oral descriptions provided by local guides (Iida 2013b). Some Antoetra people, however, report that nearly all this information was derived from a single skilled carpenter in the village of Sakaivo who passed away in 2013.

It is not possible to ascertain whether the information provided by local guides is false. However, the primary concern is that if such knowledge is made too readily available, the intrinsic value of intangible heritage may be adversely impacted. Moreover, to preserve the integrity of knowledge relating to these practices, such information should be transmitted orally within the community, and not through a printed publication. The appearance of the UNESCO booklet, therefore, although having sought to preserve an intangible heritage, may ironically threaten its survival by trying to concretize knowledge that is inherently changeable and evolving, a characteristic that forms an essential part of its core value.

	ANARANA/ DENOMINATION	HEVINY	SIGNIFICATION OU SYMBOLE
1	Sampahon' akondro 	Tsy misara-mianakavy	<i>Cohésion familiale</i>
2	Kintana 	Firariam-pahazavana eo amin'ny fianana	<i>Vœux pour une vie sans embûches</i>
3	Tanamasoandro 	Fahazavam-po Fahatsaram-po Fatoram-pihavanana eo amin'ny fianakaviana	<i>Sincérité Honnêteté Liens familiaux</i>
4	Mason-tantely 	Firaisan-kina Fiaraha-miasa Fahamarinana Fizarana ny mamy	<i>Solidarité dans les travaux à entreprendre Honnêteté Partage du bonheur</i>

Figure 1 “Meanings” of geometric patterns canonized by a UNESCO publication (Ny Birao Mpandrindra 2008)

g) Replication of the Landscape

During my visit in July 2013, it was reported that French-related NGOs had offered to assist villagers in Antoetra to build new houses. The financial support provided was exclusively for the construction of wooden houses, but not for brick houses. Owners of brick houses were subsequently offered money for materials and the provision of carpenters' salaries in exchange for disassembling the houses in which they were then living, a program that was subscribed to by a surprisingly large number of residents: a total of 60 households in the village.

During a second visit in October 2015, I observed that there were 55 newly built wooden houses, with 10 old wooden houses repaired through finances supplied by this NGO. It was not a requirement that old wooden houses be disassembled, but instead received a special grant-in-aid for the replacement of any damaged parts. This program was carried out by the NGO “Des Villages et des Hommes.” According to their official website,⁴⁾ the program was financed by a donation made on an exhibition and auction held in Paris in January 2013. The description of the exhibition on their homepage states:

72 contemporary artists are helping Madagascar. Using as their base-materials the doors and shutters hand-carved by Zafimaniry people from the high plateau of Madagascar, they have created 72 works that invite us to look at Zafimaniry culture side by side with

contemporary art. All proceeds from the sale of these works will go to help disadvantaged populations living on less than one US dollar a day. The inhabitants of the village of Antoetra, the source of Zafimaniry expertise, will thus have access to water, health, education, and a dignified environment that respects their culture.⁵⁾

Each of these artworks was subsequently auctioned off for 800–15,000 euros, achieving total sales of 270,000 euros. Despite the overall humanitarian mission of the project, it is difficult to avoid the feeling that Zafimaniry craftsmen’s art is still undervalued when compared to the sales achieved by works of Western contemporary art; however, this is an issue for another time.

As has often been observed, a “traditional” appearance for houses and the landscape is usually the preferred esthetic for tourists. The NGO website states that the renovation project aims to create a new landscape that respects traditional Zafimaniry culture by enabling wooden houses to regain their primary function in the community. However, those familiar with the former appearance and layout of the village would not fail to observe the impact of such contemporary additions on earlier forms and concepts relating to such houses in the village.

For example, due to the high density of structures in the village today, it was observed that not all newly built houses could be constructed along the traditionally important north-south axis. After the NGO renovation project, it could be seen that 19 of the 55 newly built houses (34.5%) were built along an east-west alignment. In such houses, therefore, the furniture had to be moved to incorporate this new position. This had a significant impact on domestic practices, as elders could no longer give blessings for their young as they used to by drawing power from their ancestors, which is believed to come from the northeast corner of the house (Coulaud 1973: 141).

It may be observed that in the past, modifications were common with less expensive houses made of mud. In contrast, owners of wooden houses usually strictly observed the traditional plan and symbolism of their houses. As a result of external influences and interventions, this situation is likely to change quickly.

h) Danger of Resource Depletion

There is also concern that the depletion of particular wood species, caused by intensive overexploitation of the surrounding forests in a short period, threatens both the cultural and environmental sustainability of the Zafimaniry region.

Hundreds of wooden parts that constitute the house structure are classified into about 20 groups (Iida 2013a). Each of them has a specific species of wood from which it should be preferably made: light wood for the roof and heavy wood for posts supporting the roofs. It has been reported by the Zafimaniry that heavy wood is especially hard to find. According to a survey conducted in the village of Fempina (or Fempona), where forests were so plentiful that wooden houses historically dominated the area, it was reported that only *nato* (*Faucherea parvifolia*, Sapotaceae)⁶⁾ and *rotra* (*Eugenia* sp., Myrtaceae), a good substitute for *nato*, possess the higher specific gravity required for use in ridgepole-supporting posts (*andry*). A high specific gravity indicates that the

individual tree grew slowly over a long period. Therefore, only very old trees of a particular species can provide the material suitable for making buildings according to traditional quality standards.

Despite a general preference for *nato*, its proportion relative to the presence of the species of wood used to make *andry* in nine of the newly constructed houses in Antoetra recorded during fieldwork undertaken from July 2013 to March 2014, was no more than 50%, while *rotra* was not found at all.⁷⁾ Moreover, according to an Antoetra farmer who provided an explanation of the houses under construction, most of the *andry* trees used were so young when they were cut down that the posts for which they were used were not durable enough to survive for a long time over the decades. The farmer's opinion may be considered an astute assessment as he once worked seasonally as a logging and carpentry laborer in a distant province (Bloch 2005: 3). If so, these newly built houses are being constructed from materials unsuitable for the traditional style of construction and incongruent with the philosophy of longevity.

Further fieldwork is required to confirm whether the sources of wood traditionally used for the robust construction of these houses have already been completely depleted. If they are now very scarce, it is difficult to foresee where such materials can be sourced in the future when the newly constructed houses require repairs, or when somebody else wants to build a new house, for example. While the results of fieldwork thus far have concluded signs of resource depletion, this evidence needs to be corroborated by further work.

i) Formation of Zafimaniry Identity

It was observed that the commercialization of woodcrafts may be closely linked to the strengthening of the Zafimaniry people's perception of their cultural identity. According to Motomitsu Uchibori, the Japanese anthropologist who worked among the Zafimaniry in the late 1990s, as the number of tourists to villages grew and the production of woodworks increased, such works gained status and value when they were inscribed as products of "Zafimaniry origin" (Uchibori 2007).

During fieldwork, it was seen that one of the most prominent features of their craftwork is the geometric designs that residents from the capital and non-Malagasy visitors call "Zafimaniry patterns" (*sikotra Zafimaniry*). As a result of outsiders' identification of these patterns as hallmarks of Zafimaniry culture, these features have subsequently become affirming symbols of identity for the Zafimaniry people, fostering a sense of belonging for those in the community who are surrounded by these patterns in their daily lives. Modern-day concepts of their cultural identity have thus been formed and strengthened as these unique geometric patterns gained status and recognition both outside and within the Zafimaniry community.

5. Toward an Understanding of Heritage "Adaptiveness"

The changes that the Zafimaniry people have experienced over the last half century have been dramatic. The carving skills that were formed through the rigors of life in an

inaccessible area suddenly became a source of marketable income: skills that rapidly lost their necessity for practical life as people became increasingly dependent on factory-made products supplied by a narrow road off a national route. Currently, handicrafts are largely demanded by non-local consumers, rather than the Zafimaniry people, who prefer to decorate their rooms with items resulting from their own touristic encounters.

Although the same trend can be seen in communities impacted by globalization all over the world, the Zafimaniry case may be considered a particularly extreme example. A generation ago, their skill was relatively unknown even to neighboring people, but their work is being currently regarded as “representative of humanity” on account of UNESCO’s inscription to the Intangible Heritage list. It is possible to see that the multiple changes that have occurred in Zafimaniry cultural practices are correlated and interdependent.

The most radical shift is the diversification of what was once a dependency on a singular way of life. This may be seen in crop production, for example, where methods of irrigating rice fields increasingly became part of mainstream crop cultivation from the 1970s and 1980s, meaning that swidden cultivation was no longer the only source of livelihood.⁸⁾

Similarly, crafting is not the only source of wares and tools for everyday necessities, with factory-made goods readily available in the weekly market in Antoetra, where an unpaved road brings in trucks and four-wheel drives conveying goods and visitors. This condition has thus increased opportunities for local community residents, with farming and crafting becoming a key source of cash-based income, while crafting still forms an important creative expression in their personal lives.

Meanwhile, there has been flourishing of professional craftsmen and artists whose products have acquired new forms and symbolic meanings. It can be seen that the “traditional landscape” has been preserved not out of the necessity for the residents of the community, but for the benefit of tourists. While this has made people more aware of and conscious of their cultural identity, this trend has resulted in the depletion of forest resources because of the unnatural speed and spread of “heritage-making” practices.

The changes that have occurred in Zafimaniry lifestyles and practices may be considered in tandem with widespread challenges to the concept of culture itself. Let us take an example of the Vimbuza healing rituals in Malawi, which was selected as a UNESCO masterpiece of the oral and intangible heritage of humanity in 2005, two years after Zafimaniry knowledge. Although it used to be practiced to heal patients with intractable illness with the help of spirit possession, it is now displayed, after selection and inscription, increasingly in nonritual settings, especially political rallies, touristic events, and newly created Vimbuza dance festivals. Consequently, it seems to lose its original meaning, both supernatural and medical (Gilman 2015). However, it is not only UNESCO’s exertion of authoritative power that desemantizes Vimbuza.⁹⁾ Hafstein (2018), admitting that Vimbuza is threatened, argues that instrumentalization, commoditization, festivalization, or folklorization in his comprehensive term, is a consequence of modernity where change is so ubiquitous that traditional practices are replaced with technologies provided by expert systems, whether commercial or non-commercial (Giddens 1994). If

so, researchers should not or cannot stop the process of transformation of cultural meanings, but just control speeds and directions of changes in order for folklorization and decontextualization not to trigger desemantization.

In the first half of the twentieth century, culture was conceived of in a narrower sense as a set of ideas and practices necessary for survival. After half a century, however, such definitions of culture increasingly lost their practical meanings as the areas constituting an individual's life and identity were expanded at the national and global levels. Culture thus became an object of consumption, produced through processes of negotiation and appropriation (Appadurai 1996; Clifford 1997; Kirshenblatt-Gimblett 1998). Confronted with such cataclysmic changes to the conditions surrounding the concept of culture, it can be difficult to see how ideas and practices representative of traditional lifestyles can survive as heritage at the local level.

While it is not possible to predict the result, the prognosis is not necessarily a pessimistic one, as local ideas and practices have undergone constant renewal and re-innovation since their original conception. This general characteristic of intangible heritage may be contrasted with that of architectural and monumental structures represented on the World Heritage List, which continue to exist in a relatively unchanged form on account of regular physical restorations. Intangible heritage, in contrast, is safeguarded through regular repetition and performance of its practice. Zafimaniry carvers, for example, preserve their craftsmanship by transmitting their knowledge to beginners who continue the practice. The heritage is maintained not on account of the material durability of the product, but by the repetition and performance of making these crafts. The products are not copies of an original in a rigid sense; while the base remains the same, the performance is transformed continuously after myriad repetitions. In this regard, Zafimaniry craftsmanship and practice of woodcarving can be described as an "adaptive" rather than "intangible" heritage.

Heritage conceived in this way does not have an unchangeable original or ideal form. Instead, it exhibits differences every time it is performed, with the performers themselves complicit, sometimes intentionally modifying their practices to suit present conditions. In other words, "adaptive" heritage does not have an absolute form, but has a range of acceptable and equally valuable manifestations.

This is the key difference that sets it apart from immovable and fixed architectures and monuments, which when conserved over time as structures are not permitted significant alterations to their original form. Although historically, heritage practitioners and scholars have tried to apply the precepts of conservation to the intangible aspects of heritage, this project has failed to consider that changeability is a key essence of these cultural practices. Rather than conservationist approaches, therefore, it seems that our understanding of this phenomenon can be better enhanced by turning to cultural theory, which considers the relationships between the non-physical "adaptive" and the physical, unchangeable components of heritage.

It is important that we begin to consider "adaptiveness" as a natural part of the performance and transmission of intangible heritage, rather an obstacle to it.¹⁰⁾ The value of heritage ought not to be determined by a singular universal standard (as premised in

the World Heritage Convention) but ought to be credibly assessed by experienced practitioners who are familiar with its range of acceptable variants (this is a principle highlighted in the Intangible Cultural Heritage Convention, but it has not been effectively communicated to the wider public). If we adapt such an open approach to the interpretation of heritage, it may make it difficult to grasp the full extent of its present condition. If UNESCO is to fulfill its commitment to achieve community-centered heritage management, it ought to actively promote greater flexibility in the interpretation of intangible heritage to emphasize its changeable nature (see the introduction of this volume).

6. Conclusion

Having reviewed the case study of the Zafimaniry people, it is important for us to consider the options available to assist them in transmitting their cultural legacy to the next generations under times of drastic change to their local economy and culture. Three options can be considered: 1) an approach to “freeze” carving practices by enacting a complete block of modern-day traffic and telecommunications; 2) encouraging the maintenance of current carving techniques but trying to keep their practice and performance at a distance from the market economy; and 3) professionalization of crafting as a mainstream industry, limiting the transmission of carving techniques only to skilled practitioners. Although there is much room for middle ground in these options, it is hoped that considering the three extremes may assist us in identifying a route that offers the most natural and sustainable way for the Zafimaniry people to continue their cultural traditions.

A complete freeze, proposed in option 1 above, is not a realistic or natural option for Zafimaniry people, particularly if we consider the importance that interaction with the outside world has had on the construction of their cultural identity. As stated, it has been observed that the recognition of the unique styles presented in their house building and geometric patterns has had an important influence on present-day Zafimaniry people’s understanding of their cultural identity. Although it is true that their former geographical isolation was an important source of the development of their unique cultural characteristics and techniques, communication with the outside world has also been responsible for influencing contemporary notions of their identity. Therefore, a complete block of traffic and telecommunication could only result in a negative overall impact on modern-day Zafimaniry lifestyles and culture.

If the Zafimaniry people wish to encourage ongoing economic changes and the influx of tourists and factory-made commodities, the future of their crafts can be conceived in one of two extreme ways: either they continue the tradition as a purely cultural practice completely divorced from economic gain (option 2), or they adopt crafting as the main source of their cash income (option 3). As both are unrealistic due to the complex interaction of economic and social conditions, it would be best to try to reach some middle point in this spectrum between the two extremes.

If all Zafimaniry people of adult working age were to become involved in souvenir

production, the most valued material species of wood *Dalbergia* spp. (rosewood in English, palissandre in French, vômboña in Zafimaniry Malagasy) would quickly run out. In contrast, if the craftworks were to lose their economic value, the next generation would have to look to alternative sources of income in their already limited range of resources and comparatively isolated conditions, meaning that they would be unlikely to continue the craft for the purpose of purely cultural activity.¹¹⁾ Zafimaniry craftwork should therefore maintain both economic and cultural values.

Such a swing between extremes is not a new situation for the Zafimaniry. In the past, they were able to shift their activities to adapt to and balance unpredictable changes. The only difference between the present and past situations is the level of self-determination and control the Zafimaniry now possess over the changes to their culture. In the past, the balance was easier to achieve when the Zafimaniry were in isolation from others as they could adapt themselves according to highly localized economic and social change. Currently, however, the Zafimaniry people must make similar decisions but with consideration of a wider field, considering the demands of tourists and other outsiders. This is a situation that has not had a precedent until relatively recently in their cultural history.

Nevertheless, it is important to emphasize that the impact of outsiders is not necessarily negative. The Zafimaniry can also seek help from outsiders to assist them in preserving their cultural traditions. By outsiders, I mean not only foreign tourists but also researchers, officials, NGO workers, craft dealers, and museum curators, whether domestic or international. By assisting the Zafimaniry people to gain the skills and knowledge to negotiate and deal with outsiders, while asserting their position and rights to “adapt” their heritage as they deem fit, it is hoped that they may be able to challenge the assessment that Zafimaniry culture is endangered by its interaction with the processes of globalization and modernization. Empowerment of Zafimaniry people, who have historically been capable, will enable them to find their way to survive with rich cultural resources in harsh geographical conditions.

Acknowledgments

This work was supported by JSPS Grant-in-Aid for Scientific Research numbers JP22310159, JP25360035, JP15H01910, and JP19H01400. The people of Antoetra, Fempina, Sakaivo, Ambohimanjaka, and Ambohimombo kindly assisted me in my research activities and, at times, welcomed and tolerated my unusual behaviors. Lucien Faliniaina, Yasuhiro Kubota, Daisuke Hirayama, and Shinjiro Fujii introduced me to forest ecology, and Benja Rakotonirina identified the tree species that were sampled. Hannah Eastham brushed up my English text. I express my sincere gratitude to all of them for supporting this research.

Notes

- 1) This reaction was repeatedly observed during the exhibition “Zafimaniry Style: Life and Handicrafts in the Mist Forest of Madagascar” which was held at the National Museum of Ethnology, Japan, from March 14 to June 11, 2013 (National Museum of Ethnology 2013). While this observation may be biased according to its context in Japan, Bloch’s note (later cited) shows that Europeans have the same tendency as well.
- 2) Ambohimitombo, another entry point for visitors to this area, seems to have benefited much less from tourists than Antoetra, because it has poorer access routes.
- 3) When the Zafimaniry wood-crafting knowledge was designated as a masterpiece of the oral and intangible heritage of humanity in 2003, the Convention for the Safeguarding of Intangible Cultural Heritage had not yet been approved. This convention was adopted by the General Assembly of UNESCO in 2003 and went into force in 2006. It was only in 2008, at the inter-governmental meeting to review the Convention, that it was decided that all the Masterpieces of Humanity that were selected in 2001, 2003, and 2005 ought to be automatically inscribed on the Representative List of the Intangible Cultural Heritage of Humanity.
- 4) <http://www.desvillagesetdeshommes.com/> (viewed on 19 September 2015)
- 5) <http://www.christies.com/Artists-Angels-pour-Madagascar-24390.aspx> (viewed on 19 September 2015) The website says that there were 72 objects produced by 72 contemporary artists; however, there were actually 75 objects in the list of the website.
- 6) Identification of herbarium specimen: Coulaud (1973: 28) identified it as *Labramia* sp., while Ny Birao Mpandrindra UNESCO (2008) as *Sideroxylon* sp. All of them belong to *Sapotaceae*, but Ny Birao Mpandrindra UNESCO (2008) records *Calophyllum* sp. (*Calophyllaceae*) as another species similar to *nato*.
- 7) The number of ridgepole-supporting posts observed was 22, of which 18 were on both ends of the ridgepole (*andry mangisy*) and could be observed from outside the houses. Data collected on the remaining 4, which supported the ridgepole in the middle (*andry mafana*), were obtained with permission from the house owner who provided entry into the property. 5 houses were locked, so it was not possible to identify the species of *andry mafana* in the middle posts. The *nato* comprised 11 posts of the 22, while 6 were *tamboneka* (*Ravensara acuminata*, Lauraceae), 2 were *laloña* (*Weinmannia bojeriana*, Cunoniaceae), 2 were *hazoambo* (unidentified), and 1 was *merandahy* (*Maesa lanceolata*, Myrsinaceae). If one observes all 55 newly built houses, it is likely that the proportion of *nato* is even less.
- 8) Coulaud (1973) reported that rice production was a minor method of cultivation among the Zafimaniry at the time of his research, although it had already been introduced in the early 20th century.
- 9) Another important point of Gilman’s argument is that the UNESCO selection process of masterpieces or items for the Representative List is not suitable for the ideal of cultural diversity. In Malawi, the effects of Vimbuza rituals are disputed between Christians and traditional healers, whose ontologies contradict each other (Gilman 2015). I regard this negative effect as significant, even when compared to cultural decontextualization. In the Zafimaniry case, this kind of dispute rarely happens because the Zafimaniry population is too

- small, and their products do not harm the majority.
- 10) I have an impulse to say that nothing is authentic, except the fact that everything changes. I do not stress this “authentic change” here because the word “authentic” implies “the existence of its opposite, the fake, and this dichotomous construct is at the heart of what makes authenticity problematic” (Bendix 1997: 9). In the context of this discussion, I feel that the notion of authentic change in heritage practices is heuristically possible, as long as it relates to the primary heirs’ (community’s) definition of authenticity rather than UNESCO’s evaluation of it.
- 11) In reality, Zafimaniry women stopped weaving textiles when factory-made cloths became available in this region (Yoshimoto 2013). We cannot say that the same thing would not also happen with wood-crafting.

References

- Appadurai, A.
1996 *Modernity at Large: Cultural Dimensions of Globalization*. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press.
- Arizpe, L. and C. Amescua
2013 *Anthropological Perspectives on Intangible Cultural Heritage*. Cham: Springer.
- Bendix, R.
1997 *In Search of Authenticity: The Formation of Folklore Studies*. Madison: The University of Wisconsin Press.
- Bloch, M.
1993 Zafimaniry Birth and Kinship Theory. *Social Anthropology* 1(1b): 119–132.
1995a The Resurrection of the House amongst the Zafimaniry of Madagascar. In J. Carsten and S. Hugh-Jones (eds.) *About the House: Lévi-Strausse and Beyond*, pp. 69–83. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
1995b Questions not to ask of Malagasy Carvings. In I. Hodder (ed.) *Interpreting Archaeology: Finding Meaning in the Past*, pp. 212–215. London: Routledge.
2005 *Essays on Cultural Transmission*. Oxford: Berg.
- Clifford, J.
1997 *Routes: Travel and Translation in the Late Twentieth Century*. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
- Coulaud, D.
1973 *Les Zafimaniry, un groupe ethnique de Madagascar à la poursuite de la forêt*. Tananarive: FBM.
- Decary, R.
1958 *Contribution à l'étude de l'habitation à Madagascar*. Pau: Imprimerie Marrimpouey Jeune.
- Giddens, A.
1994 Living in a Post-Traditional Society. In U. Beck, A. Giddens, and S. Lash. *Reflexive Modernization: Politics, Tradition and Aesthetics in the Modern Social Order*, pp. 56–109. Cambridge: Polity Press.

Gilman, L.

- 2015 Demonic or Cultural Treasure? Local Perspectives on Vimbuza, Intangible Cultural Heritage, and UNESCO in Malawi. In M. D. Foster and L. Gilman (eds.) *UNESCO on the Ground: Local Perspectives on Intangible Cultural Heritage*, pp. 59–76. Bloomington: Indiana University Press.

Hafstein, V. Tr.

- 2018 Intangible Heritage as a Festival; or, Folklorization Revisited. *Journal of American Folklore* 131(520): 127–149.

Iida, T.

- 2013a The House as a Cultural Symbol. In National Museum of Ethnology (ed.) *Handicrafting the Intangible: Zafimaniry Heritage in Madagascar*, pp. 48–55. Osaka: National Museum of Ethnology.
- 2013b Roughness and Delicacy: A Legacy from the Making of Swidden Fields. In National Museum of Ethnology (ed.) *Handicrafting the Intangible: Zafimaniry Heritage in Madagascar*, pp. 68–75. Osaka: National Museum of Ethnology.

Kirshenblatt-Gimblett, B.

- 1998 *Destination Culture: Tourism, Museums, and Heritage*. Berkeley: University of California Press.

Mancinelli, F.

- 2014 Shifting Values of ‘Primitiveness’ among the Zafimaniry of Madagascar: An Anthropological Approach to Tourist Mediators’ Discourses. *Journal of Tourism and Cultural Change* 2014 (DOI: 10.1080/14766825.2014.939391).

National Museum of Ethnology (ed.)

- 2013 *Handicrafting the Intangible: Zafimaniry Heritage in Madagascar*. Osaka: National Museum of Ethnology.

Ny Birao Mpandrindra UNESCO

- 2008 *Ny Zafimaniry, Nikajy ny Kolontsainy Zafimaniry, une Culture Conservée*. Antananarivo: Repoblikan’i Madagasikara.

Peltureau-Villeneuve, M.

- 1991 Le pays Zafimaniry et son art. In Pierre Vérin et Michel Peltureau-Villeneuve *Les Zafimaniry et leurs traditions esthétiques* (Série Langue et Civilisation 16), pp. 5–12. Paris: INALCO.

Smith, L. and N. Akagawa

- 2009 *Intangible Heritage*. London: Routledge.

Uchibori, M. (内堀基光)

- 2007 Making Money: Subsistence Activities and Petty Commodities in Villages of Iban and Zafimaniry (金になるということ——イバンとザフィマニリの集落におけるサブシステム活動と小商品). In R. Ogawa (ed.) *Anthropology of Resources 4: Petty Commodities’ Circulation and Social Role* (小川了編『躍動する小生産物』(資源人類学 4)), pp. 105–135. Tokyo: Institute of Languages and Cultures of Asia and Africa, Tokyo University of Foreign Languages (東京：東京外国語大学アジア・アフリカ言語文化研究所). (in Japanese)
- 2013 Time and Space in the Village Life. In National Museum of Ethnology (ed.)

Handicrafting the Intangible: Zafimaniry Heritage in Madagascar, pp. 118–125. Osaka: National Museum of Ethnology.

Vérin, P.

1964 Les Zafimaniry: un groupe continuateur d'une tradition esthétique malgache méconnue. *Revue de Madagascar* 27: 1–76.

Yoshimoto, S.

2013 Endangered Heritage. In National Museum of Ethnology (ed.) *Handicrafting the Intangible: Zafimaniry Heritage in Madagascar*, pp. 94–103. Osaka: National Museum of Ethnology.

Part II

Globalizing Local Culture

“Traditional African Medicine” as Living Cultural Heritage: Conditions and Politics of Knowledge Transfer

Jacqueline Grigo
University of Zurich

1. Introduction

For thousands of years, diverse communities on the African continent have provided health care through their traditional medicines, practices, and practitioners. External influences from other parts of the world have not only enriched and complemented the existing repertoire¹⁾ but also brought new challenges. With the introduction of colonialism, for example, Western culture and health care, the medical landscape in Africa has changed fundamentally. While some voices point to the improved health situation on the continent since the introduction of Western medicine, others stress that these external influences go along with a setback for and devaluation of traditional African medicine (TAM). Several authors underscore the negative impact of colonialism on indigenous medicine (Feierman and Janzen 1992; Konadu 2008; Abdullahi 2011).

During colonization, as well as in post-independent times, traditional healers were repressed or persecuted. This pushed healing practices underground in some parts of sub-Saharan Africa (Feierman 1985). The Ghanaian historian and political scientist Adu-Gyamfi and Anderson state that “Shaped by the perceptions of biological, intellectual and historic superiority, Europeans set out either purposely or ignorantly to denigrate indigenous African systems including traditional medicine.” The reasons they mention were “a lack of proper understanding of the indigenous philosophy which was further aggravated by some level of racial superiority” (Adu-Gyamfi and Anderson 2019: 90). Some scholars see colonialism, neo-colonialism, capitalism, imperialism, and other forms of dominations and exploitations as “major stumbling-blocks in the actualization” of the development of indigenous African medicine (cf. Abdullahi 2011: 116).

Nevertheless, TAM continues to meet a wide range of healthcare needs in both rural and urban communities of Africa (Bamidele et al. 2009). Approximately 80% of the population in sub-Saharan Africa, particularly in rural areas, depend directly on traditional medicine²⁾ for their primary health care requirements (Tabuti et al. 2003; WHO 2014; and others). Traditional healers, with various specializations, are usually much more easily available and accessible than medical doctors. In addition, lay people treat themselves and their families with home remedies, usually medicinal plants. This is important because existing public health services are insufficient to treat all those who fall ill.

Synthetic drugs are often not obtainable in rural areas due to high costs, poorly developed transport routes, inadequate storage possibilities, and poverty. In addition, local herbal medicine continues to enjoy broad acceptance among the local population (cf. Tabuti 2003).

Since the 1970s, TAM has been undergoing “rehabilitation” on a national and international level, when the World Health Organization assessed the role of traditional medicine for primary health care as essential (WHO 1983). The organization encouraged and supported African member states to promote traditional medicinal practices and integrate them into their health systems (WHO 2002; 2014). Within the framework of this agenda, the *examination* and *documentation* of TAM is rated as important. Apart from these efforts by the WHO, in the past three decades, the traditional, complementary, and alternative medicine sector has been receiving increasing policy support from multilateral and non-government organizations, civil society groups, and other self-regulated associations³⁾ (cf. Payyappallimana 2010: 66).

In the meantime, many African countries have undertaken corresponding activities.⁴⁾ Currently, post-colonial African governments have widely accepted traditional medicine through the institution of national administration or accreditation bodies for TAM, associations of traditional healers, training programs for healers, and research activities (Adu-Gyamfi and Anderson 2019: 95). This is considered important to reduce national dependence on expensive imported drugs (Janzen and Green 2008).

However, the development of adequate integration models is proving difficult for many reasons, and the intent to preserve and document traditional medicinal knowledge raises questions and ambivalences that manifest on different levels. One significant example is the danger of biopiracy: the traditional medicinal plant use in the global south is generating growing interest among international pharmaceutical companies and can lead to exploitation and expropriation of indigenous knowledge and natural resources, as national and international conventional patent laws continue to be insufficient to protect traditional knowledge and biodiversity (WHO 2008).⁵⁾ This points to a tension between the claim to traditional medicine knowledge as a *local* versus *global* cultural heritage.

Furthermore, TAM faces fundamental existential problems: a continuous loss of its natural, intellectual, and cultural bases. Rapid population growth has led to an increasing demand for land resources, which, in turn, results in a decline in natural habitats. In addition, the growing commercial use of medicinal herbs, even in cities, is threatening biodiversity, as many raw materials for herbal medicines are still gathered only in the wild. Thus, a prerequisite for the preservation of TAM is to protect the natural environment as well as its cultural and intellectual resources (WHO 2014).

The history of African cultures and their knowledge of plants as a source of remedies have been transmitted from generation to generation via an oral tradition (cf. Soelberg et al. 2015). This knowledge is gradually disappearing (cf. Luoga et al. 2000; Tugume et al. 2016). The Ugandan Botanist Patience Tugume stresses the need to capture it before it is lost. She observed that “Younger people, who are exposed to modern education, are not interested in learning and practicing ethnomedicinal wisdom that would perpetuate indigenous knowledge as part of their living cultural heritage” (Tugume

et al. 2016: 20). As implied by this statement, traditional medicine is considered to be of great importance not only as a potential resource for *primary health care* but also as *cultural heritage*.⁶⁾

Although the preservation of traditional medicine is a common, overarching goal from both perspectives, the specifications of this objective, the underlying premises, and the required approaches and measures may differ fundamentally. The intent to investigate and document traditional medicinal knowledge raises many questions and ambivalences that manifest at different levels.⁷⁾ It requires selection processes that are driven by specific power constellations: economic, political, and ideological interests, and predominant (occidental) epistemologies. These affect not only the *contents* but also the *reputation* and *dissemination* of knowledge and healing practices.

From a public health perspective, represented by post-independent administrators, scientists, and national and international health organizations, justifiably, a high priority is given to the sustainable, effective, and safe use of medicinal plants. Attempts to integrate TAM into the formal health systems usually leads to an increasing “medicalization” of traditional healing practices (cf. Bodeker et al. 2007; Bruchhausen 2018). This means an orientation toward uniform, international quality standards, including evidence-based procedures and the advantage of professionalization of medicinal care according to biomedical standards. In this context, most current conservation efforts have neglected or ignored cultural aspects, mainly the ritual and symbolic side of TAM (cf. Bruchhausen 2018).⁸⁾

Such a one-sided focus de-contextualizes, fragments, and erodes the local medicinal heritage, especially relating to non-material or metaphysical aspects (cf. Payyappallimana 2010). In doing so, it also alienates traditional practitioners from their medicines and weakens and marginalizes their position (cf. Langwick 2011). It impedes the traditional mechanisms of knowledge production and transmission and restricts further development. “Initiatives to develop traditional medicine might actually be moving away from traditional medicine” (Langwick 2011, citing a traditional healer: 289).

Additionally, the fragmentation and secularization of medicinal heritage may ignore the local expectations and needs of holistic health care. Finally, this often goes along with the expropriation and exploitation of indigenous intellectual property. Indigenous therapeutic knowledge is “de-contextualized by processes of scientific research,” to “re-contextualize medicinal plants within international biomedical agendas, laboratories and national healthcare services” (Langwick 2011: 288).⁹⁾

In this chapter, I will try to give a brief impression on how African indigenous medicinal heritage and the processes of knowledge transfer are entwined within a web of cultural, spiritual, social, and natural (inter-)relatedness.

2. Need for Cultural (Re-)contextualization

From a cultural heritage point of view, one must consider that traditional African healing methods are not limited to the use of herbal, mineral, or animal medicines, but include cultural interpretations and ritual practices that are deeply rooted in the respective

religious belief systems and follow their modes of operation. With respect to research and conservation strategies, this points to the need for cultural contextualization of local medicinal knowledge.¹⁰ Medicinal plants are not only a material resource for medicine, but as the Swiss medical anthropologist Elisabeth Hsu points out, they are also “cultural artifacts” (Hsu and Harris 2010: 83). They are part of a biological and living cultural heritage and are embedded in a dynamic network of cultural meanings and social practices. Despite widespread scientific and public interest in medicinal plants, these aspects have been widely under-studied and under-theorized (cf. Hsu and Harris 2010). Rather than merely focusing on how a particular (chemical compound of a) botanical species is used therapeutically, it is important to consider that plants and the knowledge and practices surrounding them are integral aspects of social and cosmological orders.

Thus, traditional medicine as part of a constantly evolving “living cultural heritage” requires the inclusion of social science’s focus on social institutions, meanings, and practices surrounding plant use (cf. Hsu and Harris 2010). This means integrating *material*, *cultural*, and *spiritual* dimensions and involving the respective “religious” belief systems in which the use of medicinal plants is embedded. In other words, these belief systems or *local realities* can be seen as the epistemological basis for the interpretation of experiences, observations, and decision-making related to illness, healing, and remedies.

In many African societies, the local value and functions of traditional medicine go far beyond their physiological and objectified healing potentials to include social, moral, and spiritual aspects. The Ghanaian historians and political scientists Samuel Adu-Gyamfi and Eugenia Anderson assign to the indigenous medicinal knowledge system “a major role in the protection of societies” (2019: 96). As the authors point out, its benefits cannot just be seen in its capability to cure diseases but its “intent to holistically preserve the society through its social interactions, religious sacredness, and a conservation of the environment. Its absence in African societies could cause an imbalance in a well-ordered healing system among the people” (Adu-Gyamfi and Anderson 2019: 96). The intention to sustainably develop conservation approaches for African medicinal cultural heritage means to open up for different epistemologies and ontologies and to diversify strategies.

3. Local Concepts of Illness and Medication

TAM is based on local religious belief systems¹¹) and corresponding cosmologies. The Tanzanian philosopher Raymond Sambuli Mosha describes the latter as holistic.

Humanity and all other beings [...] relate as one entity in order to enhance and preserve the harmony already inherent in them. The entire universe is humanity’s intimate partner in life. [...] Stones, and mountains, rivers and lakes, clouds and rain, are all alive in their intrinsic meanings and in their active partnership to people and everything else.

(Mosha 1999: 213)

By adhering to his moral, ethical, social, and religious obligations, man must

contribute to the maintenance of this cosmic balance because “the well-being of the visible world and that of the trans-cosmic one [...] depends to a great extent on the level of individual and communal moral living” (Mosha 1999: 212).

In a traditional local perception, illness can be caused, for example, by climatic influences, fatigue, or bad food. However, it can also be an expression or a consequence of an imbalance, which is not limited to physiological processes, but can result from violations of social norms, religious obligations or taboos, and disregard for the ancestors or from social tensions. This points to a spirito- and socio-somatic concept as an explanatory pattern within traditional African etiology. In this sense, illness also offers a projection surface on which conflicts within the group can be verbalized and processed. The Ghanaian sociologist Patric Adubofour Twumasi notes that “a breach of social relations threatens the very survival of the traditional society because of the mutual interdependence...; health and illness are means of detecting threats to social unity and for re-establishing harmony of social relationships essential to their life” (Twumasi 1975: 37).

Health implies a “balance of all social forces: kinship ties, relations with the ancestral spirits, deities, and the environment” (Adu-Gyamfi and Anderson 2019: 85). “Medical” interventions are not limited to the individual body but refer to the extended community. The Baoulé of Ivory Coast use the word *ahiré* (translated as “medicine”) for more than just the restoration of physical health. *Ahiré* can avert various undesirable conditions, including psychological, social, and economic problems—or bring about diverse desires. A love spell, for example, is also called an *ahiré*.

In this setting, the therapeutic properties of plants are conceptualized comprehensively. In the healing process, they are seen as active subjects, not as inanimate objects (Iwu 1993: 310). Healing effects arise from the interplay of organic effects and the spiritual forces contained in the plant. Their vital forces can be mobilized and used by knowledgeable persons (cf. Iwu 1993).¹²⁾

Diseases that are attributed to social and spiritual factors, taboo-breaks, or witchcraft are untreatable with conventional medicine, and “simple herbal therapy” by a lay person may not be effective. In this case, a spiritual specialist must be consulted to make the necessary diagnoses and take ritual precautions by involving the advice of ancestors and spirits. The choice of therapy depends not only on the availability of medicinal options but also on the imagined cause.¹³⁾

In sum, some of the “traditional” treatments do not meet the expectations of the patients and healers through their physiological effect, but through an attributed effect on a magico-religious level, adapted to local etiologies. The boundaries between what might be conceptualized as “medicine” and “religion” among “Western” scholars, cannot be clearly drawn here. In contrast to orthodox medicine, TAM strongly includes social, religious, and spiritual aspects. It emphasizes not just the individual body but the well-being and health of the entire society.

4. Local Significance of “Knowledge” and Why It Must Be Acquired

In the indigenous cosmological framework described above, “knowledge” has a transcendent aspect because it is seen as an integral part of the divine principle. The Senegalese philosopher Alassane Ndaw describes it as follows: “African epistemology ignores the separation of the order of knowing and the order of being. Knowledge is a being and not just an instrument at the service of man. (...) for the African, knowledge is a cosmic reality since it has the same substance as the cosmos” (Ndaw 1997: 34).¹⁴⁾

The appropriation or incorporation of knowledge is part of the lifelong spiritual transformation of an individual from an immature, unenlightened person to a knowing and wise one (Zahan 1970). The status of a knowing (and therefore morally mature) person is of great importance to the individual. The incorporation of knowledge marks the transition to a higher status.¹⁵⁾ It is a prerequisite for entry into the ancestral realm (cf. Ndaw 1999).

However, this importance of wisdom and knowledge does not come into play only after death. It also confers prestige and a higher social status to the living individual. The high reputation, respect, and obedience shown to the elderly in the village communities is largely due to their experience, wisdom, knowledge, and the associated status of a spiritually advanced and mature person. They are given the ability to make wise decisions, which also confers on them political power. Therefore, the need for constant acquisition of knowledge has ethical, spiritual, social, and political implications. Knowledge determines the position of an individual within a social and cosmological order.

This explains why the importance of knowledge is accompanied by a certain value of the secret. As Ndaw states, “One of the dimensions of African spirituality is internalization. The value accorded to what is unspoken, to the secret, to the invisible, is immense” (Ndaw 1997: 46, translation by the author). The Tanzanian philosopher and scholar of religious studies Ikechukwu Anthony Kanu conceptualizes secrecy in African traditional societies at two levels: On a social level, secrecy gives “a particular group of people identity and thus differentiates them from others” (Kanu 2018: 51). Additionally, there is a mystery level. “This kind of secrecy is associated with kings, sacred specialists, shrines, masquerades, etc. This sense of mystery gives these realities their sacred personalities” (Kanu 2018: 51).

Mosha assumes that in indigenous African societies, both the content of local knowledge and the way it is produced and transmitted are inextricably interwoven with spiritual, moral, and social aspects (Mosha 1999: 214). I will illustrate this using a concrete research example.

5. Transfer of Medicinal Plant Knowledge in a Baoulé Village (Ivory Coast)

In the following, I will reflect on the cultural conditions of medicinal plant knowledge transfer in a rural *Baoulé* village¹⁶⁾ in the southern part of Ivory Coast. I will draw attention to an indigenous spiritual “intellectual property rights” system, which is highly

ritualized and regulates and limits access to medicinal knowledge, thereby co-organizing the social and transcendental order within the community.

My research focused on processes of intergenerational knowledge transfer in the popular sector, that is, the household level, but I have also worked with traditional healers and employees of local state health centers. In the indigenous therapeutic system, there are different spheres of production, management, and transmission of medicinal knowledge¹⁷⁾: a) *common or basic knowledge* shared by most of the village population, b) *particular lay knowledge*, and c) *specialized healers’ knowledge*.

a) Common or Basic Knowledge

Many young people or even children know a handful of medicinal plants with which they can treat themselves for minor injuries or discomfort (e.g., treatment of small wounds, colds, headaches, insect bites). They learn about these “simple medicines” from their parents, grandparents, or older siblings through instruction or observation (Photo 1).

b) Particular Lay Knowledge

This lies largely in the hands of village elders. Each one has a set of expertise in recognizing and curing particular diseases or health problems (e.g., snake bites, malaria, diabetes¹⁸⁾, skin disease). This particular knowledge is passed on orally from generation to generation under certain conditions and in a strictly ritualized manner.¹⁹⁾

In the Baoulé communities, as in many African regions (cf. Konadu 2007; Langwick 2007, 2011), the spirits and gods are considered the original keepers of medicinal plant knowledge, which they pass on to ancestors and healers and, in rare cases, to lay people, for example in dreams, if the person proves to be morally irreproachable.²⁰⁾ However, it is only through the knowledge of correct preparation and application that they become valuable medicines. The healing effect unfolds only in the interactions and interrelationships between plants, (ancestral) spirits or deities, healing persons, and patients.



Photo 1 Medicinal plant market, Toumodi (Photograph by Jacqueline Grigo in 2017)

The treatment of a sick person follows a complex formula that must be strictly respected for healing. This formula includes not only requirements for (sustainable) plant collection, preparation, application, and dosage of the remedies, but also determines taboos and required offerings and recitations. For example, it may be necessary to sacrifice an egg to a plant before harvesting it. It also includes the price that must be charged for the treatment and how plant knowledge may be passed on.

These formulas are not conveyed as mere enumeration of information but in the form of narratives, involving the mythical or spiritual protagonists that occur in the original event of knowledge revelation. Konadu, who inquired about a comparable phenomenon among the Akan of Ghana, described these formulas as protocols or “oral narrative archives,²¹⁾ that “have a ‘language,’ which functions as a repository and transmitter of culture and the experiences of past generations, and serves as a nexus between the life of the ‘language’ and the life of its speakers. These archives also facilitate the reception, retention, and retrieval of cultural knowledge” (Konadu 2007: 20). He refers to them as a kind of “oral and spiritual archives [...] that present traditional knowledge for centuries” (Konadu 2007: 160).

Compliance with the instructions held in the formulas is believed to be monitored by (ancestral) spirits. In case of disregard, the practitioner’s plant-healing power is withdrawn. These findings may confirm Geissler and Prince’s assumption that medicinal knowledge and therapeutic transformations in TAM “are not so much located *within* entities as *between them*—they emerge from encounters and their traces, rather than reside in things” (Geissler and Prince 2009: 1).²²⁾

Although there is a stock of common knowledge, in general, medicinal plant knowledge is not a common domain. It is secret and, therefore, exclusive. It can only be transferred to another person in a prescribed, ritualized process, usually from an old person to a younger relative, who has proven to be “loyal, obedient, morally correct” (interview: Marcelin K.).

The latter must “remunerate” the revelation of secret with a symbolic “fee”—traditionally by means of a cola nut or a ball of cotton—a sign of appreciation toward the elder, that simultaneously protects the secret from public access. This “fee” is also described as sacrifice to the spirits (who originally gave the knowledge to the human world) that reactivates and reinforces this relationship. It ensures spiritual authorization and sustains healing power for the new user. After “payment” has been made, the complete formula is transferred meticulously. Transaction is validated with a “click of the finger”—that is, the initiate’s finger is pulled until a joint makes a clicking sound.

The passing down of medicinal plant knowledge can be seen as “an extension of relationships” (Geissler and Prince 2009) among humans, and between humans and the non-human world. Rather than being an object of individual property, plant knowledge entails a “set of obligations” (cf. Langwick 2011; 2017: 33).

In this social system, ancestral spirits represent an effective supervisory authority, which is legitimized by the religious belief system. As such, they also ensure the sustainable use of natural heritage. In addition, they grant the elders’ status and privileges that support the traditional hierarchical (reontocratic) social structure.

c) Specialized Healers’ Knowledge

Traditional healers in the region are reported to have acquired their *specialized healers’ knowledge*²³⁾ from perennial apprenticeship with experienced practitioners, but to a large extent, they have learned their skills from spirits, ancestors, and other non-human beings in dreams and visions.²⁴⁾

However, in many cases, especially with more complex patient problems, indigenous healers do not draw on their individual, intellectual knowledge depository, but instead make direct contact with spirits or ancestors to identify the causes and receive appropriate treatment instructions. They assume that every person and every disease situation is individual; therefore, there are no universally valid treatment methods for health disorders. The healing situation is highly personalized and situational. “The embodied nature of this therapeutic knowledge [therefore] confounds attempts to duplicate medicines and practices across time, place, and patients” (Langwick 2011: 281). This has an impact on present debates about intellectual property (cf. Langwick 2011: 271) and illustrates the challenges in imagining adequate heritage conservation strategies. As Langwick puts it, “African therapeutics generate innovation through engagement, not single authorship. Such epistemic practice and the ontological realities that inhere in theme do not (always) sit easily with those of modern science or law” (Langwick 2017: 33) (Photos 2a and 2b).



(2a)



(2b)

Photos 2a and 2b Traditional healer preparing a protective medicine for safe travel.
(Photograph by Jacqueline Grigo in 1999)

6. Challenges and Changing Modalities of Local Knowledge Transfer

All three spheres of medicinal knowledge mentioned above face challenges in the continuation of cultural heritage through intergenerational knowledge transfer. As any local knowledge, African medicinal plant knowledge is not static. Through its orality, it is dynamic and adaptable to changing circumstances, but is also fragile. It is influenced by socio-cultural, demographic, environmental, technological, and economic transformations, as well as by other medical systems. Such influences affect not only the stock and content of knowledge, its recognition, and distribution, but also the *modalities* and *mechanisms* of knowledge transfer. Although the transmission of *common* or *basic* indigenous plant knowledge seems simple and uncomplicated, it is endangered, as the younger people, often migrating to cities, are generally not interested in learning about it. Furthermore, many of the commonly used plant species in the village are gradually disappearing due to excessive use, monocultural land management, invasive neophytes, and climatic change. Consequently, plant medicines are forgotten after a while.

In addition, the *particular lay knowledge* of medicinal plants has gained economic value for the villagers in recent decades and is increasingly being commercialized, with a negative impact on intergenerational knowledge transfer. The “keeping secret” of knowledge and the obligation to “take something” for a treatment is part of traditional practices. In the past, what was requested for a treatment was a ritual gift—a symbolic act to balance give and take, and to harmonize people with their (living, animated) natural environment. Currently, the price demands for treatments in the village are relatively high, sometimes up to half of a month’s wages. The elderly men who have become unable to work are fed by their families and receive what is necessary for survival. However, access to “luxury goods” is difficult.

The influence of the Western world has created new needs for consumer goods (e.g., mobile phones, radio, or Néscafé). These can only be acquired through money. As people continue to fall sick and need medicinal treatment, the plant knowledge has turned into a highly welcome constant source of income, a kind of old-age pension.²⁵⁾ Consequently, the elderly often guard their secrets until they die.²⁶⁾ This commercialization of treatments blocks the transfer of medicinal lay knowledge within the families and village communities and results in a continuous loss of this living cultural heritage that also affects the primary healthcare capacities in the villages.

Although in the perception of some traditional healers, the plant knowledge *in and of itself* is not regarded as a decreasing resource, as it is believed to be part of the divine principle and “to be borne” in the relationship with the spirits and ancestors (“it is always there”), most healers in the region regard their specialized healing heritage as endangered, or at least as challenged in some respects. They recognize the lack of successors, erosion of ritual skills and techniques on how to connect to the spirit world (the ultimate source of knowledge), increasing suspicion and distrust toward their practices with the introduction of “modern education,” and the loss of natural resources and competition from representatives of other medical systems.

7. Discussion

In this chapter, I have tried to clarify that the importance of traditional medicine for local African communities goes beyond primary health care in a physiological understanding. Traditional medicinal knowledge and skills and the processes of knowledge transfer, as forms of heritage practice, are interwoven within a complex, *mutually supportive* web of social, cultural, and spiritual factors. In this setting, the religious belief system is essential for the preservation of medical knowledge (Photos 3 and 4).

The *exclusive focus* on medicalization, and the associated cultural decontextualization of traditional medicinal knowledge and practice, which is generally expressed in current (inter-)national research and conservation strategies, may ignore local expectations of holistic healthcare and disregard a large part of the concerns and social functions addressed by TAM. This exclusive approach also undermines the traditional mechanisms of knowledge transfer and disempowers traditional healers.²⁷⁾

Traditional medicine as a living cultural heritage considerably supports the cultural identity of local communities.²⁸⁾ Its psychosomatic and socially integrative dimensions are adapted to the needs of patients by integrating relevant local explanatory models. The comprehensive approach places disease in a larger context than the more mechanistic



Photo 3 *Goli Glin* mask dancer, representing a buffalo-headed bush spirit. (Photograph by Jacqueline Grigo in 1999)



Photo 4 *Kpwan ple* mask dancer. The Goli is a series of dances performed at special occasions to protect the village from evil influences and exert a positive influence on the non-human world. (Photograph by Jacqueline Grigo in 1999)

etiology of the biomedical system. Diagnosis and treatments include a patient's mental state, social and natural environment, or spiritual needs. In doing so, they contribute to cohesion and the maintenance of social and transcendental order within communities.

Although they might overlap in some areas,²⁹⁾ the biomedical public health approach and TAM not only work in different ontological frames but also focus on different therapeutic scopes. Current social science debates revolve around the question of whether and how the two different medical paradigms can be integrated,³⁰⁾ avoiding one-sidedly subordinating traditional medicine knowledge and practices to the orthodox, scientific paradigm and to considering it merely as a pool of isolated information to be exploited (e.g., Langwick 2007, 2011; Konadu 2007; Thornton 2017; Obrist and Van Eeuwijk 2020). The two medical systems continue to have a strongly asymmetrical relationship, which can be interpreted as an ontological and epistemological continuation of cultural imperialism. Integration would require bringing scientists, healers, and their medicines into the same frame (Langwick 2011: 266), which seems to be difficult, as both medical systems might be "irreconcilable at their very core" (Konadu 2007: 177). Instead of the misleading concept of integration,³¹⁾ Konadu suggests "cooperation" as more feasible "if both systems acknowledge and accept their areas of expertise and limitations, perspectives and cultural foundations from which they operate" (Konadu 2007: 177). Similarly, some scholars have suggested that TAM and cosmopolitan medicine should be allowed to operate independently (Konadu 2008; Oyelakin 2009; cited in Abdullahi 2011: 119). The Canadian sociologist and anthropologist Julie Laplante advocates that we should "bring 'indigenous medicine' into conversation with biomedical ways of making medicine 'work,' not as exotica or requiring translation through the RCT (randomized controlled trial) filter, but as contemporary practices that challenge and feed into current ways of knowing in science and research" (Laplante 2015: 136). The views described are all attempts, with different emphases, to overcome the current hierarchies of knowledge production.

8. Conclusion

As part of living cultural heritage, TAM is understood as a *process*, rather than a *product* of cultural practice (cf. Arnoldi in this volume). It is closely tied to people and their oral traditions and, therefore, in a constant state of transformation. Moreover, medicinal knowledge is "not trapped in plants, minds, or communities, but rather, healing knowledge lives in the dynamic relations between them" (Langwick 2017: 35, citing a healer). This means that TAM is simultaneously highly processual and relational. To preserve this heritage cannot (only) mean perpetuate a status quo by simply collecting and "documenting" the corresponding practices, knowledge, and (plant) materials. To preserve TAM means to ensure its vitality and viability by enabling "the continuation of the processes surrounding its production" (Introduction by Iida, this volume). Safeguarding strategies therefore require a more differentiated approach that needs to be sensitive to local conditions of knowledge production and transmission. Starting from the different spheres of medicinal knowledge, I suggest considering some points that seem to

be important in my view.

Where *communal* or *basic* knowledge is involved, it might be secured to the communities by documentation and representation. This can be beneficial by increasing the pool of *common domain* knowledge on plants and supporting the capacities of medicinal self-care in the villages. The establishment of *adequate*³²⁾ educational programs and medicinal plant gardens (as suggested by a villager) could prove useful. However, one must consider that this knowledge is particularly vulnerable to external exploitation. The question here is, under which conditions can this knowledge be “uncovered” and made accessible without it being expropriated by external stakeholders?

For the continuation and development of *particular lay* and *specialized* medicinal knowledge, conditions must be maintained that support existing heritage practices, so that this knowledge can continue to be implemented and enacted within the web of social and spiritual relationships through which it is constituted and on which it reacts.

While lay practitioners pass on *existing* healing knowledge, in the case of medicinal specialists, it is not only the knowledge but also the *techniques of knowledge production* that are part of the heritage practice. “Innovation,” in a local-traditional sense, is emerging from relationships and is based on the ability to establish contact and negotiation with the (ancestral) spirits, that is, on a *ritual skill* that is or can be inherited only within its corresponding ontological frame.

Either way, important prerequisites are the availability of natural resources (intact environment and biodiversity) and ongoing intergenerational contact, that is, continuously raising awareness of the value of this knowledge. Kwasi Konadu emphasizes that Africa “must come to see its culture [...] as its most precious and endangered natural resource or recourse, and as the basis from which socio-political and economic self-sufficing will emerge and be sustained” (Konadu 2007: 180).³³⁾

In recent decades, initiatives have emerged, where traditional healer organizations have developed their knowledge, combining traditional herbal knowledge and spiritual approaches with scientific (research) methods. The PROMETRA Buyijja Forest School in Uganda is an example where traditional healers are trained and research is conducted.³⁴⁾ Where cooperation with traditional practitioners or their integration into the health sector is sought, it will be necessary to treat them not merely as “informants” or “data mines” (cf. Konadu 2007) but as “collaborators.” This also means respecting and acknowledging their traditional methods of knowledge production and transmission, for example, guaranteeing the freedom to “keep secrets,” where necessary, as secrecy is, paradoxically, one of the prerequisites for indigenous knowledge production and transfer: Secrecy is seen as an obligation toward non-human worlds that keeps that relationship intact and enables communication and knowledge acquisition.

Further “secrecy is the only way that healers can maintain their work as specialized” (Langwick 2011: 284, citing a healer from the Ugandan Healer Association PROMETRA). By marking a boundary between the “profane” and the “sacred,” the secret secures the healer’s distinctive status in society and thus shapes his or her relationship to patients in a special way. Part of the therapeutic “success” lies in this unique relationship. The secret empowers the healers, not only vis-à-vis the community,

but also vis-à-vis external access. From a healer's point of view, the secret may protect their knowledge from being expropriated by science, the state, or multinational corporations (cf. Langwick 2017).³⁵⁾

To meet TAM on an equal footing, taking indigenous healers seriously as cooperation partners means, ultimately, to open up to their specific ontologies and epistemologies and appreciate them as locally valid realities in their own right. According to the historian Caroline Arni "the question is not 'how' reality is given, but what exists as 'the real' in a specific place at a specific time, whereby 'existing' is a question of how humans relate to other humans and non-humans through actions" (Arni 2019: 206).

Consequently, current cooperation projects then "must not write ancestors and other entities critical to healers' transformation of plants into medicines out of the project's guidelines. Rather, the challenge is to figure out how to write them in" (Langwick 2011: 289). In scientific assessments of "efficacy" of (indigenous) treatment methods, epistemological differences are not considered, and the different therapeutic goals are ignored. A more differentiated perspective on the concept of "efficacy," which considers diverse therapeutic aims, is required here. Hsu (1996) suggests evaluating treatment practices from different perspectives, distinguishing the "therapeutic result" (from the healer's perspective), the "therapeutic quality" (from the patient's perspective), the "therapeutic efficacy" (external perspective of a biomedical scientist), and the "therapeutic success" (external perspective of a social scientist). Each of these aspects of efficacy has different "endpoints" in the evaluation of a treatment outcome³⁶⁾ (cf. Hsu 1996) and requires different measurement methods, as they are based on different criteria.³⁷⁾ Langwick poses the essential question in this context: "Are scientists to be the mediators of truth and the authenticators of culture? Or are they to be collaborators, cooperating with healers in the name of different goals?" (Langwick 2011: 269).

If one approaches TAM with the intention of guaranteeing primary healthcare or preserving cultural heritage, a radical inclusion and engagement of local actors on an equal footing seems necessary. This requires recognition of the general incompleteness of knowledge (Nyamnjoh 2019: 1), to accept the plurality of "ways of knowing," and to open up to the possibility and existence of multiple "realities."

Notes

- 1) Adu-Gyamfi and Anderson state that "From the influence from Greek and Roman healing through to Persian and Arabic influence then to Christian faith healing and biomedicine, African traditional medicine has undergone changes to arrive at what it is today. Indeed, one can argue that health care in Africa has improved due to the interplay of diverse forces which have influenced it over the years" (2019: 89).
- 2) The World Health Organization (WHO) defines Traditional Medicine as follows: "Traditional medicine is the total knowledge, skills and practices based on the theories, beliefs, and indigenous cultural experiences, whether explicable or not, used in the maintenance of health, diagnosing, preventing, or eliminating physical, mental or social diseases. Such knowledge may rely exclusively on past experience and observations handed down from generation to

generation, verbally or in writing” (World Health Organization 2002). In many contexts dealing with non-academic healing phenomena, the term *Traditional, Complementary and Alternative Medicine* (TCAM) is used. This is to clarify that it is not only about antiquated knowledge stocks, but also about a variety of shifting practices that are characterized by innovation, renewal, and mutual global influence. I will use the two terms interchangeably.

- 3) This applies not only to the African continent, but worldwide (cf. Payyappallimana 2010).
- 4) “In the past twenty years, the WHO regional office for Africa spearheaded the implementation of a regional strategy endorsed by African heads of State in Lusaka, Zambia to promote the role of TCAM in health systems in the African region. The gains experienced since the adoption of the regional plan include policy formation in 36 countries and research promotion, including the establishment of TCAM research centers in some countries like Nigeria, Ghana, and South Africa. The regional plan has also promoted the inclusion of TCAM courses into the curricula of healthcare training institutions in countries across the continent. For instance, such plan has seen the inclusion of TCAM courses in some South African and Ghanaian universities. It has also promoted the training of TCAM practitioners and the local production and cultivation of medicinal plants, as well as the establishment of intellectual property rights for traditional medicine knowledge in few nations” (James et al. 2018).
- 5) Rather, they promote inequality by favoring the corporations of the Global North. Western pharmaceutical and cosmetics companies secure exclusive exploitation rights that bring them billions in profits. While the majority of biodiversity is native to the countries of the South, 97% of all organic patents are in the hands of companies based in industrialized countries (cf. Frein and Meyer 2008).
- 6) The “heritagization” of TAM can thus be an interesting issue. As a consequence of globalization processes, for example, the Chinese government intentionally utilizes the UNESCO Intangible Cultural Heritage scheme as a means to advertise Traditional Chinese Medicine worldwide. This is how they have used World Heritage sites for the purpose of tourist branding (Luo et al. 2020). However, in an African context, or more specifically in Ivory Coast, Traditional Medicine is promoted and commercialized on a regional and national level, but, to my knowledge, it is not yet of significant importance for international tourism.
- 7) Which aspects of a medical system are regarded as useful, effective, and relevant? What exactly does “effective” mean—with regard to which therapeutic claim? Who decides this and who benefits from what?
- 8) As the US-Ghanaian historian Kwasi Konadu suspects: “It was easier for Europeans to accept the potency in African herbs than for them to wholly accept African healing therapies including spiritual healing.” This, he continues, “slowed down the progress of African medicine, focusing and tagging most African healing expressions as backward and driven by superstition and belief in witchcraft” (Konadu 2007: 46).
- 9) It can be rated as a further effect of colonialism that the state health organizations, when promoting traditional medicine, refer mainly to herbal medicine. This can be unresistingly integrated into occidental epistemologies and scientific forms of efficacy-proof and legitimization strategies (Abdullahi 2011). The statements above point to a third problem of TAM: a lack of recognition and a general refusal to fully understand its inherent logics and ways of functioning.

- 10) Local knowledge and skills are local in the sense that they are acquired and used by people in relation to local goals, situations, and problems. It is knowledge “that has been generated by communities [...] in order to cope with their natural and social environment in a sustainable manner” (Murdoch and Clark 1994). “Local,” however, is not to be understood strictly topographically as its location, but rather as a shifting space for routinized interpretations and practices within a certain setting of interactions with relevant entities. Local knowledge is thus created under the influence of certain social and natural conditions and within local cultural and religious systems of meaning and beliefs and interacts with these reciprocally.
- 11) Before Christianity and Islam spread to the African continent, sub-Saharan African communities developed their own religious ideas and practices, which formed the basis of their social and cultural life and still play an important role in contemporary everyday life. However, it is not possible to speak of “the traditional African religion,” as it occurs in very different local forms, which are closely related to the numerous ethnic and linguistic groups. Thus, there is not one traditional African religion, but innumerable manifestations. Nevertheless, many similarities and certain basic characteristics can be observed (Ray 2005: 83). As oral traditions, they are of course—more than canonized religions—in constant change, influenced by missionary, colonial and later post-colonial influences. Some recurring characteristics of traditional African religions consist of 1) Orality/oral tradition and importance of myths; 2) Both monotheistic and polytheistic principles. There is the idea of a supreme god who created the world and preserves it (Mbiti 1975). This (mythological) God generally is far from the everyday life (Ray 2005: 84). In contrast, the lower gods, spirits, and ancestral spirits, are constantly involved in the daily affairs of people and form the center of ritual life. They are immanent and their relationship to humans is reciprocal. They can be sources of both protection and harm. Shrines, priests, cult groups, rituals and offerings are necessary to facilitate interaction with them, to make them feel positive or to seek their advice (cf. Ray 2005: 85); 3) Worship of ancestors who do not leave the world completely after their death, but remain connected to the family and act, among other things, as moral guardians. Just as living family members must be respected, so the ancestral family members must be respected too, to ensure order and harmony (Ray 2005: 85); 4) Rites of passage and initiation (not discussed further here); 5) Widespread (and also anchored in urban society) notions of magic and “witchcraft,” as well as high value of divination. These also found their way into adapted Christian and Muslim religious traditions (cf. Signer 2004); and 6) Conception of an animated nature.
- 12) The plants are even alleged to unfold their effect, if they do not come into direct contact with the patient, as in the case of as the charms, amulets, or protections in front of the door (Okpako 1991).
- 13) In “modern” (non-traditional) or urban settings “local wishes to keep the experience of ill health related to the experience of an invisible world of helpful and hostile beings” remain in place (see, e.g., Bruchhausen 2018: 50). This results in new groups of ritual practices that have replaced the former traditional communities and clan settings (cf. Bruchhausen 2018: 50) According to Janzen and Green, prophet-founders play the role of ancestor-mediators, while others assume the diagnostic role of diviners (cf. 2008: 11). Traditional healers in urban contexts are constantly adapting their practices to changing conditions. During the colonial period, terms like “literate healers” appeared (Osseo-Asare and Dove 2016: 69). These healers

took certain practices of European physicians as their model (cf. Adu-Gyamfi and Anderson 2019: 93). This type of “modernized” traditional healers later got organized into traditional healer associations “who sought to conserve traditional medicinal knowledge and fashion it after the well accepted western biomedicine and its physicians” (Adu-Gyamfi and Anderson 2019: 93). These various new charismatic or faith healing practices, although highly interesting and relevant in contemporary Africa, are not at the center of this contribution.

- 14) “L'épistémologie africaine ignore la séparation de l'ordre du connaître et de l'ordre de l'être. La connaissance est un être et non pas seulement un instrument au service de l'homme. (...) pour l'Africain, la connaissance est une réalité cosmique puisqu'elle de la même substance que le cosmos” (Ndaw 1997: 34).
- 15) In some cases, accompanied by an initiation rite where the individual is initiated into new exclusive knowledge.
- 16) The village consists of three neighborhoods. One is inhabited by Christians (Catholics, Protestants, and Dejma—a Pentecostal community), one by Muslims, and one by those who refer to themselves as “animists,” who can be classified as belonging to TAM. The Christian inhabitants have also adopted or retained many of the characteristics of the traditional African religions, which is reflected in their religious ideas and practices.
- 17) Konadu similarly observed different spheres of knowledge in the indigenous medical knowledge among the Akan in Ghana. He distinguishes between *core-basic* knowledge, *specialized* and *in-depth* knowledge, and *peripheral* knowledge (Konadu 2007: 159).
- 18) Diabetes is diagnosed by observing how ants behave toward the patient's urine on the ground.
- 19) Local knowledge is not necessarily evenly and fairly distributed as popular knowledge. In every community, there is both general and specialized local knowledge (cf. Antweiler 1995). Each society has different, culturally defined ways of disseminating knowledge. No matter how important this may be for solving problems, it is far from being passed on arbitrarily in a society (cf. Honerla and Schröder 1995).
- 20) On a rare occasion, I have been told by a villager, “spirits or ancestors will also transform into human form and give the knowledge of a certain medicine to a person” (interview: N'guessan K.). It is also believed that some people (especially hunters) understand the language of animals and sometimes get medicine from them. An informant told me that his grandfather had received a remedy against snake venom from a snake. It is assumed that all plants have their natural healing powers, which were given by *Nyamien*, the supreme God.
- 21) In the same context, he mentions not only “oral narrative archives,” but also proverbs, gold weights, and *adinkra* symbols (on textile cloth) with the same functions (cf. Konadu 2007).
- 22) “In essence, healing does not simply depend on the medicine employed but a totality of healing experience between the healer, patient and supernatural forces” (Adu-Gyamfi and Anderson 2019: 78).
- 23) This sphere of knowledge corresponds, according to Konadu (2007: 20), “to specialized and in-depth knowledge that is associated with the specialists, who function ultimately to maintain the coherency and expand the development of the community as it principally relates to holistic health and healing.”
- 24) Usually, they were called to this profession by an ancestor, who had also been a healer, or by a spirit and are inevitably obliged to devote their life to it.

- 25) Many African societies have a strong collectivist orientation. The cultural ideal provides for material equality among the members of a society. At the socio-economic level, this results in a constant effort to level out inequality. The society is thus simultaneously hierarchical and egalitarian (cf. Signer 2004). It is hierarchical, through the traditional hierarchical social structure, which, for example, gives older people or superiors a higher position and decision-making power that must not be questioned. It is egalitarian in the sense that material imbalances within the community must be immediately neutralized, everything acquired must be distributed. In these societies it is therefore hardly possible to accumulate economic capital (Kabou 1991; Signer 2004). Those who are materially better off provoke the envy of the disadvantaged (primarily family members) and run the risk of being “bewitched,” that is, psychologically, physically, or socially destroyed (cf. Signer 2004). The idea that someone can make another person ill or even kill him or her by the power of his or her negative thoughts exists, according to David Signer, almost throughout sub-Saharan Africa. It has often been observed that “witches” are motivated primarily by envy (cf. Signer 2004). According to Signer, it is therefore impossible or at least dangerous for the individual to accumulate economic capital. Thus, it is obvious that resources must be accumulated in a culturally justified variety of capital in order to secure access to luxury goods in the long term—for example, in the form of knowledge of medicinal plants. For the “hoarding” of knowledge, in contrast to the “hoarding” of money, is culturally (more) accepted. With regard to the case study: The above statements apply only to villagers who call themselves Christians or animists. The Muslim inhabitants have a different way of dealing with knowledge. For the Djula inhabitants of the village, knowledge about medicinal plants is not secret knowledge, and they do not require anything for treatments and showing medicinal plants. I have been told: “the Koran forbids to take anything for it. Allah put the plants on the earth so that people can cure their diseases. They are there for everyone” (interview: Kadidja).
- 26) Furthermore, many of the younger people migrate to the cities and lose the possibility of or an interest in learning about herbal medicines.
- 27) Hedberg and Straugård had already observed in the late 1980s, that “any [integrative] attempt to separate the ‘empirical’ from the ‘spiritual’ for the purposes of approaching and incorporating only the ‘empirical’ into the modern health care system is bound to result not in the promotion of [indigenous] medicine, but, on the contrary, in rendering it as mechanical and segmented as modern medicine may have become of late” (Hedberg and Straugård 1989: 29, cited in Bishaw 1991: 199).
- 28) TAM and its web of cultural meanings and corresponding practices reinforce social unity and cohesion and maintain the moral values of the community. Through the ritualized healing activities and acts of knowledge transmission (as captured in the oral formulas), social relationships with the ancestors and the community are reactivated. The passing down of knowledge can be seen as an extension of relationships. In addition to concrete practical instructions, the formula contains narrative references to a mythological past, creating a sense of continuity and belonging and promoting cultural identity.
- 29) Quoting Opoku and Edusei, Konadu stresses that many scholars fail to either recognize or accept that there has been a demystified “scientific” process to indigenous medicine in addition to the vast knowledge of medicines, acquired through close observation of nature and animals’

- application of those medicines, and practical experience accrued over centuries” (Opoku 1978: 150; Edusei 1985: 162, cited in Konadu 2007: 19).
- 30) Okello and Musisi state that “no African nation is categorized as having an integrative system, and only three countries, Ghana, Nigeria, and South Africa, have an inclusive one” (Okello and Musisi 2015: 259, cited in Payyappallimana 2010: 94). “The majority of other countries in Africa have tolerant systems. In this category, the national health care system is based entirely on western medicine, and the law tolerates only some traditional practices. These laws are often ignored, and in practice traditional medicine is accepted and tolerated throughout Africa” (Okello and Musisi 2015: 259, cited in Payyappallimana 2010: 94).
 - 31) From Konadu’s point of view, when speaking out in favor of integration, it would rather be more meaningful to integrate the exported, biomedical system “which is removed from the majority of the people, and only accessible to a few financially well-off, urbanized individuals” into the indigenous one “that is embedded in the thought and pragmatic structure of society” than vice versa (Konadu 2007: 175).
 - 32) In this context, Adu-Gyamfi and Anderson point to “the need for Africans to go back to our roots of indigenous knowledge conservation while advancing the scientific aspects of it” (Adu-Gyamfi and Anderson 2019: 96). As an example, they mention “a clan of women called *Ngiepan* in Uganda [that] has preserved traditional medicinal plants through songs, story-telling and dances” (Adu-Gyamfi and Anderson 2019: 96).
 - 33) The Senegalese economist and cultural theorist Felwine Sarr shares this view and expands it to include the dimension of peace “...today we know—through the people who study cultural anthropology—that cultural genocide [in Rwanda] preceded physical Genocide and that religious and spiritual culture is the place where social bonds are also forged. [...] Communities are fundamentally resilient when they have preserved strong cultures, when they have preserved ways to connect, to build a strong community, and when the religious is their foundation” (Sarr 2020: 11).
 - 34) The project aims to “improve healthcare for rural populations and protect forests. The objective is to reduce poverty and improve the living conditions of people living in the Buwama district of Uganda by strengthening traditional healthcare and expanding the use of ecological methods of cultivation. Those seeking to train as natural healers attend weekly courses on how to recognize common diseases and treat them with herbal medicines. By the end of the three-year course, they will be able to recognize hundreds of medicinal plants and be familiar with their effects and how they are processed and used. This also sensitizes them to the importance and protection of forests as they depend on their natural resources” (PROMETRA website: <https://prometra.org/research-and-education/uganda-forest-training-school/>)
 - 35) Langwick has observed how the ways healers “defend their secrets have come to challenge the political work that traditional medicine is being asked to do in national and international development initiatives, which cast it as a raw material—a resource for medical science, economic growth, and health development. These defenses point to the deeper transformation required” (2017: 33).
 - 36) For example, “therapeutic efficacy” is a measure of the effect of a treatment for example, the reduction of parasite density in the body, while “therapeutic quality” measures the effect on the perceived illness, that is, the alleviation of symptoms, and the “therapeutic result” could be the

perceived harmonization of relations within the household or with the non-human world.

- 37) Langwick argues in this context “that the nature of scientific proof is not self-evident, but rather emerges in the details of research methodologies and the structure of research institutions [...]. As a result, the conditions that allow some things to be proven and not others change over time (2011: 288).

References

Abdullahi, A. A.

- 2011 Trends and Challenges of Traditional Medicine in Africa. *African Journal of Traditional, Complementary and Alternative Medicine* 8(5S): 115–123.

Adu-Gyamfi, S. and E. Anderson

- 2019 Indigenous Medicine and Traditional Healing in Africa: A Systematic Synthesis of the Literature. *Philosophy, Social and Human Disciplines* 1: 69–100.

Antweiler, C.

- 1995 Lokales Wissen: Grundlagen, Probleme, Bibliographie. *Zur Relevanz kulturspezifischen Wissens für Entwicklungsprozesse* (Local Knowledge: Foundations, Problems, Bibliography. In S. Honerla and P. Schröder (eds.) *On the Relevance of Culture-specific Knowledge for Development Processes*), pp. 19–52, 86. Saarbrücken: Verlag für Entwicklungspolitik.

Arni, C.

- 2019 Nach der Kultur. Anthropologische Potentiale für eine rekursive Geschichtsschreibung. *Historische Anthropologie* (After Culture. Anthropological potentials for a recursive historiography. *Historical Anthropology*) 26(2): 200–223.

Bamidele, J. O., W. O. Adebimpe, and E. A. Oladele

- 2009 Knowledge, Attitude and Use of Alternative Medical Therapy amongst Urban Residents of Osun State, Southwestern Nigeria. *African Journal of Traditional, Complementary and Alternative Medicine* 6(3): 281–288.

Bishaw, M.

- 1991 Promoting Traditional Medicine in Ethiopia: A Brief Historical Review of Governmental Policy. *Social Science and Medicine* 33: 193–200.

Bodeker, G. and G. Burford

- 2007 *Traditional, Complementary and Alternative Medicine Policy and Public Health Perspectives*. London: Imperial College Press.

Bruchhausen, W.

- 2018 Medicalized Healing in East Africa: The Separation of Medicine and Religion by Politics and Science. In D. Lüddeckens and M. Schrimpf (eds.) *Medicine—Religion—Spirituality: Global Perspectives on Traditional, Complementary, and Alternative Healing*, pp. 23–55. Bielefeld: Transcript Verlag.

Edusei, K.

- 1985 *Für uns ist Religion die Erde, auf der wir leben* (For us, religion is the earth we live on). Stuttgart: Urachhaus.

- Feierman, S.
 1985 Struggles for Control: The Social Roots of Health and Healing in Modern Africa. *African Studies Review* 28(2/3): 73–147.
- Feierman, S. and J. M. Janzen
 1992 *The Social Basis of Health and Healing in Africa*. Berkeley: University of California Press.
- Frein, M. and H. Meyer
 2008 *Die Biopiraten: Milliardenengeschäfte der Pharmaindustrie mit dem Bauplan der Natur (The biopirates: The pharmaceutical industry's billion-dollar deals with nature's blueprint)*. Munich: Econ.
- Geissler, P. W. and R. Prince
 2009 Active Compounds and Atoms of Society: Plants, Bodies, Minds and Cultures in the Work of Ethnobotanical Knowledge. *Social Studies of Science* 39(4): 599–634.
- Hedberg, I. and F. Straugård
 1989 *Traditional Medicine in Botswana: Traditional Medicinal Plants*. Gaborone: Ipelegeng Publishers.
- Honerla, S. and P. Schröder
 1995 *Zur Relevanz kulturspezifischen Wissens für Entwicklungsprozesse (On the relevance of culture-specific knowledge for development processes)*. Saarbrücken: Verlag für Entwicklungspolitik.
- Hsu, E.
 1996 The Polyglot Practitioner: Towards Acceptance of Different Approaches in Treatment Evaluation. In S. G. Olesen and E. Hoeg (eds.) *Communication in and about Alternative Therapies*, pp. 37–53. Odense: Odense University Press.
- Hsu, E. and S. Harris
 2010 *Plants, Health and Healing: On the Interface of Ethnobotany and Medical Anthropology*. New York: Berghahn Books.
- Iwu, M. M.
 1993 *Handbook of African Medical Plants*. London: CRC Press.
- James, P. B., J. Wardle, A. Steel, and J. Adams
 2018 Traditional, Complementary and Alternative Medicine Use in Sub-Saharan Africa: A Systematic Review. *British Medical Journal Global Health* 3(5): 1–18.
- Janzen, J. M. and E. C. Green
 2008 Medicine in Africa. In H. Selin (ed.) *Encyclopedia of History of Science, Technology, and Medicine in Non-Western Cultures*, pp. 1–17. Berlin: Springer-Verlag.
- Kabou, A.
 1991 *Et si l'Afrique refusait le développement?* Paris: L'Harmattan.
- Kanu, I. A.
 2018 The Paradox of Secrecy in African Traditional Religion. *Journal of Religion and Human relations* 10(1): 35–55.
- Konadu, K.
 2007 *Indigenous Medicine and Knowledge in African Society*. New York: Routledge.
 2008 *Medicine and Anthropology in Twentieth Century Africa: Akan Medicine and*

- Encounters with (Medical) Anthropology. *African Studies Quarterly* 10(2/3): 45–69.
- Langwick, S.
- 2007 Devils, Parasites, and Fierce Needles: Healing and the Politics of Translation in Southern Tanzania. *Science, Technology and Human Values* 32(1): 88–117.
 - 2011 Healers and Scientists. The Epistemologic Politics of Research about Medicinal Plants in Tanzania, or ‘Moving away from Traditional Medicine.’ In W. P. Geissler and C. Molyneux (eds.) *Evidence, Ethos and Experiment: The Anthropology and History of Medical Research in Africa*, pp. 263–295. New York: Berghahn.
 - 2017 The Value of Secrets. Pragmatic Healers and Proprietary Knowledge. In C. William Olsen and C. Sargent (eds.) *African Medical Pluralism*, pp. 31–49. Bloomington: Indiana University Press.
- Laplante, J.
- 2015 *Healing Roots: Anthropology in Life and Medicine*. New York: Berghahn.
- Luo, Y., J. Jiang, and D. Bi (eds.)
- 2020 *Tourism Product Development in China, Asian and European Countries*. Singapore: Springer Nature Singapore.
- Luoga, E. J., E. T. F. Witkowski, and K. Balkwill
- 2000 Differential Utilization and Ethnobotany of Trees in Kitulanghalo Forest Reserve and Surrounding Communal Lands, Eastern Tanzania. *Economic Botany* (54): 328–343.
- Mbiti, J. S.
- 1975 *Introduction to African Religion*. London: Heinemann.
- Mosha, S.
- 1999 *The Heartbeat of Indigenous Africa: A Study of the Chagga Educational System*. New York: Routledge.
- Murdoch, J. and J. Clark
- 1994 Sustainable Knowledge. *Geoforum* 25(2): 115–132.
- Ndaw, A.
- 1997 *La pensée africaine: recherches sur les fondements de la pensée négro-africaine*. Dakar: Nouvelles Editions Africaines du Sénégal.
- Nyamnjoh, F. B.
- 2019 Decolonizing the Academy: A Case of Convivial Scholarship, Keynote Adress (Schlettwein Lecture 2019) at the Conference on Africa and teh Academy in the 21st Century, Basel, Switzerland, 1–2 November.
- Obrist, B. and P. V. Eeuwijk
- 2020 Medical Anthropology in, of, for and with Africa: Three Hotspots. *Medical Anthropology* 39(8): 782–793.
- Okello, E. and S. Musisi
- 2015 The Role of Traditional Healers in Mental Healthcare in Africa. In E. K. Akeampong, A. Hill and A. Kleinman (eds.) *The Culture of Mental Illness and Psychiatric Practice in Africa*, pp. 249–261. Indiana: Indiana University Press.
- Okpako, D.
- 1991 *Traditional Medicine: Principles of Pharmacology, a Tropical Approach*. Cambridge: University Press.

- Opoku, K. A.
1978 *West African Traditional Religion*. Accra: FEP International Private.
- Osseo-Asare, A. D. and A. Dove
2016 Writing Medical Authority: The Rise of Literate Healers in Ghana, 1930–1970. *Journal of African Studies* 57(1): 69–91.
- Oyelakin, R. T.
2009 Yoruba Traditional Medicine and the Challenge of Integration. *The Journal of Pan African Studies* 3(3): 73–90.
- Payyappallimana, U.
2010 Role of Traditional Medicine in Primary Health Care: An Overview of Perspectives and Challenging. *Yokohama Journal of Social Sciences* 14(6): 57–77.
- Ray, B.
2005 African Religions: An Overview. In J. Lindsay (ed.) *Encyclopedia of Religion 1* (2nd ed.), pp. 83–91. Detroit: Thomson Gale.
- Sarr, F.
2020 *Les entrelacs de l'object*, brochure to Kader Attias' Exhibition “Remembering the future,” Kunsthaus Zürich, August–November 2020.
- Signer, D.
2004 *Die Ökonomie der Hexerei oder warum es in Afrika keine Wolkenkratzer gibt (The economics of witchcraft or why there are no skyscrapers in Africa)*. Wuppertal: Peter Hammer Verlag.
- Soelberg, J. et al.
2015 Historical versus Contemporary Medicinal Plant Uses in Ghana. *Journal of Ethnopharmacology* 160: 109–32.
- Tabuti, J., L. A. Lye, and S. S. Dillon
2003 Traditional Herbal Drugs of Bulamogi, Uganda: Plants, Use and Administration. *Journal of Ethnopharmacology* 88: 19–44.
- Thornton, J. R.
2017 *Healing the Exposed Being: A South African Ngoma Tradition*. Johannesburg: Wits University Press.
- Tugume, P., E. K. Kakudidi, M. Buyinza, J. Namaalwa, M. Kamatenesi, P. Mucunguzi, and J. Kalema
2016 Ethnobotanical Survey of Medicinal Plant Species Used by Communities around Mabira Central Forest Reserve, Uganda. *Journal of Ethnobiology and Ethnomedicine* 12(1): 2.
- Twumasi, P. A.
1975 *Medical Systems in Ghana: A Study in Medical Sociology*. Accra: Ghana Publishing Corporation.
- UNESCO
2020 Intangible Cultural Heritage Website. <https://ich.unesco.org/en/transmission-00078> (retrieved on 1 December 2020)
- WHO
1983 *Traditional Medicine and Health Care Coverage: A Reader for Health Administrators and Practitioners*. Geneva: WHO.

- 2002 *WHO Traditional Medicine Strategy 2002–2005*, Geneva: WHO/EDM/TRM/2002.1.
- 2008 *The World Health Report 2008: Primary Health Care (Now More Than Ever)*. Geneva: WHO. https://www.who.int/whr/2008/08_overview_en.pdf (retrieved on 4 November 2020)
- 2014 *WHO Traditional Medicine Strategy 2014–2023* Geneva: WHO. https://apps.who.int/iris/bitstream/handle/10665/92455/9789241506090_eng.pdf?sequence=1 (retrieved on 4 November 2020)
- Zahan, D.
1970 *Religion, Spiritualité et Pensée Africaine*. Paris: Payot.

Visual Citizenship in Senegal: Contemporary Contests of Cultural Heritage¹⁾

Allen F. Roberts²⁾

University of California, Los Angeles

1. Introduction

“Visual citizenship” is to belong by the eye.³⁾ National flags, portraits of saints, and historical monuments help define the cultural heritage of communities the world around (see Morgan 2005: 220–255). Such rallying images can long endure or be lost in the vagaries of faith, fortune, or fad. Visual citizenship is inexorably adaptive, as are all aspects of collective identity and purpose, and new ways of seeing the world assist people to cope with misfortune even as they celebrate life’s triumphs, however ephemeral they may be. Visual, narrative, and performative contributions to heritage converge in social processes fruitfully understood as *refabulation*.

Urban Senegal has been undergoing radical refabulation since the late 1980s, as memories suppressed or neglected during the French colonial period (1885–1960) are summoned to produce new celebrated faces and places.⁴⁾ “Refabulation” refers to the choosing of myths and allusions suited to the needs of those *seeing* to such transformations. Through youth-instigated changes, many French monuments and street names in Dakar have been altered to recognize African heroes and illustrious events; if vestiges of the colonial project remain, it is because Senegalese themselves have *decided* to include such fragments of an updated past in present-day stories of their own telling (see Diouf 1992a). Refabulation need not be homegrown or “bottom-up,” however, for special and foreign interests may elbow their ways into prominence, transforming landscapes as they seek to shape mindscapes to their financial or political advantage. Consider the following scene, for example:

Toward the tip of the Cap-Vert peninsula upon which Dakar sprawls with rhizomatic intensity, Léopold Sedar Senghor Airport long welcomed domestic travelers, international visitors, and those coming home from abroad.⁵⁾ Planes descended to the oceanside view marked by the Mamelles—two steep “breast-like” hills (hence *mamelle* in French). One Mamelle has long been topped by a lighthouse beaming out to sea, while the other is now adorned with a monstrous monument called “African Renaissance,” begun in 2006 and dedicated in 2010 in celebration of Senegal’s fiftieth anniversary of independence from French colonial rule (Photo 1). The sculpture was conceived by former Senegalese president Abdoulaye Wade (2000–2012) and constructed by a North Korean company.



Photo 1 “African Renaissance” monument in Dakar, Senegal. (Photograph by the author in 2011)

The firm’s fees are said to have been exchanged for a huge grant of land once constituting a portion of Senghor Airport (see De Jong 2010).

At a foot or so taller than New York’s Statue of Liberty, “African Renaissance” is reputedly the grandest sculpture outside of Asia and Eastern Europe. It echoes Soviet Realism in its depiction of a naked-to-the-waist African man, his right arm around a voluptuous African woman whose right breast and legs are provocatively exposed, and his left arm holding aloft an African child pointing westward out to sea. Most features and circumstances of the monument have been protested as inappropriate by local people, with outrage typically matched by wit. How can such a waste of funding be tolerated in such a poor country? The nudity is an affront to many Muslims, as is the woman’s revealing garb to Senegalese feminists. Moreover, is the child not pointing overseas, where unemployed Senegalese might rather be these days? Special derision was reserved for President Wade’s early claim—later abandoned—to income generated from souvenirs and other commercial ventures as his intellectual property right.

To be fair, many of those invited to celebrate the monument’s dedication saw it as a triumph of *Négritude*, and President Wade hoped that critics would understand the achievement to be consistent with the broad-based philosophy of the much-esteemed Léopold Sedar Senghor (1906–2001), first President of the Republic. The monument also refers to the New Partnership for Africa’s Development or NEPAD, the initiative of the African Union adopted in 2001 that integrated President Wade’s own Omega Plan for

Africa to garner substantial international exposure for Senegal. Ambitious plans for a NEPAD-driven African renaissance included eradicating poverty, sustainable growth, and accelerated empowerment of women. Sadly, little has come of such good intentions, and most blogged responses to the “African Renaissance” monument have been scornful of the empty statements and unrealized actions deemed typical of the elderly former president.⁶⁾

Attending the inaugural festivities, Malawian President Bingu wa Mutharika (now deceased) seemed to echo the opinion of many skeptics when he said that “this monument does not belong to Senegal.”⁷⁾ President Mutharika was referring to pan-African solidarity, of course. Yet with its Soviet Realist design, its flaunting of stereotypical “Africans,” and its construction by North Koreans in exchange for some of Dakar’s choicest real estate, to whom *does* “African Renaissance” belong? Whose cultural heritage does the monument make manifest and promote? This chapter contrasts two case studies from contemporary Senegal to help readers understand how visual citizenship recognized for its inspiration is contested by external forces, as reflected in ongoing debates about “African Renaissance.”

2. The Mystical Graffiti of Pape Samb

Through the 1990s and early 2000s, Dakar was bursting with vibrant visual culture, affirming a sense of citizenship and heritage. Images ranged from locally focused advertisements, slogans for political candidates and factions, and public health messages to inspirational images of the saints of Senegal’s four Sufi movements. Of the latter, portraits of Sheikh Amadu Bamba (1853–1927), the *Senegalese* holy man from whose prolific writings and miracles the Mouride Sufi Way (Muridiyya in Arabic) has been created, were by far the most prevalent. This study focuses on such imagery.⁸⁾

Bamba is a “saint,” as the Arabic phrase *wali Allah* is often translated in English and French by Mourides and writers on the topic. The phrase refers to an “intimate” or “friend” of God, and Bamba explained how this divine relationship was established during his exile from Senegal between 1895 and 1902. Despite his avowed pacifism, French colonial authorities found Bamba’s charisma to be subversive and kept him under close surveillance from the mid-1890s until his death more than 30 years later. In transcending his persecution, the Saint wrote that he had “been able to come into proximity with my Lord” (Bamba n.d.; see also Mbacke 2009; Ngom 2016), with a more literal than figurative assertion intended.

Bamba’s extraordinary relationship to Allah is confirmed for Mourides by the only known photograph of the Saint, taken around 1913 and published in a colonial work four years later.⁹⁾ Although it is difficult to determine when the photograph became available to Mourides, books published in France but of local relevance were likely available to Senegalese readers shortly after they appeared in print in the remarkably cosmopolitan cities of Saint-Louis, Dakar, and Rufisque. Bamba’s image became widely known to Mourides, and the Saint was “produced” in new ways as an object of knowledge and devotion, as Michel Foucault (1980: 97) might have posited. Indeed, “a process of

reflexive objectification of the observer” was underway, as Jean-Bernard Ouédraogo (2002: 47) would undoubtedly add.

The portrait of Amadu Bamba is no ordinary picture (Photo 2). On a sultry sunny day in 1913, a frontal, full-length photograph of Bamba was taken as an instrument of colonial surveillance. The slight man is wrapped in a voluminous white robe with long sleeves, completely hiding his hands. His head is swathed in a loose white wrap, of which one end conceals the lower portion of his face. Because his shoulders are slightly turned, the robe continues the uninterrupted lines of the turban to present a nearly formless body in silhouette. The intense sun of that day in 1913 is palpable, for Bamba’s dark skin absorbs and reflects light. The result is an image of high contrast comprising a collection of black and white shapes that is more reminiscent of Arabic letters than a finely articulated, “realistic” depiction denoting personality or emotion (Photo 3). Indeed, the photograph is nearly devoid of the individualistic particularity one would associate with surveillance photography, except insofar as this very peculiarity is what is recognized as the Saint’s countenance and no one else’s.¹⁰

Sufis have long referred to the “calligraphy” of the Prophet Muhammad’s face as “a marvelously written manuscript of the Qur’an” (Schimmel 1975: 413). His nose is said to have been like an *alif*, the sweeping stroke with which one begins the Holy Name of Allah, and His eyebrows, the *Basmala* formula “In the name of Allah” with which one begins prayers or blesses other endeavors. The Prophet’s eyes and mouth also suggested letters, as derived from ancient Arabic notions of physiognomy (cf. Courtine and Haroche



Photo 2 C.1913 photograph of Sheikh Amadu Bamba, from Marty (1917: 222), public domain.



Photo 3 Portrait painting of Amadu Bamba by Assane Dione, private collection. (Photograph by Don Cole in 2003, of the UCLA Fowler Museum, with permission)




Photo 4 Calligram of Amadu Bamba's based upon Assane Dione's portrait. The Shahada proclamation of Islamic faith is written in Arabic script. UCLA Fowler Museum x99.56.30. (Photograph by Don Cole in 2003, with permission)

2007: 39–40). Following such revelations, Sufis possessing deeply arcane knowledge can “read” Bamba’s countenance as revealed in the 1913 photograph (Photo 4). The image emphasizes the potentiality of *batin*—the profound signification that stands dialectically between visible and invisible realms. Indeed, in such a mystical image, “certain parts are visible, while others are not; visible parts render the others invisible, and a rhythm of emergence and secrecy sets in, a kind of watermark of the imaginary” (to redirect Baudrillard 1988: 33). Such an assertion recalls Seyyed Nasr’s (1987: 128–129) paraphrase of Rumi, that “no reality is exhausted by its appearance,” for one must “penetrate into the *ma’na* [essential meaning] of things” to partake of their “inebriating interiority.” Indeed, “the great paradox of Islamic art” is its quest to “represent a reality that cannot be seen” (Laibi 1998: 14). The portrait of Amadu Bamba provides opportunities to reflect upon such profundities.

The bright sunlight of that day in 1913 produced other noteworthy results when considered through a Mouride visual epistemology. As Bamba’s left ankle and foot emerge from the stark white of his robe, the man’s deep shadow obscures his right foot so that it appears to be missing. If the Saint’s foot is “not there,” where can it be? For many Mourides, this is an instance of what Mark Taylor might call “the non-absent absence of the holy” (cited in Berry 1992: 4), in that the Saint is seen to step into the plane of observation from another dimension where his right foot must still be located. Having written of how he came into proximity with Allah, such features of the 1913 photograph demonstrate that Bamba *is* a saint, able to traverse between heavenly and human realms. Such a realization brings an immediate boon, for in returning to humanity

from his divine encounter, Bamba bears with him Allah's active blessing known as *baraka*. It may be noted that the present tense of this last sentence is appropriate and necessary, for the image inhabits a moment defined by each viewing, and those seeing Bamba's iconic portrait are blessed every time they do, today as in the past.

Rationalist arguments about how any such feature as a "missing" foot may be because of the nature of the photographic event or subsequent darkroom manipulations are irrelevant. What need not be noticed in a photograph can and often will be, and there always exists the possibility that signs of Allah (*aya*) will be discovered. As such understandings are shared, "visual piety" is developed as "practices, attitudes, and ideas invested in images... structure the experience of the sacred." David Morgan's surprising verb—"to structure"—suggests that images may possess active agency rather than remaining passive illustrations. As he asserts, "what the image depicts and what the devout viewer thinks it means merge seamlessly into a compelling *presence*" (Morgan 1998: 2–3, 9; Roberts and Roberts 2022).

Bamba conveys *baraka* blessing through such a presence. As the dynamism of grace, *baraka* "bestows physical superabundance and prosperity and psychological happiness" (Triaud 1988: 53) inherited by descendants of Amadu Bamba and other saints. Above all else, *baraka* is an active energy that heals, protects, and promotes people in countless ways. However, what may be unusual to Senegalese Sufis is the degree to which they know that *baraka* is available through pictures that help define their identities—not just spiritually, but nationally as an important element of visual citizenship.¹¹⁾

Portraits of Sheikh Amadu Bamba have been produced in a staggering array of media. Some are silkscreened, lithographed, or otherwise produced by (semi-) industrial means, and seemingly infinite generations of photographic prints are struck from the 1913 photograph along with studio shots of the Saint's sons and daughters. Until recently, most images were made by hand through tiny cottage industries. They might be carved in coconut shell or wood, and sometimes into the trunks of living trees; cast in silver, plastic, recycled aluminum, plaster of Paris, or cement; stenciled on cloth and T-shirts; painted on canvas, wood, or the back of window glass; and, in one case, even inked onto a calcareous cuttlefish "bone." Mourides hold that such variation of hands and media stems from divine gifts rather than triumphs of individual initiative: To have a "good idea" as to how to produce an image and then sell it to feed, clothe, and shelter one's family is due to the intervention of the Saint himself (A. Roberts 1996; 2022). Regarding the spiritual value of the works, no matter how "well-achieved" they may or may not be according to (usually extraneous) aesthetic criteria, all portrayals of the Saint are "authentic" insofar as they are efficacious in providing *baraka* blessing energy (M. N. Roberts 2008).

Through the *baraka* communicated by images of Amadu Bamba, artists actively transform urban Senegal spiritually and materially. In the early 2000s, a street artist named Pape Diop produced images of Amadu Bamba that were so iterative that they verged on fractal composition (Roberts and Roberts 2008; 2010). Diop's designs were of many sizes, but the smallest ones caught the eye first, for they were the most intense in




Photo 5 “Empire Moride” vignette of mystical graffiti by Pape Diop on a wall near Soubédioune fish market in Dakar. (Photograph by the author in 2004)

density and contrast (Photo 5). On closer inspection, one soon realized that they telescoped to larger and larger pictures, offering a distinct sense of depth despite their two-dimensionality. Diop made his pigments from the pulverized carbon plates of cast-off automobile batteries mixed with battery acid. As a paintbrush, he used a frayed chewing stick of the sort many Senegalese use to clean their teeth. As Diop’s earlier graffiti faded and flaked, their ephemeral nature made them all the more poignant; but in the earlier years of his street-based practice, he often refreshed or painted over his designs, creating palimpsests of pious purpose and presence.

Pape Diop limned Bamba’s portrait over and over and over again. Occasionally he added portraits of Bamba’s sons and Mouride caliphs, and words and phrases were interspersed in the artist’s complex compositions (Photo 6). “Hahad” was the most frequently repeated term as a local spelling for one of the Ninety-Nine Names of Allah that means “The Unique.” Given the proximity of the word to Bamba’s images, one can speculate that Diop was broadening the sense of Allah’s Name to characterize the Saint’s divine singularity. Sadly, *speculate* is all one can do regarding the artist’s oeuvre, for it was said that he could no longer speak after being struck by a car while he crossed a road. Not even members of his own family knew how to locate him, for the man lived on the street and was always on the move. Nonetheless, even if his intentions could not



Photo 6 Vignette of mystical graffiti by Pape Diop in the Médina neighborhood of Dakar, with “Confiance à personne — do not trust anyone” as someone else’s superimposed graffiti. (Photograph by the author in 2004)

be ascertained as he might have wished to articulate them, one *could* describe the impact of Diop’s work on those living in the neighborhoods he refabulated with such fervor.¹²⁾

Repetition can be an end unto itself, as Gilles Deleuze (1994: 70) has explained. Pape Samb’s iterative murals resonated with aural arts, and especially the half-sung, half-chanted *zīkr* (or *dhikr*) that characterize Mouride devotion. As the graphic artist Yelimane Fall noted of Diop’s work, “for us [Mourides], the image of the Saint is engraved in us, it is everywhere in us, in our arms, in our heads, everywhere; but [look at] how many times this guy [Pape Diop] has wanted to bring forth the image from within himself as an interior *zīkr*, a *zīkr* within himself!”¹³⁾ The Qur’an exhorts Muslims to “Remember Allah often and glorify Him morning and evening,” for “in remembering Allah the hearts find comfort.”¹⁴⁾ Many Mourides sing or listen to recorded *zīkr* to cadence everyday activities and devotions, making it difficult to distinguish work from worship. Indeed, given Bamba’s phenomenology of work as prayer, it is irrelevant to do so (see Roberts and Roberts 2003).

Zīkr revive and soothe the parched soul, but only if inspired by and learned from a Sufi master. As *zīkr* are chanted, the adept “should keep the image of his sheikh before his eyes for spiritual help during the recollection” (Schimmel 1975: 169–170). For many

Sufis, such an assertion refers to remembrance rather than to any actual depiction of the sheikh. However, Mourides make this a literal practice through images of Amadu Bamba like those of Pape Diop, based upon the 1913 photograph of the Saint.

Other aspects of Diop's repetition of images underscored their impact as visual *zīkr*. The contrast of saturated black and white shapes of his smallest pictures induced visual and spiritual directness, for their strongly delineated shapes served as "chromatic poles" that produced powerful kinesthetic effects. When crisp black and white shapes are juxtaposed, "each becomes more intense and saturated" through "simultaneous contrast" (Saint-Martin 1990: 33–35; 45–47). The white sets off the black and vice versa, emblazoning the image in one's perception. In the dazzling sunlight of Sub-Saharan cities like Dakar, retinal fatigue from such contrastive play can produce "flickering flashes," colored after-effects, and haloing (Saint-Martin 1990: 33–35; 45–47). Indeed, many Mourides attest that after long contemplation of Bamba's image, they see the Saint when they close their eyes and in their dreams.

An even more startling characteristic of human vision known as auto-stereopsis may have been triggered by Pape Diop's repeated images and the contrast between the brightest, most clear-cut small ones and those behind them. Through the welter of Pape Diop's murals, such a response could leave a viewer with a sense of three-dimensionality that reached outward or beckoned a person into labyrinthine spiritual intricacies. Further, as per Yelimane Fall, Diop's "small images [of the Saint] are like little doors: they come out toward you as though projected to invite you into them." Thus, in pondering Pape Diop's works, a Mouride might gain the impression of being "in the picture" with Amadu Bamba to be readily embraced and blessed by his *baraka*. A further outcome was that such an entrancing experience must have enhanced a sense of *place* in the otherwise anonymous, often anomic streets of Senegal's inner cities. Those drawn into the wealth of detail available through the three-dimensional experience Diop provided were engaging in discovery of a particularly Senegalese sort, for one "entered" the image in an almost tangible way, and the *place* so determined must have been of great spiritual import.

By covering walls with sacred portraits, Pape Diop was transforming and defining the streets of inner-city Dakar, making them apotropaic and talismanic in healing and protecting those who dwelt near or passed by (Photo 7). Pape Diop's fractal compositions defined and consecrated the places where he painted his murals, and their iteration compounded the *baraka* of Bamba's images. The Saint's beneficence was conveyed through the artist's hand to assuage the everyday difficulties that denizens of Dakar suffer all too often. In covering walls with images of Amadu Bamba, Senegalese Sufi artists like Diop offer those who see their work the *baraka* conveyed by the Saint and all the hope, dignity, and protection so implied.

The sense of collective identity that results from such visual achievements transcends association with Mouridism as a specific Sufi way among the four mystical movements found in Senegal, for Amadu Bamba is understood above all to be a *local* pacifist mystic. He is among the most important historical figures of the republic, and Bamba's iconic images have become a gauge of collective heritage and citizenship, even for non-Mourides to a significant degree. A narrative portrait of the Saint purchased in



Photo 7 Mystical graffiti by Pape Diop on the walls of a vacant lot near the Soubédioune fish market of Dakar. (Photograph by the author in 2004)

Dakar in 2011 bears a caption highlighting this relationship: “basic cultural values.” A local artist originally produced the image as a reverse-glass painting; however, the representation is now photoshopped in and imported from China.¹⁵ Such a tectonic shift to expropriate—and expatriate—production of what is still considered a basis for social identity stands as a most ironic assertion of what may constitute Senegalese visual citizenship in the age of Abdoulaye Wade’s “African Renaissance.” In “rebirth” (*renaissance* in French), Senegal may be losing rather than confirming its Africanity.

3. Recolonizing an Image Economy

As a second case study, picture this, if you will: In a full-color image purchased in Dakar in 2011, Amadu Bamba is shown performing his most compelling miracle (Photo 8). In 1895, as he was being sent into exile by French colonial authorities, the holy man was denied the opportunity to fulfill his Muslim devotions by the Christian captain of the ship transporting him to Gabon. The Archangel Gabriel intervened, stopping the ship and helping the Saint to pray upon the waters. Many Senegalese artists have captured this transcendent moment, and one often sees such an image in Mouride homes and shops, inspiring people with the courage to overcome the most burdensome of daily realities (Photo 9). Indeed, it is this very scene that bears the caption “basic cultural values” mentioned above. In the picture purchased in 2011, however, a Chinese junk with dusky-red battened sails halts in the sea behind the Saint, replacing the late-nineteenth-century French steamships of other accounts and depictions of the miracle.¹⁶

Apart from the banalities of photoshopping, what is going on in this picture? Nothing short of a recolonization of the Senegalese visual economy by foreign interests, in my estimation (see A. Roberts 2010). Indeed, the odd image of Amadu Bamba is a manifestation of far greater political forces than may meet the eye, suggesting challenges to and perhaps changes in “basic cultural values”—and, thus, cultural heritage and senses of visual citizenship—among contemporary Senegalese.



Photo 8 Image of the miracle of Amadu Bamba praying upon the waters with a Chinese junk (sailing ship) in the background. Montage photoshopped in the PRC and purchased by the author in Dakar in 2011, scanned to produce this image.



Photo 9 The miracle of Amadu Bamba praying upon the waters, reverse-glass painting by Mor Gueye purchased 1998, private collection. (Photograph by the author in 1999)

Deborah Poole (1997: 9–10) explicates the phrase “visual economy” in her important study of a late-nineteenth-century Andean image world. Like other economies, those concerning visual culture are characterized by three features: “an organization of production encompassing both the individuals and the technologies that produce images,” “the circulation of goods or, in this case, images and image-objects,” and “the cultural and discursive systems through which graphic images are appraised, interpreted, and assigned historical, scientific, and aesthetic worth.” “How images accrue value” is of special significance to these latter reckonings. We would add that all economies, including visual ones, are fluid as to relationships that they imply, create, and strengthen, for actors, ideas, and means come and go constantly, making it impossible to define the boundaries of any given transactional field.

Colonization of a visual economy suggests co-optation by foreign interests. The prefix “re-” in recolonization implies that something like this has happened before, although not necessarily in the same ways or for the same reasons for which it is happening now.

A vibrant visual economy was created by and among Senegalese Muslims in the late nineteenth century as colonial forces asserted hegemonic control of the vast expanses of what would become French West Africa. For a while, greater Senegambia was convulsed by resistance. In reaction, French authorities took an increasingly militaristic approach to enlarging their sphere of interest. Transition from political economies influenced by

transatlantic, regional, and domestic slave trades to domination by colonial capitalism was hugely fraught, and the French felt obliged to play a wary game, promoting certain Muslim authorities while suppressing any movement they deemed subversive to their colonial aspirations. Although desisting from further violence, Senegalese Muslim leaders were anything but passive in building social structures counter to French colonial models. Hence, they “turned increasingly to the production of devotional literature which served to reinforce their authority in an arena independent of the colonial state.”¹⁷ Significantly, the “literature” in question was both written and visual.

Devotional chromolithographs were imported from northern Africa in increasing numbers, and those portraying “heroes of the Faith” proved especially popular among Senegalese Muslims (Renaudeau and Strobel 1984: 57). For instance, the Imam Ali was portrayed as severing the leg of the infidel Meccan general Amr ibn ul Wudd, and the famed Battle of Badr of 624 CE was depicted in frantic glory, with a host of angels leading the Prophet’s far-outnumbered forces to victory. That these exhilarating pictures might foster resistance was recognized in 1908 by William Ponty, then Governor-General of French West Africa and headquartered in Dakar. He prohibited further importation of Islamic chromolithographs, noting that

Syrians and Moroccans are flooding the country with unusual numbers of Arabic publications of all sorts as well as crude color engravings representing scenes from Muslim life.... Journals, brochures, and diverse images are destined for holy men and their literate followers or those who pretend to be, which assures sale of the engravings.... All these publications and engravings that present a hostile character or one that is simply susceptible to promoting Muslim resistance activities must be destroyed.... One cannot deny what a marvelous instrument of propaganda these thousands of coarse engravings constitute here, [that are so] vivid in color and that present the defenders of the only true religion in the most favorable light. (author’s translation from a citation in Renaudeau and Strobel 1984: 50)

The Governor-General’s reference to “the only true religion” reflected local sensitivities rather than Ponty’s own. In a letter to the French minister of colonies, he suggested that the prints were especially effective “among people who are not only ignorant but—it is important not to forget—naïve, impressionable, and still impregnated with old fetishistic superstitions.” Presumably, Ponty’s high-handed, Eurocentric dismissal concerned African practices following indigenous and mystical Islamic sources. Such chromolithographs addressed “imagination rather than intelligence, and [were] accompanied moreover by comments appropriate to the needs of the cause” of colonial resistance. The Governor-General also complained that money spent to acquire such images was lost to colonial taxation and absurdly suggested that depictions of French heroes be made available in their stead (William Ponty cited in Bouttiaux-Ndiaye 1994: 14).

Censorship never fails to pique people’s interest, and one can guess that the banning of such affective images reinforced their impact rather than diminishing it. As David

Robinson (1991: 150) has suggested, French authorities may have done as much to foment Islamic resistance in Senegal as Muslims themselves. Still, an outcome that French authorities could not have anticipated was the rise of reverse-glass painting by Senegalese artists through which chromolithographs that had escaped French confiscation could be reproduced to meet local devotional purposes (Diouf 1992b, Roberts and Roberts 2001). Of significance here is French recognition of the importance of a local visual economy and the authorities' conscious attempt to control the circulation and "worth" of images. Moreover, of interest is the resilience of Senegalese artists and the constituencies they served in finding ways to overcome any such colonization of their visual citizenship.

Returning to contemporary Dakar, first effects of a latter-day *recolonization* of the visual economy can now be assessed. Rather than the formal powers held by French colonizers prior to Senegalese independence, informal networks of Chinese commerce are impacting visual culture in Senegal as a secondary feature of the grand politics of the Chinese government.¹⁸⁾ Increasing numbers of humble Chinese traders have ridden the coattails of the huge infrastructural schemes the People's Republic of China is financing in Senegal and other Sub-Saharan African countries in a bid for greater access to natural resources to supply the PRC's booming industrial economy (see French 2015). By one estimate, Dakar had approximately three hundred Chinese businesses by 2004, a number which more than tripled by 2008 (Michel and Beuret 2009: 119). Recolonization also fosters a new Chinese middle class in Dakar (Barraud 2009), and with well over a million Chinese immigrants settling in Africa since 2005 (French 2015: 5), such processes will surely accelerate.

Senegalese cottage production of visual materials has been curtailed in recent years. During visits to Dakar in 2009 and 2011, I saw no hand-made pictures of Amadu Bamba for sale on the street in places where I had encountered a plethora of them in the past. This does not mean that artists are no longer making sacred images, for one can assume they must be, not only to sell but because the very act of producing the portrait of Amadu Bamba permits the artist to share in the Saint's *baraka*. Clearly, though, great changes in the Senegalese visual economy have occurred in recent years. Image production and circulation are the most obvious, but "how images accrue value" (Poole 1997: 10) seems to have been somewhat transformed as well.

A goal of my brief visit to Dakar in May 2009 was to locate and interview young men selling small photographs of saints and locally famous wrestlers, vocalists, and politicians. Among other uses, displays of such portraits often frame the windshields of minibuses and trucks, always placed such that they face outward so that the saints may bless the road ahead (Photo 10). To my surprise, not a vendor could be found for several days of searching what used to be highly likely places. In 2011, picture-peddlers were again rare, and images were far more readily available at colorful street-side displays in front of Chinese shops along the divided Boulevard du Centenaire leading to and beyond the Great Mosque of Dakar (Photo 11).¹⁹⁾ Included were well-known portraits of local Sufi saints, the Sacred Hearts of Jesus and the Virgin Mary, Arabic calligraphy, sacrosanct scenes of Mecca, bland pictures of Western-style flower arrangements, and the



Photo 10 Windshield of a car rapid public-transport minivan in Dakar, displaying photos of Amadu Bamba, his family, and most ardent followers. (Photograph by Doran H. Ross in 1999, with permission)



Photo 11 Roadside display of Chinese-produced Senegalese devotional images and other pictures for sale. (Photograph by the author in 2009, with the shop-owner's permission)

occasional “I LOVE YOU” in a snappy plastic frame.

Sidewalk enterprises selling such popular pictures are supplied by two Chinese wholesalers importing images from the PRC. Credit and links to Chinese export businesses provide a distinct advantage over small-scale Senegalese ventures. Indeed, I was told in 2011 that in just the last three or four years, Chinese commerce had co-opted much of the clientele of Sandaga, the sprawling mid-town market that has long served the city's poorest citizens.²⁰ The Senegalese press suggested that competition from a “massive arrival” of Chinese shopkeepers had halved local people's sales at Sandaga. A common complaint has been that the Chinese earliest on the scene sent home samples of clothing and other locally produced goods selling well in Sandaga, and their knock-offs now flood Senegalese markets. One man said he tries to keep Chinese “spies” from visiting his shop, as he knows they will have his goods copied in China to undercut his business even more (Senghor 2009). Another bitterly complained that because these pirated products are shoddy relative to merchandise imported from Europe or the United States sold in Sandaga along with local products, many now refuse to visit the market because they assume the products there are of similarly poor quality to but more expensive than Chinese wares (Senghor 2009).

The xenophobia of such accounts can be blistering on blogs, but it is countered by more sober voices holding that many Senegalese merchants are also known to sell Chinese knock-off handbags, sunglasses, watches, and the like, and the issues are far

more complex than any calls to expel Chinese nationals from Senegal (Senghor 2009). Furthermore, since diplomatic relations were re-established between Senegal and the PRC in 2005, thousands of Chinese visas have been granted to Senegalese merchants eager to obtain inexpensive merchandise to sell worldwide (*Jeune Afrique* 2007). Such complications—including hypocrisies on all sides—suggest that visual and other economies are in dynamic relationships that are always in flux, impossible to pin down, and forever including some people and excluding others in their shifting determinations of “worth,” profit, and, in some sense, meaning itself.

Nonetheless, acrid anecdotes abound (e.g., Mbaye 2009) decrying flip-flop thongs that fall apart before one can wear them home, children’s school clothes that are almost immediately in tatters, and water faucets that never function. Fearful reports of milk products imported from China that might be tainted (as tragically reported in the PRC) were angrily said to have been ignored by Senegalese authorities who allegedly denied that Chinese milk was present in Senegal at all, despite obvious evidence to the contrary (Gomis 2008; Gueye 2008). Even Chinese merchants surveyed online have occasionally admitted that their goods are of poor quality. As one man asked, if they were to import high-end merchandise to Senegal, who would buy from *them* as opposed to more entrenched expatriates? (xibar.net 2011). Apparently, repeated street demonstrations by Senegalese merchants and dissatisfied customers have been to no avail. Indeed, the Chinese press celebrated that Sino-Senegalese business greatly intensified in 2010 (Xinhua 2010), as manifested by the inauguration of Dakar’s immense New National Theater in April 2011, financed, designed, and constructed by the PRC following Chinese architectural aesthetics. Theaters and related institutions created by President Senghor, central to his post-Independence politics of culture and meant to establish a sense of *Senegalese* citizenship, visual and otherwise, have been replaced as “African Renaissance” continues.

4. Pictures at an Exhibition

Brief interviews in 2009 with two young Senegalese men managing curbside picture displays in front of Chinese textile shops revealed that they purchase images and the plastic frames in which they are sold from Chinese middlemen (Photo 12). Several years ago, copies of the photos and hand-crafted portraits of Senegalese Sufi saints made and hawked on the streets of Dakar were sent to China for photoshopping, enlargement, and duplication. The young men noted that images imported from China and laminated at the wholesale shops of Dakar are cheaper, larger, and more plentiful than any produced locally.

Thus, regarding the recolonization of the Senegalese visual economy of devotional materials, local production has been hijacked, stifling circulation. Sales have been established in an area adjacent to the Great Mosque as a dramatic complement to mundane wares available in the boulevard’s growing number of Chinese shops. However, as Deborah Poole (1997: 10) might ask, what has become of “cultural and discursive systems through which graphic images are appraised, interpreted, and assigned historical,



Photo 12 Chinese shop in Dakar selling devotional images photoshopped in the PRC for the Senegalese market. (Photograph by the author in 2011)

scientific, and aesthetic worth”?

The photoshopped Chinese image of Amadu Bamba praying on the waters (Photo 8) remains puzzling. It is based on a lithograph derived from a painting by Ibou Ndoye, originally prepared for sale and gifting at the annual pilgrimage to the holy city of Touba in 1997 but still in wide circulation. The basic figure of Bamba has been roughly transferred from the Ndoye print without feathering or other photoshopping subtleties. Ndoye’s portrayal of the Saint’s face has been replaced by the widely circulated image of Assane Dione’s depiction of the Saint in Photo 3 (Roberts and Roberts 2003: 36; 63). Merged onto the Saint’s slightly turned, turbaned head as Ndoye presented it, Dione’s face of Bamba is at an odd angle and of a strangely different scale than the body. Also “sampled” from Ndoye’s litho is the Archangel Gabriel depicted with an African face and bird-like wings but with feathers clipped in clumsy *découpage*, carrying the Great Mosque of Touba as the pilgrimage site where Bamba lies buried. The rest of the picture is inspired by, but not the same as, Ndoye’s work. The sheepskin the Saint threw down to pray upon the waters is crudely replaced with a swatch of rug-like background design from the photoshopping menu, skewed to suggest perspective; but the “prayer rug” is oriented such that the Saint is praying toward the long side of the rectangle as no Muslim would ever do. Furthermore, if the junk (or other ship) were sailing along the west African coast toward Gabon, it would be heading roughly eastward. Thus, in this image, the Saint is praying toward the south, rather than east-by-northeast following the Qibla Line leading from all global points to Mecca.²¹⁾

The composition seems careless and oblivious to narrative details essential to Senegalese renderings. What is one to think? Is this a callous statement of disregard, a dismissive “whatever” to devotional particularities? The means and motives of hegemonic bullying differ greatly, but colonization is (re)colonization, nonetheless. The French may have sought to eliminate Islamic imagery, and the Chinese may be substituting their own “Senegalese” pictures for local ones, but in both cases, Senegalese artists lose out.²²⁾

Furthermore, Senegalese “basic cultural values” and, thus, visual citizenship are challenged, as locally holy persons are portrayed so peculiarly.

When I showed the photoshopped image of Bamba and the Chinese junk to friends in Dakar in 2011, responses ranged from the pointed dismissal that “these Chinese merchants only sniff out (*flairer*) profit” and pay no attention to anything else, to angry ripostes that such pictures are “lies.” Despite such complaints, to dismiss the picture as a simple insult to local sensitivities would be to overlook the visual epistemology that Senegalese Sufis may bring to such images, as demonstrated so brilliantly by the talismanic creations of the street artist Pape Diop. With irony in the eye of the beholder, it is difficult not to see something other than expediency in the any-boat-will-do paradigmatic shift from steamship to junk as Bamba’s ship of exile. Might these features be considered “proof” of what is being felt on the street by local shopkeepers “exiled” from their own markets and nationalist identities? Might the presence of a Chinese junk reveal other “signs of Allah” (*aya*) suggesting Bamba’s currency in global affairs?

Artistic responses to these circumstances have begun. For an “off” exhibition called “We Are Numerous and So Are Our Problems” at Dakar’s *Galerie Arte* during the 2008 Dak’Art Biennale of Contemporary African Art, Viyé Diba prepared a montage called “The Faucets” (Photo 13).²³ The artist explained that

this work concerns the relationship between demography and space. Unbridled consumerism figures among our problems, insofar as the materials that we consume are made in such a way that one is obliged to buy them repeatedly and so participate in the global economy. Chinese products in this game are always very competitive because of their affordable prices; but [because it never functions for long, if at all] my water faucet submits me to a regular ritual of changing parts, and so to consumerism. Through its




Photo 13 Untitled collage of paper cut-outs of water faucets rolled up and inserted in recycled plastic tubes attached to a canvas. Viyé Diba, collection of the artist. (Photograph by the author in 2011, with the artist’s permission)

quantity of images of faucets, my work shows the new dependence of countries like ours.

In more recent work in the same series, Diba mounted 421 cut-outs of “water faucets” on a canvas and covered them with black gauze that makes it challenging to distinguish one from the next in a very different sort of repetition from that of Pape Diop. The number “421” appears in a small window among the “water faucets” to underscore the abject absurdity of today’s hyper-consumption of Chinese products that simply do not work no matter how many a buyer may purchase, seemingly *ad infinitum*. Even as production and circulation are recolonized, “cultural and discursive systems” through which arts “are appraised, interpreted, and assigned historical, scientific, and aesthetic worth” (Poole 1997: 10) possess their resilience in the hands of expressive activist-intellectuals like Diba. One can expect that with the blessings (*baraka*) of Senegalese saints, new ways to thrive economically, live in dignity, and participate in inexorable changes to visual citizenship will emerge even as Chinese recolonization intensifies. Here, a Senegalese interlocutor would surely exclaim *insha’Allah*—“God willing.”

Notes

- 1) “Visual citizenship” as a reflection of cultural heritage through art was independently coined by Allen Roberts for a paper at the “Tolerance, Democracy, and Sufis in Senegal” conference organized in 2008 by the Institute of African Studies and the Institute for Religion, Culture, and Public Life of Columbia University. This last work was translated into French (see A. Roberts 2013a), and a revised version is produced here with permission from Drs. Mamadu Diouf and Rosalind Fredericks as editors of that volume, to whom I am most grateful. A version of this paper was also presented at a symposium in 2014 called “Spirited Topographies: Urban Refabulation, Underscapes, and Mobilities” convened by Drs. Smriti Srinivas and Mary Hancock at the University of California, Davis, through a Multi-Campus Research Group funded by the University of California. Insights from these colleagues also contribute to this chapter, but I alone am responsible for all assertions made here.
- 2) My late spouse, Dr. Mary “Polly” Nooter Roberts (d. 2018), was a full participant in all research, writing, teaching, and museum exhibitions to which allusion is made in this chapter, which is lovingly dedicated to her memory.
- 3) A Google search (September 2013) suggested that the phrase “visual citizenship,” as developed through a conference in 2010 and ongoing activities organized and taught at New York University, has had human rights activism as its focus; see Telesca (2013), and <https://www.artandeducation.net/classroom/video/153804/arielle-azoulay-what-is-visual-citizenship> (viewed August 2021) Ideas from the NYU conference led Georgia Erger to curate an exhibition called “Visual Citizenship” presented at Michigan State University’s Broad Museum of Art in 2020; <https://broadmuseum.msu.edu/exhibitions/visual-citizenship> (viewed August 2021)
- 4) This chapter is based on ongoing research in Senegal by Mary Nooter Roberts and the author that began in 1994 and led to a major book and exhibition called “A Saint in the City: Sufi Arts of Urban Senegal” funded by the U.S. National Endowment for the Humanities and seen

in six U.S. museums from 2003 to 2008. Warm thanks are extended to the many friends who have made this work possible, and especially to the late Serigne Saliou Mbacké, then General Caliph of the Mourides, who blessed our project from the start, and to El Haji Ousmane Gueye, and the late Cheikhou Camara for their many years of excellent assistance, wisdom, and fellowship.

- 5) Blaise Diagne International Airport, located 43km east of downtown Dakar, replaced the earlier facility in 2017.
- 6) On Négritude, see <http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Négritude>. On Senghor's cultural politics as a Senegalese poet and president, see Harney 2004. On the Omega Plan, see Wade (2003). For blogged responses to the monument, see *Le Soleil*, 11 December 2010, via Seneweb.com.
- 7) <https://edition.cnn.com/2010/WORLD/Africa/04/03/Senegal.statue>.
- 8) On Mouride visual culture, see Roberts and Roberts (2003) and many of the author's other publications for ample bibliographies of relevant source materials. The French "Mouride" is used here because it is the most common spelling in the literature and among Mourides.
- 9) (Marty 1917; cf. Paoletti 2018). The authenticity of other photographs purported to portray Bamba has been challenged by most observers. In May, 2020, however, four snapshots from the 1918 album of a minor French colonial officer were brought to an online auction in France that specializes in old postcards. Many feel that these pictures depict Bamba, and one wonders if they will lead to revelations vis-à-vis the photograph of c.1913.
- 10) The 1913 photograph of Sheikh Bamba has been the subject of much theoretical writing by the author and his late spouse; see Roberts and Roberts (1998; 2003; 2008; 2019; 2022), among other works.
- 11) On visual practices of other Senegalese Sufi movements than the Mourides, see A. Roberts (2013b; 2016).
- 12) Pape Diop's work was documented during my visits to Dakar in 2004, 2005, 2006, 2009, and 2011. See Roberts and Roberts (2008; 2010). I was not been able to locate the artist despite repeated attempts, and in 2011, his production seemed to be waning, with very few new or renewed graffiti to be found.
- 13) The late Yelimane Fall was trained in graphic arts and was an extraordinary calligrapher whose work is now in the permanent collections of several U.S. museums and illustrated in Roberts and Roberts (2003) and Becker and Zito (2014). He was also an activist, using art-making to reach out to street children in greater Dakar.
- 14) Suras 33:40 and 13:28, as translated in Fakhry (1998: 152; 265).
- 15) Photoshop™ is a licensed product of Adobe Systems Incorporated. It is unknown whether Chinese manipulation of these images was achieved through use of this particular computer program; here, the term is rendered generic as a verb. It should be noted that photoshopped images are not photographs, per se; yet in the cases to follow, Senegalese people attribute to them the indexical authenticity they associate with photography; see Roberts and Roberts (2003).
- 16) "Junk" is the anglicized name, perhaps derived from the Javanese term *jong*, long given to certain Chinese and other East-Asian sailing ships like the one in Photo 8; see [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Junk_\(ship\)](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Junk_(ship)).
- 17) (Stewart 1997: 54; cf. Barry 1998; Baum 1999; Robinson 1991, 2000). These matters are

discussed in greater detail in Roberts and Roberts (2003: 88–92) and my other publications cited here.

- 18) See *Agence France Presse* of 24 June 2009, “L’Afrique risque de préférer bientôt la Chine et l’Inde à l’Europe” (Africa risks preferring China and India to Europe) via <https://www.seneweb.com/news/article/23642.php>, taken from a speech in Brussels by then-President Abdoulaye Wade to the executive branch of the European Union; cf. Barraud (2009). On the astounding growth of Africa as China’s “second continent,” see French (2015). For a more positive view of Chinese commercial ventures in Africa, see Michel and Beuret (2009); note that their discussion of Senegal is largely in a chapter entitled “An Invasion of Junk”—with this last word a reference to shoddy goods rather than to Chinese sailing vessels, mentioned above in Photo 8. For a more recent view of “China’s ‘Soft Power’ in Senegal” as reported by Al Jazeera (English), see <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=7VnQONVxWdQ>, posted in 2018 and viewed in 2021. The PRC’s “charm campaign” is discussed there as a reaction to growing antipathy to vastly expanding Chinese cooptation of national and local-level Senegalese economies.
- 19) The website <http://www.xibar.net> (viewed in 2011) offered a pungent view of how Chinese merchants are “disfiguring” the once-bourgeois Boulevard du Centenaire they increasingly occupy. I hasten to state that by no means have I studied these politico-economic phenomena extensively, nor have I systematically consulted relevant literatures. Instead, my assertions here are meant to call attention to issues hotly discussed during my visits to Dakar in 2009 and 2011.
- 20) See Ebin (1992) for an excellent account of the informal economy of Sandaga in the past.
- 21) These observations were provided by audience members of a talk the author presented at Ohio University in 2011 at the invitation of Professor Andrea Frohne.
- 22) Thanks to Steven Nelson for discussion of this point, 2010.
- 23) Pers. comm. 2009. Viyé Diba is an internationally acclaimed contemporary artist whose paintings and sculptures are in the permanent collections of several international museums. He holds a doctorate in Urban Geography and teaches at the National School of Fine Arts of Dakar; see Harney (2000), Pommier (2003), Aronson and Weber (2012), and Roberts and Roberts (2012).

References

- Aronson, L. and J. Weber (eds.)
 2012 *Environment and Object: Recent African Art*. Munich: Prestel.
- Bamba, A.
 n.d. *Jaawartou*. Dakar: Lamp Fall Dabo.
- Barraud, D.
 2009 La Chine et l’Afrique: Cela ne fait que commencer (China and Africa: This Is Only the Beginning). *Les Afriques*, 7 June at <https://www.seneweb.com/news/article/23297.php> (viewed August 2009)

- Barry, B.
1998 *Senegambia and the Atlantic Slave Trade*. New York: Cambridge University Press.
- Baudrillard, J.
1988 *The Ecstasy of Communication*. New York: Semiotext(e).
- Baum, R.
1999 *Shrines of the Slave Trade: Dioula Religion and Society in Precolonial Senegambia*. New York: Oxford University Press.
- Becker, C. and A. Zito
2014 Yelimane Fall: Senegalese Calligraphy in Action. *African Arts* 47(2): 28–39.
- Berry, P.
1992 Introduction. In P. Berry and A. Wernick (eds.) *Shadow of Spirit: Postmodernism and Religion*, pp. 1–8. New York: Routledge.
- Bouttiaux-Ndiaye, A.-M.
1994 *Senegal Behind Glass: Images of Religious and Daily Life*. Munich: Prestel for the Royal Museum of Central Africa, Tervuren, Belgium.
- Courtine, J.-J. and C. Haroche
2007 *Histoire du visage (History of the Face)*. Paris: Petite Bibliothèque Payot.
- De Jong, F.
2010 La tragédie du roi Abdoulaye? Néomodernisme et Renaissance Africaine dans le Sénégal contemporain (The Tragedy of King Abdoulaye? Neomodernism and African Renaissance in Contemporary Senegal). *Politique Africaine* 118: 187–204.
- Deleuze, G.
1994 *Difference and Repetition*. New York: Columbia University Press.
- Diouf, M.
1992a Fresques murales et écriture de l'histoire: Le Set/Setal à Dakar (Wall Paintings and Writing History: Set/Setal in Dakar). *Politique Africaine* 46: 41–54.
1992b Islam: Peinture sous verre et idéologie populaire (Islam: Reverse-Glass Paintings and Popular Ideology). In B. Jewsiewicki (ed.) *Art pictorial zairois*, pp. 29–40. Québec: Éds. du Septentrion.
- Ebin, V.
1992 A la recherche de nouveaux 'poissons': Stratégies commerciales mourides par le temps de crise (The Search for New "Fish": Mouride Commercial Strategies in Times of Crisis). *Politique Africaine* 45: 86–99.
- Fakhry, M.
1998 *The Qur'an, A Modern English Version*. Reading, UK: Garnet.
- Foucault, M.
1980 *Power/Knowledge: Selected Interviews and Writings, 1972–1977*. Edited by C. Gordon. London: Pantheon.
- French, H.
2015 *China's Second Continent: How a Million Migrants Are Building a New Empire in Africa*. New York: Vintage Books.
- Gomis, J.
2008 Consommation: Les Sénégalais n'ont pas peur du poison (Consumption: Senegalese

- People Have No Fear of Poison). *Le Quotidien*, 2 October at <https://www.seneweb.com/news/article/18842.php> (viewed August 2009)
- Gueye, M.
2008 Produits laitiers—importation de Chine: On boit la tasse (Milk Products Imported from China: We Drink by the Cupful). *Le Quotidien*, 3 October at <https://www.seneweb.com/news/article/18858.php> (viewed August 2009)
- Harney, E.
2000 Viyé Diba: Profound Beauty. *African Arts* 33(2): 80–81.
2004 *In Senghor's Shadow: Art, Politics, and the Avant-Garde in Senegal, 1960–1995*. Durham, NC: Duke University Press.
- Jeune Afrique*
2007 Les Sénégalais prennent d'assaut le marché chinois (Senegalese Take Initiative against the Chinese Market), 30 October at <https://www.seneweb.com/news/article/12947.php> (viewed August 2009)
- Laibi, S.
1998 *Soufisme et art visuel (Sufism and Visual Arts)*. Paris: L'Harmattan.
- Marty, P.
1917 *Études sur l'Islam au Sénégal (Studies of Islam in Senegal)*, 2vols. Paris: Ernest Leroux.
- Mbacke, A. A.
2009 *Ways Unto Heaven: By Sheikh Ahmadou Bamba (1853–1027), The African Muslim Leader of Nonviolence. English Translation and Commentaries*. Touba, Senegal: Majalis Research Project.
- Mbaye, O.
2009 Rude concurrence—mévente: La casse-tête chinoise des cordonniers (Rude Competition—A Slump in Sales: The Chinese Challenge to Cobblers). *Pressafrik*, 3 February at <https://www.seneweb.com/news/article/20940.php> (viewed August 2009)
- Michel, S. and M. Beuret
2009 *China Safari: On the Trail of Beijing's Expansion in Africa*. New York: Nation Books.
- Morgan, D.
1998 *Visual Piety*. Berkeley: University of California Press.
2005 *The Sacred Gaze: Religious Visual Culture in Theory and Practice*. Berkeley: University of California Press.
- Nasr, S. H.
1987 *Islamic Art and Spirituality*. Albany: State University of New York Press.
- Ngom, F.
2016 *Muslims Beyond the Arab World: The Odyssey of 'Ajami and the Muridiyya*. New York: Oxford University Press.
- Ouédraogo, J.-B.
2002 *Arts photographiques en Afrique (Photographic Arts of Africa)*. Paris: L'Harmattan.
- Paoletti, G.
2018 Searching for the Origin(al): On the Photographic Portrait of the Mouride Sufi Saint Amadou Bamba. *Cahiers d'Études africaines* 58(2): 323–348.

Pommier, C.

- 2003 The Art of Viyé Diba: 'The Intelligent Hand.' Video. Vancouver: Arts in Action Society, with SudProd Senvision, Dakar.

Poole, D.

- 1997 *Vision, Race, and Modernity: A Visual Economy of the Andean Image World*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

Renaudeau, M. and M. Strobel

- 1984 *Peinture sous verre du Sénégal (Reverse-Glass Painting in Senegal)*. Paris: Fernand Nathan.

Roberts, A. F.

- 1996 The Ironies of System D. In C. Cerny and S. Seriff (eds.) *Recycled, Reseen*, pp. 82–101. New York: Harry Abrams for the Museum of International Folk Art, Santa Fe.
- 2010 Recolonization of an African Visual Economy. *African Arts* 42(3): 1, 4–8.
- 2013a Citoyennetés visuelles en compétition dans le Sénégal contemporain (Competitions of Visual Citizenship in Contemporary Senegal). In M. Diouf and R. Fredericks (eds.) *Les arts de la citoyenneté au Sénégal: Espaces contestés et civilités urbaines (Arts of Citizenship in Senegal: Contested Spaces and Urban Civilities)*, pp. 195–235 and cover image. Paris: Karthala.
- 2013b Icons from the End of Days: Visual Hagiography Among Layennes of Senegal. *World Art* 3(2): 235–258.
- 2016 The Visual Performative of Senegalese Sufism. In A. Hannoum (ed.) *Sufism in Practice: Sufi Arts, Rituals, and Performances in Africa*, pp. 175–208. New York: Routledge.
- 2022 "Brainsmithing" African Material Religion. In B. Plate and P. Tamini (eds.) *Routledge Handbook of Material Religion*. New York: Routledge.

Roberts, A. F. and M. N. Roberts

- 1998 L'Aura d'Amadu Bamba: Photographie et fabulation dans le Sénégal urbain (The Aura of Amadu Bamba: Photography and Fabulation in Urban Senegal). *Anthropologie et Sociétés* 22(1): 15–40.
- 2001 'Paintings Like Prayers': The Hidden Side of Senegalese Reverse-Glass 'Image/Texts.' *Research in African Literatures* 31(4): 76–96.
- 2003 *A Saint in the City: Sufi Arts of Urban Senegal*. Seattle: University of Washington Press for the UCLA Fowler Museum, Los Angeles.
- 2006 Voir la ville invisible (Seeing the Invisible City). *Politique africaine* 100: 177–197.
- 2008 Mystical Graffiti and the Refabulation of Dakar. *Africa Today* 54(2): 50–77.
- 2010 'La répétition pour elle-même': les arts itératifs au Sénégal (Repetition for Itself: Iterative Arts of Senegal). In P. Descola (ed.) *La fabrique des images*, pp. 195–203. Paris: Musée du quai Branly.
- 2012 Sufi Arts: Engaging Islam through Works of Contemporary Art in Senegal. In E. Bongmba (ed.) *The Wiley-Blackwell Companion to African Religions*, pp. 417–429. Oxford, UK: Blackwell.
- 2019 Enigma and Purpose: Visual Hagiographies of Urban Senegal. In C. Gruber (ed.) *The Image Debate: Figural Representation in Islamic and Global Cultural Contexts*, pp.

- 194–211. London: Gingko Press.
- 2022 A Sheltering Gaze: *Darshan* with Baba, *Baraka* from Bamba. In S. Srinivas, N. Jeychandran, and A. F. Roberts (eds.) *Devotional Spaces of a Global Saint: Shirdi Sai Baba's Presence*. New York: Routledge.
- Roberts, M. N.
- 2008 Exhibiting Episteme: African Art Exhibitions as Objects of Knowledge. In K. Yoshida and J. Mack (eds.) *Preserving the Cultural Heritage of Africa: Crisis or Renaissance?* pp. 170–186. Rochester, NY: James Currey.
- Robinson, D.
- 1991 Beyond Resistance and Collaboration: Amadu Bamba and the Murids of Senegal. *Journal of African Religion* 21(2): 149–171.
- 2000 *Paths of Accommodation: Muslim Societies and French Colonial Authorities in Senegal and Mauritania, 1880–1920*. Athens, OH: Ohio University Press.
- Saint-Martin, F.
- 1990 *Semiotics of Visual Language*. Bloomington: Indiana University Press.
- Schimmel, A.
- 1975 *Mystical Dimensions of Islam*. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press.
- Senghor, A.
- 2009 Les Chinois: Nouveau bouc émissaire des commerçants sénégalais (The Chinese: New Scapegoats of Senegalese Merchants), WebNews, 12 June 2009, at <https://www.seneweb.com/news/article/23398.php> (viewed August 2009)
- Stewart, C.
- 1997 Colonial Justice and the Spread of Islam in the Early Twentieth Century. In D. Robinson and J.-L. Triaud (eds.) *Le temps des marabouts* (The Time of Marabouts), pp. 53–66. Paris: Karthala.
- Telesca, J.
- 2013 Preface: What Is Visual Citizenship? *Humanity: An International Journal of Human Rights, Humanitarianism, and Development* 4(3): 339–343.
- Triaud, J.-L.
- 1988 Khalwa and the Career of Sainthood. In D. C. O'Brien and C. Coulon (eds.) *Charisma and Brotherhood in African Islam*, pp. 53–66. New York: Oxford University Press.
- Wade, A.
- 2003 The Omega Plan for Africa: An African Strategy for Globalization. *The African Economist* 4(12): 1–36.
- xibar.net
- <https://www.xibar.net/BOULEVARD-DU-CENTENAIRE-UN-ANCIEN-QUARTIER-BOURGEOIS-DEFIGURE-PAR-LA-PRESENCE-CHINOISE-a8519.html> (viewed October 2011)
- Xinhua*
- 2010 2010, année de l'intensification de la coopération sino-sénégalaise (2010, A Year of Intensified Sino-Senegalese Cooperation), archived at http://www.focac.org/fra/zfgx_5/jmhz/t781765.htm (viewed October 2021), and as reported on <https://www.seneweb.com> (viewed April 2011)

The Community Speaks with Many Voices: Representing Cultural Heritage in the Smithsonian’s *African Voices* Exhibition

Mary Jo Arnoldi

Department of Anthropology

National Museum of Natural History, Smithsonian Institution

1. Introduction

In December 1999, the Smithsonian National Museum of Natural History opened a new permanent exhibition of African and African Diaspora history and culture, *African Voices*. The making of this exhibit involved a commitment to an active collaboration between the museum and communities in Africa and the African Diaspora in the Americas. In developing the exhibit, the team included different perspectives and “voices” in the individual galleries and displays. Given that the museum is a public space, the team adopted the principle that only public and openly discussed information about objects and associated cultural practices within their source community should be included.

African Voices was six years in the making and involved content curators, educators, community specialists, scriptwriters, and designers working as a team.¹⁾ It includes over 400 historical and contemporary objects representing Africa’s long history and cultural diversity (Figure 1). It prominently features Africa’s rich intangible cultural heritage using proverbs, adages, oral histories, testimonies, poetry, song, music, performances, and soundscapes throughout the exhibition. The history corridor, *A Walk through Time*, serves as the central spine of the exhibit. It begins with the story of the emergence of humans in Africa five million years ago and ends with a changing display titled *Africa Today*²⁾ (Photo 1). Four main galleries flank the history corridor. Three galleries, *Living in Africa*, *Work in Africa* (Photo 2), and *Wealth in Africa*, are devoted to stories from continental Africa. The fourth gallery, *Global Africa*, emphasizes the prior and current dispersion of people of African descent worldwide. Contemporary stories are emphasized within these four galleries; however, they are historicized and chosen to complement stories presented along the history corridor. Urban and rural stories throughout Africa and within the African Diaspora provide a balanced representation of people’s contemporary lives. Two Crossroad galleries, *Ghana’s Makola Market* (Photo 3) and *The Kongo Diaspora to the Americas*, link the lateral galleries on either side of the history corridor. A *Focus Gallery* is devoted to temporary exhibits and has featured seven exhibits since its inauguration in December 1999. *The Freedom Theater* features two 20-minute films that run




Figure 1 *African Voices* Exhibition Map. (Courtesy of the Imaging Department, NMNH, Smithsonian Institution)



Photo 1 *African Voices*.
Africa Today History Moment.
2019.
Local Research - Global Impact.
(Photograph by James DiLoreto,
Courtesy of the Imaging
Department, NMNH,
Smithsonian Institution)



Photo 2 *African Voices*.
Working in Africa gallery.
(Photograph by Donald Hurlbert, Courtesy of the
Imaging Department, NMNH, Smithsonian
Institution)

consecutively throughout the day: *The Atlantic Slave Trade* and *The Struggle for Freedom in Africa*.³⁾

This essay explores three community collaborations in the development of *African Voices* that underscore the museum's efforts to highlight multiple voices and include different interpretations and perspectives within individual displays. The first features the participation of high school students in Malawi in a story of a Chewa masquerade; the



Photo 3 *African Voices.*
Makola Market yam vendor,
Comfort Kwakye.
(Photograph by Donald Hurlbert,
Courtesy of the Imaging
Department, NMNH,
Smithsonian Institution)

second presents a collaboration with three professionals concerning land rights, access, and resource management in the Ngorongoro Crater in Tanzania; and the third describes the process of community collaboration in the development of *Discovering Rastafari!*, a temporary exhibition within *African Voices* from November 2007 to November 2011.

2. *Kasiyamaliro*, a Chewa Masquerade

One of the featured objects in the *Living in Africa* gallery is a large antelope body mask, *Kasiyamaliro*, from the Chewa of Malawi (Photo 4). This masquerade appears in public performances in Chewa farming communities on the occasions of a boy's initiation, at burial and funerary rites, and at the installation of a chief. Today, the *Kasiyamaliro* masquerade also appears at political rallies and national day celebrations and during Christmas Day festivities. Although this masquerade performance is public, its secrets are known only to initiated members of the *Nyau* association.⁴⁾

Given that many of our visitors are students, the exhibition especially focused on including young people's commentary where appropriate. The focus on the public performance of the Chewa masquerade was an opportunity to include student voices. The team worked with Adam Michaelides, an American Peace Corps volunteer teaching at the Dowa Secondary School in Mporela, Malawi. With permission from the school, he asked his students to write short essays on what the Chewa masquerade means to them and what they would like Americans visiting the exhibition at the Smithsonian to know about it. Excerpts from student essays serve as interpretive content for the masquerade. A group




Photo 4 *African Voices.*
The Kasiyamaliro masquerade from the Chewa of Malawi. (Photograph by Donald Hurlbert, Courtesy of the Imaging Department, NMNH, Smithsonian Institution)



Photo 5 *African Voices.*
The Chewa *Kasiyamaliro* masquerade story installation. A text rail includes a photograph of the students who participated in the project and excerpts from their essays. (Photograph by Donald Hurlbert, Courtesy of the Imaging Department, NMNH, Smithsonian Institution)

photograph of the students who contributed essays is included in the text rail, giving a face to the commentary (Photo 5).

Without violating any association secrets, the students' comments present a range of perspectives on the masquerade. Several essayists spoke to the origin of the masquerade in the distant past, while others wrote about its construction. Most reiterated the belief in the masquerade's essential association with spirits and ancestors. "When there is death, the burial ceremony is done by Gule Wamkulu [masqueraders]. This dance is for spirits"—Jephter Banda. "I feel and believe the Kasiyamaliro is a kind of transfigured ancestral spirit as it is said by the elders of the dance" and "Even though the mask is made by men, we believe that the Kasiyamaliro comes from the ground"—Jimmi Njirisi.

Several students spoke to the power of the masquerade, and a few wrote about their ambivalent feelings toward it. "The mask brings out trouble, danger, and happiness among the people"—Mackson Msokera. Others spoke regretfully about the current changes in cultural practices, "Nyau dance is deteriorating since people are forsaking their culture, which is not good at all!"—Jimmi Njirisi. Others highlighted their pride in the masquerade as part of a Chewa cultural heritage. "When I see this mask, I feel happy that my tribe 'CHEWA' [exists] since each tribe is best known by its culture"—Postani Kawala. The comments by the students gave the story an immediacy and contemporary feel. Their essays allude to long-held and deep beliefs that address current changes in Chewa cultural values and practices. The idea of continuity and change and a long

history and vibrant present are key themes explored in this story that find expression throughout *African Voices*.

3. Work in the Ngorongoro Crater

Tanzania's Ngorongoro Conservation Area (NCA) was founded in 1959 as a multi-land use area. It supports abundant wildlife and is a prime tourist destination. Unlike national wildlife parks that exclude human activity, the NCA's stated goal is to develop Maasai communities, conserve wildlife, and foster tourism. This exhibition story poses the question, "Can People and Wildlife Coexist in Ngorongoro?" (Photo 6). The challenge for Tanzania and the NCA is finding a balance that works.

The story was developed with the participation of three professional colleagues: Dr. Naomi Kapury, a Maasai anthropologist working on development issues in Kenya and Tanzania; Deo-Gratias M. Gamassa, an ecologist and professor at Mweka College of Wildlife Management in Tanzania; and Paul Mshanga, the Head of Tourism at Ngorongoro Crater. The intention to present a story with different perspectives about land use and work in the Crater was discussed with each colleague prior to agreeing to participate in the project. In a series of in-person and telephone interviews in Tanzania,




Photo 6 *African Voices*.
Ngorongoro Crater story. Main
Gallery Label "Can People and
Wildlife Coexist in Ngorongoro?"
(Photograph by James DiLoreto,
Courtesy of the Imaging
Department, NMNH, Smithsonian
Institution)

each participant was asked to address three questions that speak broadly to the NCA's goals for managing the Crater: *How have Maasai herders coexisted with the wildlife in the Crater?*, *What are the conservation challenges in the Crater?*, and *How can tourism be best conducted at Ngorongoro?*

The exhibit story is divided into three sections with a focus on herding, conservation, and tourism (Photo 7). A large photo mural in each section depicts the specific type of work that is the focus of the display. Iconic objects in each section are related to specific types of work. Herding is represented by a Maasai cattle bell, a basketry milk container, and a wooden throwing club or *ringa*. Objects associated with wildlife conservation include a dart gun and darts, a rhino horn, and an elephant tusk (Photo 8). Representing the tourist experience are a Maasai man's face ruff and girl's beaded headdress, a group of commercial postcards depicting Maasai culture and wildlife in the Crater, and a 35mm camera.

Each of the three sections includes a large *point of view* panel with a photo of each participant next to their comment (Photo 9). The participants were given the opportunity to edit their quotes and choose how they wanted to be represented on the panel. For example, in the Conservation section, in response to the question on "What Are Ngorongoro's Conservation Challenges?," Deo-Gratias Gamassa, ecologist, is the first voice to note that, "The high Challenges human population increase creates many demands on land and is the major catalyst to the human-wildlife conflicts. The reasons for population change must be identified. The Conservation Area management should seek to understand the socio-economic aspirations and needs of the local Maasai." Dr. Naomi Kipury, Maasai anthropologist, Nairobi, Kenya, speaks to the long relationship between the Maasai and local wildlife and the current challenges they face: "If Maasai did not live the kind of life they live, there wouldn't be any wildlife to conserve. The



Photo 7 *African Voices.*
Ngorongoro Crater.
(Photograph by James DiLoreto, Courtesy
of the Imaging Department, NMNH,
Smithsonian Institution)



Photo 8 *African Voices.*
Ngorongoro Crater. Wildlife Conservation
case.
(Photograph by James DiLoreto, Courtesy
of the Imaging Department, NMNH,
Smithsonian Institution)




Photo 9 *African Voices*.
Ngorongoro Crater. Point of view label
“Perspectives: What are the Ngorongoro’s
Conservation Challenges?”
(Photograph by James DiLoreto, Courtesy
of the Imaging Department, NMNH,
Smithsonian Institution)

longer they maintain that kind of life, the longer the wildlife survives. But, increasingly, Maasai cannot make a living from livestock. Their cattle are dying from wildlife diseases transmitted to livestock and from lack of water.” Paul Mshanga, Head of Tourism, Ngorongoro, Tanzania, speaks of the devastating impact of wildlife poaching in the Crater and Tanzania’s programs to address critical conservation strategies: “We once had about 206 rhinos. Then there was a wave of poaching in the 1970s and 1980s. Today less than twenty rhinos remain. With such a small number, we are also worried about inbreeding. We’ve recently received two female rhinos from South Africa. We think they will increase the population a bit and improve the gene pool.”

The exhibit aims to introduce museum visitors to contemporary debates in Tanzania around land use, management, and conservation in the Crater and present different issues and viewpoints to highlight the complexity of the issues at stake. Hopefully, the Tanzanian story might resonate with our American visitors where similar debates and different views on land use and conservation are currently unfolding in their own communities.

4. Focus Gallery: *Discovering Rastafari! 2007–2010*

Discovering Rastafari!, a temporary exhibition that opened in 2007 in *African Voices*, featured the history of Rastafari, a religious, cultural, and revolutionary liberation movement that emerged in oppressed black communities in colonial Jamaica during the 1930s and today spans the Caribbean archipelago and five continents (Photo 10). The exhibit development involved collaborations with a large cross-section of the Rastafari community in the United States, Jamaica, and elsewhere in the Caribbean and in Africa. Although these collaborations were highly rewarding, they were also fraught with tension.

Through paintings, maps, texts, and personal testimonies in video interviews and texts, the exhibit explored the foundational history of the movement and its fundamental beliefs and sacred practices. It documented the spread and current impact of the movement globally through the vehicle of popular culture and music and the influence of delegations of Jamaican Elders who traveled across the Atlantic world. The exhibition was visually dense, layering objects, rare memorabilia, artwork, images, text panels, and the voices of Rastafari adherents themselves to create a vibrant and informative view of the movement (Photo 11). The film produced for the exhibit includes testimonies by Rastafari members that address the key exhibit themes. In this film, men and women of various ages and social positions speak about the history of the movement, its sacred practices, their collective struggles to build communities and a culture, and their vision of Africa. Their commentary is compelling and personal; it underscores the fact that in its contemporary global context, the Rastafari movement is heterogeneous in race, gender, class, ideological orientations, ethnicity, and national boundaries.

Discovering Rastafari! was five years in the making and is based on nearly 25 years of original archival and field research by Dr. John Homiak, Smithsonian National Museum of Natural History anthropologist, and his colleague, the late Professor Carole Yawney of York University, Toronto.⁵⁾ At its core was Homiak and Yawney’s commitment to engaging Rastafari communities in developing the project—something possible only because each had developed longstanding relationships with key members of the movement in Jamaica and elsewhere in the Caribbean. However, winning the trust of the broader Rastafari community in Jamaica was not an easy task and was accomplished with varying degrees of success. Persecuted for their beliefs and practices during the movement’s first five decades of development (1930s–1970s), the Rastafari traditionally took a guarded approach to outsiders and have been highly skeptical of scholars. The latter are typically seen as lacking a commitment to properly understand or represent the movement. Alternatively, they have been characterized as “spies” or dupes who gather



Photo 10 Entrance to the *Discovering Rastafari!* exhibit.
(Photograph by James DiLoreto, Courtesy of the Imaging Department, NMNH, Smithsonian Institution)



Photo 11 Inside the *Discovering Rastafari!* exhibit. Wall paintings and video interview with Rastafari elder.
(Photograph by James DiLoreto, Courtesy of the Imaging Department, NMNH, Smithsonian Institution)

information to channel back to the citadels of Babylon (i.e., dominant oppressive society) as a means of controlling the movement. This mistrust of scholars extends to many mainstream institutions, including museums, suspicions which reflect the fact that most Rastafari have had little or no experience with museums, seeing them as places where the artifacts of “dead” or “dying cultures” are put on display for curiosity seekers.

Homiak and Yawney’s first step was to constitute an advisory group from the various Rastafari communities that could command broad trust and acceptance across the wider movement. This required dealing with the highly decentralized nature of the movement and navigating its sectarian politics, often fraught with dissent and distrust. One important turning point for the exhibit was fieldwork conducted in Ethiopia in 2002. Members of the Rastafari settler community who have “repatriated” themselves from various sites in the Diaspora to Ethiopia could launch the concept of this exhibition as a positive effect. For the Rastafari, in general (irrespective of their specific backgrounds), including the settler story acknowledged the importance members attach to their self-identification as Africans and their professed need to maintain a collective presence on the African continent.

Most US-based Rastafari who came to the exhibit over the four years of the exhibition were extremely proud and positive about the experience. Their largely positive reception of the exhibit reflected the fact that the museum was willing to develop a collaborative process with the community in determining the themes of the exhibit they perceived as central to their practices and experiences. They also saw the exhibition as a high-profile corrective to much of the negative press received by US-based Rastafari during the 1980s and the 1990s. In 2007, at the opening of the exhibit, a young Rasta from Washington said to me, “I have walked by this museum my entire life, but I never went in, as I didn’t think there was anything for me inside.”

However, in Jamaica, this situation was more complex. Some people worked closely with the curators and were positive about the exhibit. However, others remained wary and saw the exhibit as an example of cultural exploitation. As Homiak has so aptly observed, “All forms of cultural representation and collaboration are fraught within the Rastafari movement where there are no centralized structures of authority and there is an active and dynamic ‘underlife’ that periodically ruptures and percolates into the public sphere ... all forms of community consensus are provisional and subject to revision and reinterpretation.”⁶⁾

Revision and reinterpretation were manifested in Jamaica in 2012 with the convergence of two events that raised issues around the protection of Rastafari cultural heritage. First, the Institute of Jamaica announced its plans to create a Rastafari exhibition, proposing the launch to rebrand its museum section as the National Museum of Jamaica. This led to public and vocal critiques by members of local Rastafari communities, centered on their intellectual property rights and issues of the state’s appropriation of their cultural heritage. *Rastafari: Unconquerable!* opened in 2013. In a press interview, Jonathan Greenland, the Director of the National Museum, said of the making of the exhibit, “We had to do a lot of community negotiations, both from an individual level and also on a large scale. We were able to meet with the elders of the

different communities (of Rastafari) all over Jamaica. It's based on constant negotiations from individuals."⁷⁾

Around the same time the exhibit was being developed, Snoop Dog, the American Rapper, was on an extended visit to Jamaica to record a crossover reggae-rap CD. In Jamaica, he converted to Rastafari and took the name *Snoop Lion*. Most informed observers saw his conversion as an effort at rebranding, the title of his CD *Reincarnated* suggesting as much. In Jamaica, Snoop Dog and his crew filmed ceremonies held by the Nyahbinghi congregation and later used some of this footage in a music video promoting his new Rastafari identity.⁸⁾ The music video did not sit well with some members of the Nyahbinghi community, one of whom is Jamaica's ranking reggae-dancehall artist Sizzla Kalonji. What followed was a classically Jamaican lyrical putdown by Sizzla, who publicly attacked Snoop and accused him of violating the ritual protocols of the Nyahbinghi sacred space, the commercialization of Rasta cultural heritage, and the infringement of the intellectual property of Rastafari. In his 2012 song entitled "Burn Out the Smithsonians," Sizzla called out the Smithsonian Institution, the Institute of Jamaica, the University of the West Indies, and Snoop Dog as agents of Babylon and cultural pirates.⁹⁾

5. Conclusion

The Chewa masquerade and the Ngorongoro Crater stories are only two of the many stories in the permanent exhibit that involved active engagement with community members, artists, and cultural specialists within Africa.¹⁰⁾ As the three community collaborations reveal, how the museum team engaged with source communities in representing African and African Diaspora cultural heritage and to what effect often took quite different paths. The interaction with the Malawian high school students was not direct but mediated by their teacher, who provided his students with information about the museum project. The engagement with the three professionals for the Ngorongoro Crater story involved an initial presentation of the story's objectives to each participant, followed by a series of interviews with three broad questions. Developing the *Discovering Rastafari!* exhibiting the engagement between the museum and Rastafari communities in Jamaica, Africa, and Washington had many positive outcomes. However, it was often fraught with tensions around issues of trust in the museum. Most of the Rastafari community members in Jamaica and Washington were supportive of this exhibit and saw the advantage of having a serious representation of Rastafari history and beliefs in a major museum. The collaboration was only possible because of the long-term relationships these communities had with the exhibition curators. However, even as the curators were embraced as part of solidarity, the Smithsonian Institution was publicly reviled five years later in Jamaica as new political circumstances gave rise to a strong minority voice that redrew some of the support lines for the exhibit in Washington and Jamaica.

Representing African and African Diaspora cultural heritage, whether from the perspective of mainstream groups or those marginalized in their societies, is like the

continuous loop of a Mobius strip. Managing the collaborations between the museum and source communities is never completely predictable or conflict-free, as these communities speak with many voices. Cultural heritage is a process and not a product. It is continually shaped by internal and external political and social forces. However, despite the pitfalls, the mutual respect from such collaborations between source communities and the museums is a worthwhile investment of time, effort, and resources.

Notes

- 1) There were four critical stages in the development of African Voices: The Idea Statement (1993), Concept Script and Design (1995), Final Script and Design (1998), and Audio Visual Development (1999). Given that this process occurred over a seven-year period, people moved in and out of the Development Team. *Content development*: Mary Jo Arnoldi (1993–99), Mark Auslander (1995–99), Linda Heywood (1994–99), Ivan Karp (1993–97), Christine Mullen Kreamer (1993–99), Michael Atwood Mason (1994–99), Sulyman Niang (1995–99), Fath Ruffins (1993–94), Theresa Singleton (1994–98), John Thornton (1994–99). *Designers*: Jim Simms (1993), Bennie Welch and Main Street Design (1994–95), Douglas Gallagher (1995–99). *Scriptwriters*: Sharon Barry (1993–96), Bee Wuethrich (1996–99). *Community specialists*: Philippa Jackson (1994–95), Austin Johnson (1995–98). *Educators*: Laura McKie (1993–95), Stephanie McKissic (1995–98). *Evaluators*: Science Learning Inc. (1993–99), Smithsonian Office of Institutional Studies (1999–2000). *Audiovisuals*: Northern Lights Production (1999). *Interactives*: Squid Country Safari (1999). *Website*: Terra Incognito (1999). The museum team also worked with a diverse Extended Team composed of Africans, African Americans, Africanists, and community leaders. Their counsel, numbering 120 in the project's early years and 60 in the later phases, was essential and resulted in a better final product.
- 2) Since the opening of the exhibition in December 1999, three different stories have been featured in the *Africa Today* display: a story on rural health challenges in Africa with a focus on community-based solutions in Kenya; a story on wildlife conservation in Africa focusing on local community efforts to conserve turtle breeding grounds around Lamu island; and, most recently in 2019, a story highlighting science in Africa, featuring joint excavations of dinosaurs on the Angolan coast by Angolan, Portuguese, and American paleontologists and their students.
- 3) See Kreamer (1997) and Arnoldi, Kreamer, and Mason (2001) for a detailed discussion of the making of the *African Voices* exhibit, its philosophy, exhibiting strategies, and the community collaborative process.
- 4) See Yoshida (1993) and Faulkner (1988) for discussions of the *Nyau* men's association and the *Kasiyamaliro* masquerade performances.
- 5) I would like to thank John Homiak, a curator for this exhibition, for sharing with me details of his collaborations with various Rastafari communities in the development of this exhibit. I would also like to thank him for his critical reading of this section and his editorial suggestions.
- 6) Personal communication from John Homiak (2012).
- 7) Thaffe, N. *The Gleaner*. July 22, 2013, np.

8) House of Nyahbinghi label in the *Discovering Rastafari!* exhibition, 2007.

“Named after an African anti-colonial movement, the House of Nyahbinghi is Rastafari’s oldest organization. Its many elders reworked Biblical prophesies, Ethiopian symbols, and African-Jamaican ideas about the power of nature to create the spiritual ore of the movement. They wore dreadlocks, innovated a style of drumming—also called Nyahbinghi—and developed a distinctive dialect as symbols of their African identity. In addition, they established the importance of roots and herbs, defending the use of cannabis as their sacrament. Nyahbinghi began celebrating groundations in the early 1950s. Later called Nyahbinghi, these events last three or seven days. They unite people “to praise Jah and chant down Babylon” with songs, drumming, and inspired conversations called reasonings. Nyahbinghi commemorate important dates for Rastafari, help recruit new members, and reaffirm participants’ experience as Africans-in-exile.”

9) Sizzla Kalonji (aka Miguel Collins) August 2012. You can hear Sizzla’s song at <http://urbanislandz.com/2012/06/29/sizzla-diss-snoop-dogg-beef-reggae-hip-hop-music/>. I would like to thank John Homiak for providing me with the information about the recent controversy surrounding the exhibit in Jamaica and for annotating the following verses of Sizzla Kalonji’s song.

“All you do is go around and record the sacred services in the holy temple of His Majesty and try to sell it, eh?”

Nothing is right, boy, nothing is cool...

Who de ras klatt Snoop Daag a try feh fool? [Who the hell does Snoop Dog think he’s fooling]

Tell ‘im say Emperor Selassie I a rule [Tell him that Emperor Selassie rules]
Him cyaan’t even get Selassie I stool.

Tell ‘im dis is not slavery days [tell him these are not slavery days]
De Babylon lady [Queen Elizabeth], she not get mi praises
Emperor Selassie I get daily praises
Nyahbinghi fiya haffa blaze

Mi ask Selassie I feh de crown, and...
Blaze up de chalice in de zone, and... [light the ganja pipe in my yard]
Mi haffa slap another roun’, an’ [I have to draw the pipe for another round]
Hotta fiya burn out Smithsonians! [ritual fire that cleanses adherents and destroys one’s enemies]

Education top-a-top, ya see... [It is education that rates in Jamaican society]
It matter wey yuh grab a chair an’ hab a property [Babylon only cares about your standing]

in society]

Because dis fiya neber stop, ya see... [but the Nyahbinghi ritual fire never ceases its vigilance]"

Because deh come feh tek your **intellectual property**. [because they come to take your intellectual property]

- 10) In addition to the three exhibit stories highlighted in this essay, there is, at least, one story in each gallery involving extensive participation with source communities, including the Makola Market story in *Market Crossroads*, the Somali *aqal* display in the *Living in Africa* Gallery, and videos featuring Vodun, Santeria, and Umbanda religious specialists in New York City in the *Global Africa* Gallery.

References

- Arnoldi, M. J., C. M. Kreamer, and M. A. Mason
 2001 African Voices: Reflections on Process, Intentions, and Strategies. *African Arts* 34(2): 16–35, note 94.
- Faulkner, L. B.
 1988 Basketry Masks of the Chewa. *African Arts* 21(3): 28–31, note 86.
- Homiak, J.
 2012 Personal Communication.
- Kreamer, C. M.
 1997 African Voices. *Museum News* (Nov–Dec): 50–55.
- Smithsonian Institution, National Museum of Natural History, Department of Exhibits
 1999 *African Voices*. Final Exhibition Script.
 2007 *Discovering Rastafari!* Final Exhibition Script.
- Thaffe, N.
 2013 Rastafari Legacy on Show at Nat'l Museum. *The Gleaner*, July 22. np.
- Yoshida, K.
 1993 Masks and Secrecy among the Chewa. *African Arts* 26(2): 34–45, note 92.

Part III

Past in the Present, Present in the Future

Local Juridical Authority as Intangible Heritage Practice: A Case from Burundi

Thomas Laely
University of Zurich

If the Bushingantahe as an institution of conflict resolution and jurisdiction in the local ambit of the Central East African society of Burundi is little known, with scarce scientific examination outside the country, this situation is not exceptional in the realm of intangible heritage. It is also less controllable and more difficult to grasp. For example, it is more challenging for higher authorities to integrate the Bushingantahe into a superordinate order. Relative to Rwanda's *gacaca* system of community justice (a form of transitional justice), which received significant international attention in coping with the genocide of 1994, the Bushingantahe was denied such attention to a comparable extent. Notwithstanding, the Bushingantahe in its form as restorative and reparative justice in Burundi was also called upon to address the long-running conflicts at the national level, especially in the period after 1993 and in the course of the negotiation of the Arusha Peace Agreement of 2000. In the country, the Bushingantahe is invoked when questions of justice, compensation, and conflict resolution are at stake and legal mechanisms are required, going beyond purely punitive justice. However, it is not always clear whether the Bushingantahe is understood to mean the actual, distinctively formalized institution or the values and imagery associated with it, a point which often remains vague and depends on the people who refer to it and the place and time of reference. As is often the case with intangible heritage, it is considerably fluid and varies per time and situation, as this article will show.¹⁾

This study focuses on the connections and entanglements between the local and higher levels up to the national level in political, legal, and social contexts. To what extent is the Bushingantahe to be considered and understood as an expression of societal regulation at the manageable local level (often associated with the “hill” in Burundi), and to what extent can it be interpreted per superordinate levels and interests? The study shows the fate and historical development of the intangible heritage, the attempts to harness it, be it by its abolition, revival, or actualization, over the various periods with their different political regimes and claims to power.

1. Introduction: A Judicial System Grounded in the Local Community

Since the mid-1960s, Burundi has been characterized by cycles of great political violence, recurring waves of civil war-like turmoil, and massacres that have claimed

hundreds of thousands of victims. In comparison to its northern “sister state” of Rwanda, whose violent political events at the beginning of the 1990s and especially the genocide of 1994 received broad international attention such that the country’s name remains inextricably linked to it, violence in Burundi has received comparatively little attention outside the immediate region.

The civil war, which keeps flaring up repeatedly for half a century, has had disastrous economic consequences for the country, which still ranks at the bottom of the international poverty scales. There have been numerous internal displacements (Photo 1), especially since 1993, when Melchior Ndadaye, who was voted state president in democratic elections, was murdered along with numerous high-ranking state representatives by the military, until then largely dominated by persons of Tutsi origin. This in turn led to an equally bloody reaction by the Hutu population and a civil war that lasted for one good dozen years. Currently, tens of thousands, if not hundreds of thousands, and many of them of Tutsi affiliation, still live in refugee or displaced person camps. International economic sanctions have further contributed to the precarious economic situation. The sanctions were considered in 2015 against the Burundian regime and the increasingly autocratic Pierre Nkurunziza (President of the Republic 2005–2020) and renewed in September 2020 against the successor regime under Evariste Ndayishimiye because of constitutional violations, political repression, and human rights violations.

Since the end of the 20th century, in the search for a solution via local and international organizations and consultants, the idea of the Bashingantahe council²⁾ as a tool to enhance peace and stability in Burundi has been repeatedly and quickly invoked in a utilitarian manner to break the cycles of violence and to have a suitable legal mechanism at hand (cf. Naniwe-Kaburahe 2008: 163; Nindorera 2003: 27). Thus, under the first government of Major Pierre Buyoya, extensive reform measures were introduced in 1988 after the massacres of more than 10,000 people in the two northern communities of Marangara and Ntega. In 1989, President Buyoya appointed a National Commission to study the issue of national unity (Commission nationale d’étudier la question d’unité



Photo 1 Camp of Internally Displaced Persons close to Gitega, October 2013 (©Thomas Laely)

nationale). With the publication of its report, a broad “Débat sur l’Unité Nationale” was launched, which finally led to the adoption of a new constitution in March 1992, providing for the democratization of the institutions of political life. The transition from the previous single- to multi-party system was one of the mainstays of this reform. However, a multi-party system has not been introduced unconditionally. Political events primarily fueled the associated concerns during the short period between decolonization and the end of the monarchy in the 1958–1966 period when several political parties were permitted, and the political competition that ensued led to violent conflicts. According to the 1992 constitution, the multi-party system was only implemented at higher political levels, especially at the national level.³⁾ However, the lower levels, starting with the *Commune* (Burundi was then divided into 114 administrative municipalities), were to be kept free of competition from political parties. Instead, democratization was based on the model of the old moral and judicial authority system of the Bushingantahe, dating back to pre-colonial times.⁴⁾

In this context, the institution of Bushingantahe acquires special significance. In effect, it constitutes a legal, moral authority whose importance rests primarily at the local level, even if its weight at the higher political levels should not be neglected. Before discussing the details, let us first clarify the reasons for introducing the multi-party system at this level. According to the commission preparing the new constitution, among the most frequently invoked motives were as follows:

(...) the omnipresence of political parties can be a real danger to the daily understanding of the people on the hills. By introducing a partisan spirit that is contrary to customary conviviality, there is a risk that a neighbor who belongs to a competing party will be perceived and treated as an enemy instead of seeing him or her as a mere political opponent with whom one must compete fairly. The omnipresence of parties risks compromising a number of values that should be the foundation of democracy, including social peace and national unity. (...) For this reason the Constitutional Commission proposes that grassroots democratization should be based on the institution of *Ubushingantahe* which, for centuries, has served as the basis for social peace, justice, understanding and conviviality of Burundians on our hills. (translation by the author)⁵⁾

Besides kin and family ties, the institution of the Bushingantahe is considered a model and key factor for social cohesion, a central instrument for necessary regeneration by opening and maintaining relationships across ethnic boundaries (Nindorera 2003: 25). The strength of the Bushingantahe institution lies in the Bushingantahe’s mode of selection or in the fact that its representatives were legal spokespersons recognized from below, the local population, and not imposed top-down by the higher political authorities (Naniwe-Kaburahe 2008: 154f). The process of recognition and selection, usually broadly supported in the local community, distinguishes and sets them apart from all other legal bodies.

Based on the available historical knowledge, the Bushingantahe was a societal institution that evolved from the narrower local setting, regulated fundamental social

tasks, and, with the formation of the “Early State” in its (sacral) monarchical form, assumed advisory and legal responsibilities at all higher political-administrative levels. As the Bashingantahe councils had apparently been assigned to all levels of political administration from the early kingship, the regional chiefs and their deputies, up to the royal court, the rulers likely employed a system of checks and balances (cf. Naniwe-Kaburahe 2008: 154; 156). There are also numerous legends, anecdotes, sayings, and proverbs that bear witness to these honorable tasks (Baranyanka 2009: 59–64).

Parallel to the debate on the development of Bashingantahe, other questions about political transformation, the formation of state structures, the claims of the state, and its relationship to “civil society” emerge. More generally, the subject fits into the much broader framework of the relations between “Civil Society” and “State,” a field of study privileged by the Africanists since the 1980s. It is, therefore, a reflection on the relations between state and non-state authority and on the limitations of the former. For example, the local level serves as a restricted laboratory of analysis where this interaction occurs. Finally, there is a question about the history of transformations in the relationship between the state and the local community.

In the monarchical society of Burundi (ca. 17th–20th century), the holders of this juridico-moral authority, the Bashingantahe, occupied an important position even at the supra-local level as influential councilors and judges at the royal court and at the courts of the Ganwa princes, who governed the different regions. This study focuses on their importance at the local level, which refers to a hill or a group of hills. Indeed, much of Burundi is composed of a seemingly infinite series of hills: highlands gently sloping to the east and to the west separated by a chain of high mountains (up to over 2,000m) from a narrow band of lowlands with a humid tropical climate on the shores of Lake Tanganyika, where the only larger city and economic capital Bujumbura⁶ lies. The hills that follow one another in the so-called “l’intérieur” (hinterland) of the country are marked by a very scattered habitat. The basic spatial unit is an isolated compound (enclosure) or cluster-shaped hamlet. The absence of a significant concentration of villages is an essential feature of this country. Until recently, only a minority of the population lived in urban areas.⁷ Each hill, separated from the neighboring hill by a streamlet and swampy valleys, forms an important social unit, later designated as the “local group.” It comprises a few localized patrilineal segments termed “small localized lineages.” Until the end of the monarchy in the mid-1960s, older men enjoyed high esteem, either based on their status as representatives of the lineage or on their position within the institution of Bashingantahe.

This situation changed with the political transformations introduced during colonization, which had full effects only in the post-colonial period. The decline of the elders was symbolically marked by the fact that the Mwami (king), who reigned since 1915, was deposed in 1966 by his young son Charles Ndizeye at the instigation of influential Batutsi circles (cf. Manirakiza 1990). The fact that the power of Charles Ndizeye (enthroned under the title of Mwami Ntare V) was swept away the same year by Michel Micombero, commander of the armed forces and President of the Republic, established by his coup d’état, shows that this issue is not a mere matter of the dismissal

of elders by juniors. Thenceforth, the old monarchical society was transformed into a modern republican state, a state ruled by a military regime and supported by a single party. The institution of Bushingantahe was not spared from this change. In light of the Bushingantahe and its destiny, the history of the relationship between the local and state levels manifests itself in an exemplary way. The attempts to “functionalize” it provides insight into how the state deals with local intangible heritage. However, it is prudent to first closely consider the institution.

2. The Bushingantahe Authority System

2.1 Characterization

Almost everyone in Burundi would agree that the institution most likely to stand for justice, wisdom, and integrity is the Bushingantahe. This assumption is not by chance. Since the end of the 1950s and decolonization, Burundian society has found itself increasingly in aggravated crises and instability. Moreover, the more these values are obviously lacking, especially in everyday political and social life, the more this institution is invoked. As there has been ample reason and opportunity for this in recent decades, it is almost a mythical institution today. In fact, every political regime, in whatever form and whether in recent or more remote historical periods, has tried to claim and instrumentalize the Bushingantahe for itself. There is no reason to assume this would have been different for the monarchical and pre-colonial periods.

The Bushingantahe can be defined as an institution of community justice at the grassroots level. Let us first examine the ancient pre-colonial form of Bushingantahe. The Bushingantahe (sing.: *(u)Mu-shingantahe*) were and still are the real notables of the hill (Photos 2a, 2b and 2c). In a narrow sense, they have primarily juridical authority. In a broader sense, they have a high moral and political authority as role models and leaders



(2a)



(2b)



(2c)

Photos 2a, 2b and 2c Invested Bushingantahe, province Muramvya 1989 (©Thomas Laely)

of their local groups, as confirmed by the etymology of the word “Bashingantahe.” This term is composed of the verb *gushinga* and the noun *intahe*. *Intahe* is a small stick, usually made of ficus *umumanda* wood, which the Bashingantahe carry as a sign of their authority (Photo 3). They rhythmically strike the ground (*gushinga*) to underline the important passages of the presentation of the dispute, deliberations, and sentence communication. Thus, the Bashingantahe are conflict settlers, arbitrators, mediators, and counselors at the local level. Even if their role goes beyond simple mediation, they are generating decisions rather than implementing them. More Justices of the Peace than Court Judges, they have neither judicial competence nor penal power.⁸⁾ Moreover, Mushingantahe, in general, refers to a person of authority, in love with justice, and of high integrity and experience, given an advanced age (Rodegem 1970: 464f; Ntabona 1999). The Bashingantahe are primarily responsible for judicial tasks: reconciliation and resolution of conflicts of all kinds within the hill community. If they fail to resolve such conflicts, they transfer them to extra-local political bodies and corresponding judicial authorities. In addition, the Bashingantahe serve as witnesses in various agreements at the local level, from marriages through succession regulations and the division of inheritance to the determination of land boundaries and lease contracts. The Mushingantahe is associated as witness and authenticator. In legal problems, the Bashingantahe are eye-witnesses, a task they can assume already by their advanced age: Are they not the ones who can remember in detail the drawing of the boundaries (*akarimbi*) that goes back far into the past and know the history of social relations most accurately? Generally, the obligation to establish and maintain harmony and unity, understanding and reconciliation, and, thus, protect the peace and order within the local community rests on them.

In addition to the legal field, the Bashingantahe were the guardians of customs and traditions at the local level. As the first moral authorities, counselors, educators, and role models of their community, they lead in constructing and consolidating the value system. Their duties are not limited to legal and normative aspects. As leaders of the territorially based groups, responsible for the consolidation of the internal order and representation toward the outside, the Bashingantahe took on prominent political functions in addition to their narrow duties as conflict resolvers. They were the first interlocutors of the local political authority. In pre-colonial Burundi, the Mwami generally delegated government power in various regions to members of his Ganwa lineage, with considerable autonomy in their territory. A Ganwa Prince administered his territory with the help of delegates, called *ivyariho* (sing: *icariho*; “substitute, lieutenant,” litt.: “who or what is in the place of...”), who were called “Sub-Chiefs” (Sous-Chefs) during the colonization; each was responsible for one, two, or three hills. Apart from a few messengers (*intumwa*), mostly caught on the job, these *ivyariho* had no other auxiliaries. As the Bashingantahe represented the most influential localized lineages (cf. Mworoha 1987: 210), the local *icariho* needed their support. Some were regularly summoned to his court to settle important juridical conflicts the local groups could not resolve independently.

Thus, another important issue emerges. Who became Mushingantahe, and how did one reach this social position? The status of Mushingantahe had to be acquired through a



Photo 3 Bashingantahe—“Burundian notables in the countryside”
(©O.N.T. Burundi, photo by J.P. Bastière, around 1978)

long process of observation and trials; no one acquired it “automatically,” and no one was forced to do so. The Bashingantahe were recruited from the Batutsi and Bahutu (ethnic) groups. Only the Batwa (former hunter-gatherers, who still occupy a marginal social position today in all areas of life) were excluded from this social status. Accordingly, all adult males were expected to run for nomination to the Bashingantahe, the most prestigious social position within a local group. However, only a minority reached it—we are not dealing with an “age class” here: not every older man, and at least not necessarily every representative of the lineage, attained the status of Mushingantahe during his lifetime. This social position was not accessible to every older person, especially not women: “The *intahe* (stick) of the woman does not exist” because “the woman has no secrets” (a reference to the obligation of discretion about the content of the non-public deliberations of the Bashingantahe). The Bashingantahe are not to be mistaken for the elders of the lineages of a hill, i.e. with representatives of localized lineage segments. Even if this authority system contained obvious gerontocratic elements, the Mushingantahe is expected to exhibit more than just “the charisma of age” (Spencer 1985: 182f; cf. Mworoha 1977: 170f, 178).

It is quite possible, however, that the institution of Bashingantahe, as presented to us by the “mature” monarchy (19th century), is the result of a much earlier institution of lineage heads (the “elders”). The institution of Bashingantahe is widespread throughout Burundian territory; it is unknown in neighboring countries, including Rwanda.⁹ The fact that this institution was also known in the regions conquered only in the 19th century under Mwami Ntare Rugamba supports the argument that the monarchy contributed to the institutionalization of the Bashingantahe. Arguably, the monarchy had an interest in promoting the existence of such an institution and, thus, contributed to its extension to the whole territory. The hypothesis that originally presented the Bashingantahe as leaders and representatives of lineages or clans accredited by the king is reinforced by the fact that the Batwa never provided any Bashingantahe and were excluded from this social position. The other hypothesis is that these former hunter-gatherers knew neither separate clans (*imiryango*) nor any lineage organization before the complete formation of the

state. This situation would also explain the striking parallelism between their clan names and the Bahutu, and especially the Batutsi. Hence, the “merit” of the generalized extension of the Bashingantahe belongs to the monarchy, which has estimated the true value of the instances of reconciliation and decentralized representations of the local population. Finally, this institution containing the autonomist claims of the Baganwa and other regional leaders, was not to displease the central power. In the pre-monarchical era, the “pre-Bashingantahe”¹⁰⁾ (the elders) likely played a much more general role. Under the monarchy, they assumed a primarily judicial role—increasingly specialized in juridical matters and, over time, associated with all government levels, highlighting the progressive incorporation of a lineage institution into the monarchical state.

2.2 The Status of the Mushingantahe: A Career of Several Stages and Grades

Whoever wanted to become a Mushingantahe had to prepare from his youth. One had to go through several stages and milestones, all marked by a big party during which the candidate had to offer much beer to the Bashingantahe of the surroundings and all those present. These stages described ascending graduation for aspirants, and this hierarchy continued even beyond the circle of the already invested Bashingantahe (cf. Rodegem 1966: 8). This order was manifested in their gatherings by the setting at the time of drinking and their duties and rights. However, their rank was also reflected in the local group at every function and formal meeting, accompanied by beer distribution in a convivial atmosphere.

Hence, one had to fulfill a few preconditions of a social, economic, and moral nature. The candidate must be recognized as a legitimate son, married at a mature age, and prove his aptitude for social commitment, first within the restricted framework of harmonious management of his household. It also implied the attainment of a certain economic status such that “one had something to give and something to keep,” as the Kirundi saying goes (*ukugira ico utanga n'ico usigarana*). Moreover, certain personal and moral qualities were required. The candidate was expected to possess *umutima* (mind, heart; here, politeness, education, compassion), which, generally, means a self-confident and balanced personality, with an acute social conscience. In other words, he must be endowed with a high sense of responsibility, especially for his community of provenance to which he always feels attached (Ntabona 1985). Maturity and integrity require a strong sense of truth and justice.¹¹⁾ Thus, if needed, he can confront even the powerful and rulers. Several proverbs evoke such integrity: “The true *mugabo*¹²⁾ swallows a piece of dough, but not his word,” and “the true *mugabo* turns over on his mat, but not in his word” (cf. Hakizimana 1976: 33f). The reference to speech (*ijambo*) was central. A Mushingantahe “has the word” in all respects. He is an eloquent but not a smooth speaker. In an impartial spirit, he speaks clearly and confidently and has a deep sense of his professional obligations, especially when they require discretion.

Whoever wanted to become a Mushingantahe had to go through a long ordeal within his local group, lasting several years, which did not always end with success. The local community took time to observe and test the Mushingantahe applicant before official investiture, called *kwâtirwa*, which can be translated as “to be invested; to be initiated.”

The path to the official investiture as a Mushingantahe (a career never precisely explored in the scientific literature thus far) was rigorously ordered, depending on the region, in two, three, or four hierarchical stages. First, a general distinction was made between “Bakungu” and “Bashingantahe”. All men not invested in the Bashingantahe were called *Bakungu*.¹³ “the not (yet) invested.” As it was customary for every man (even young men) to apply for Mushingantahe, they were all considered potential candidates. The periods of observation, learning, and maturation began just after adolescence. An assiduous *mukungu* would occasionally attend investigations and even juridical deliberations. Afterward, he would be asked a few questions to see if he had been following the case.

Those who wanted to outperform the rank of an ordinary “rear” *Mukungu* (*mukungu w'inyuma*) and rise to the “front” *Mukungu* (*mukungu w'imbere*), in allusion to the seating order and sequence when drinking beer, had to excel in the expected qualities and “offer beer to the Bashingantahe for the first time.” This kind of beer-offering could be connected to the celebration of the public presentation of the first child of the applicant.¹⁴ The Bashingantahe could reject this “application beer” as insufficient and demand more. Under certain circumstances, the candidate must wait for the birth of his second or third child to reapply.

The man who finally had been promoted to “*mukungu w'imbere*” in this way enjoyed some new responsibilities and privileges but was subjected to more intensive scrutiny thenceforth. He had to give the ordinary Bakungu their beer, bring the Bashingantahe their pot, and appreciate its contents. Each status group drank separately. After years of intensive contact and observation by the Bashingantahe, he could advance from being an ordinary aspirant to a closer applicant and postulant to the final *kwâtirwa* investiture. If the Bashingantahe accepted the associated beer offering, he became “*umunya-mutâmana*,” the “man in the robe (cloak) of the Bashingantahe,” expressing that he had received the “call” to Mushingantahe, the promise of an investiture (cf. Rodegem 1966: 8). The trial period and initiation were then opened. However, only a minority reached the stage of this last formal apprenticeship (cf. Trouwborst 1962: 148). The differences to East African age group or “class” systems also become apparent, of which the sequence of grades or stages may remind here and there (see, e.g., Spencer 1985: 178ff).

To be admitted to the investiture, all local lineages (*imiryango*) had their say, with the local Bashingantahe being the last to decide; it was within their power to postpone a request *sine die*. The one who received the “Cloak of Bashingantahe” was chosen as their apprentice and helper. What happened after this step? It was now up to the candidate’s father to invite the most important relatives, neighbors, and local Bashingantahe to his premise, offer them a special beer, and formally submit his son’s candidacy. The speed of progress depended on elements such as the economic fortune of the applicant. However, the assigned formal “investiture godfather,” *umuhetsi* or *umuheka*,¹⁵ was also influential. He could have been a paternal relative whom the trainee himself suggested; although, ultimately, it was the hill Bashingantahe *in corpore* that determined him. The *muhetsi* was described as the first advocate and facilitator: the very manager and “impresario” of

his protégé's *kwâtirwa* campaign. One of his most important tasks was the organization of the investiture celebration. Under his leadership, the "novice" was introduced to the details of Mushingantahe duties. It was up to the *muhetsi* to ensure that the required amount of beer was accumulated, an organizational and economic effort not to be underestimated. The postulant was dependent on the assistance of his relatives, neighbors, friends, and followers. Finally, it was also the task of his godfather to introduce the aspirant to the local political authorities and inform them of the upcoming investment festival. Although it is somewhat uncertain from which point in history the applicant must be presented to local authorities in advance, this is a clear expression of the central state capture of the juridical field and the corresponding local authority system.

2.3 Investiture and Social Position of the Bashingantahe and Their Internal Hierarchies

The entire local community, relatives of the aspirant, and any individual passing through were invited to the demanding *kwâtirwa* ceremony, which took place in the candidate's compound. On the appointment day, "caravans" of beer pot carriers arrived at dawn. The public character of the ceremony was explicitly emphasized. Various speeches and an ever-renewed beer distribution took center stage. The beer jugs were distributed according to social categories and rank, including professions (Ntabona 1985: 279). Each grade was entitled to a particular jug of beer. Thus, the dominant social order was externalized and confirmed, and, above all, the candidates' recognition by all social strata was demonstrated. The local political authority honored only the candidate from an influential local lineage or members of lineages with whom it had special ties. The new initiate had to take an oath and, thus, as the local saying goes, swallow "the little stone of real men" (*kumira akabuye k'abagabo*). It is symbolic of the irreversibility of both the step taken and the commitment to assume the ensuing responsibilities (cf. Baranyanka 2009: 60; Rodegem 1966: 10). The newly-promoted man and his wife could drink the Bashingantahe jug for the first time. They were carried in the air so that everyone could see and applaud the invested Mushingantahe. The event sealed and formalized the agreement and link between the new Mushingantahe and his community and the acceptance by the local group of his new status, which now instituted him as spokesman, representative, and first legal and moral authority of the community.¹⁶⁾ It is always stressed that any opposition, wherever it came from, would have immediately interrupted the nomination.

Thus, a Mushingantahe was invested in by and for the local group from which he came. In the pre-colonial period, the investiture was in the hands of the local groups, especially of the oldest lineages of the locality: Without their agreement, no one could be invested. Admittedly, there were other investiture alternatives via the political centers; however, they seem to have gained importance only in a later period and never graduated beyond an exception. They are of interest here only insofar as they can be interpreted as an expression of the pre-colonial attempt of the central government to associate the Bashingantahe in one way or another with the political administration (Photos 4a and 4b).

One does not become a Mushingantahe overnight. Gradation from one stage to the next is understood as a requirement for learning by careful progression, very much in the spirit of the proverb *ibanga ntirimirwa intama*, “commitment [is] not something you can swallow without chewing it” (cf. Ntabona 1985: 279). Moreover, the Mushingantahe candidate is also already indebted to his local group by the economic expenses incurred during his ascent; he is much obliged and bound to it. A careful analysis of the different stages and duties corresponding to each one reveals an increasing responsibility linked to additional competencies and gradual integration in the juridical process. From an outside observer, one first became auxiliary to Bashingantahe in charge of conflict resolution. In the next stage, one was involved in the investigative process and allowed to attend the deliberations. However, only after the investiture could one participate in the judgment, where the word of a Mushingantahe gradually matured and gained weight (cf. Rutake 1986: 6). Periodic beer distributions on the long journey to Bashingantahe can be understood as a formalization of transitions and the social recognition of progress. The fact that a Mushingantahe was first mandated and legitimized not from above but from below does not mean this institution was not recognized and promoted by the central power. However, even in pre-colonial times, beer distribution did not have an exclusive ceremonial meaning. In addition to the indispensable personal qualities, this fact reassured that the candidate had a stable local base and a branched network of external connections. On the occasion of the investiture, he needed much beer from other hills. The distribution of beer thus had a selective function, as per economic power and the capacity to mobilize beer. Anyone who did not feel supported by a relatively influential and numerically strong lineage and a devoted neighborhood could not be invested.¹⁷⁾

There was also a clear ranking among the invested Bashingantahe. The position and prestige of each Mushingantahe were determined using two criteria: first, his personal qualities, influence, and “seniority,” all of which were determined by his social grouping (the lineage segment, clan, and ethnic group attributed to him); and second, his place within the hierarchy of legal and judicial levels that existed under the fully developed monarchical state (councils at the courts of the [sub-] chiefs up to the royal court; i.e., the *banyarurimbi*; cf. Rodgem 1966: 6f, 12; Mworoha 1977: 193, 210).

The first criterion was mainly decisive at the level of the hill. At each meeting of the Bashingantahe, an internal ranking became visible, again expressed in their seating and drinking order. They were generally divided into two categories: “the rear ones” and “the front ones” (*hari abari inyuma n’abari imbere*). Each of these groups had its unique beer and jug. The rear, still light-weight and usually younger Bashingantahe were called *abashingantahe bo ku carire* (Bashingantahe on the straw/calf bedding) or *banyacarire*, for short. They owed reverence and respect to the more experienced, venerable, and usually older Bashingantahe. The latter had their beer pot with them on the special sitting mat to which they were entitled; consequently, they were called *abashingantahe bo ku kirago* (Bashingantahe on the mat).¹⁸⁾ *Ku kirago* is a place of honor. Among the *Banyakirago*, one again distinguished the *bicôcero*, whose physical strength had decreased so much that they remained sitting in their place and could not rise easily to go to the beer pot. Therefore, they got their calabash. However, these were not retired



(4a)



(4b)

Photos 4a and 4b Invested Bashingantahe, province Muyinga, 1989 (©Thomas Laely)

Bashingantahe, as I initially perceived—a resignation would not have been compatible with the sense of duty associated with Mushingantahe status. Only in cases of senility was care taken to ensure the people concerned were restrained. It would have been unthinkable to exclude them as elders. Admittedly, the aging process is often associated with a decreasing ability to assert oneself. However, insofar as they were still of a lucid spirit, they could be involved in the debates and decision-making; the trial could even be held in their compound if they could not move.¹⁹⁾

The internal differentiation and rankings among the Bashingantahe were not connected to any formal occasions or initiations, and, in principle, no special beer gifts were required. However, as in the step-by-step process for prospective Bashingantahe, considerable regional differences existed throughout Burundi. For example, some differentiation was unknown in various peripheral regions, and the designations could differ from region to region. The connected system and processes were apparently most differentiated at the center in areas around Muramvya and Gitega, which may only apply to the period at the end of the 19th and the first half of the 20th century; data on earlier periods are not known. And several of the specifications described are no longer found today, as we shall see in the next chapter. Thus, the description was more an ideal model than a fully lived reality; it was always subject to changes, variations, evasions, and exceptions, as with all social realities.

3. Transformations under Changing Political Regimes

3.1 Alignment per Political Order

Let us turn to the question of what happened to the Bashingantahe system of authority under the changing political regimes since the beginning of the 20th century and its status in the 21st century. It is not surprising that all changes in the political order and the system of rule had somewhat direct effects on this locally based authority system (cf. Ntabona 1999). It applies primarily to the larger cuts—colonization, decolonization, and the transition from monarchy to republic in its three successive moldings. It applies equally to the attempts of the last 30 years to “rehabilitate” the Bashingantahe, deformed

and mutilated per the ruling order to break with the cycles of violence, cope with their consequences, and find an appropriate form of justice. In retrospect, the more its original spirit was invoked, the more instrumentalized the institution and vice versa.

Based on the political integration and attempts at appropriation under the colonial administration and later republic with its single-party regime, it is, if not obvious, then not too far to search, that even under the monarchical order, those in power must have had a lively interest in using this system of authority, founded in the wider local community, which largely regulated the local area. This situation probably explains the establishment of the Bashingantahe “second type”, directly placed alongside the political authorities at the higher levels.

3.2 Colonial Remodeling

If we disregard the conversions during the pre-colonial period and the formation of the “Early State” given the precarious data situation, the first interventions already occurred in the early colonial period. The bustling Catholic Church, whose functionaries and missionaries preceded and accompanied political colonization, was the first to penetrate the rural areas of the hills. Its representatives competed with Bashingantahe, seeking to assume their authority and traditional role as advisors, mediators, and regulators of marital conflicts and shape them according to their code of values (cf. Naniwe-Kaburahe 2008: 159; Nindorera 2003: 14). They appointed church officials and bodies in the form of *abajenâma* councils on the hills, recruited local cadres as auxiliaries, and worked as teachers in addition to their missionary work.

The Bushingantahe as an institution survived the relatively short colonial period (first German, then from 1916 Belgian), which began in the last years of the 19th century. It is essential to note that the colonial order did not begin to shape the everyday lives of people in the hills until the 1930s. When the Belgian colonial administration penetrated for the first time into the narrower rural space (“l’intérieur”), the judicial order at the level of the hill was no longer left to the Bashingantahe alone. Formal tribunals were established at the level of the *Chefs* and *Sous-Chefs*; the Bashingantahe were affiliated in the capacity of “assessors” in these customary law courts chaired by all-powerful chiefs or sub-chiefs (Gahama 1983: 301; Deslaurier 2003: 78). On July 1, 1962, Burundi and Rwanda achieved political independence at the same time. Though the colonial era hardly lasted more than one generation, the Bushingantahe was by no means unaffected by the upheavals therein. Rather, during this period, it underwent changes that made it easy for the later post-colonial republic to portray the Bushingantahe as hollow, justifying its complete redirection into new, now openly state-run paths. Let us take a closer look at these phases of development.

Under the colonial regime, the territorial administration was strengthened and standardized. Previously, many *Baganwa* and *Inkebe* territorial leaders, *Ivyariho* delegates, and *Bishikira* favorites were linked by very varied and highly intertwined dependency structures. These rulers governed regions of unequal sizes; the size of their territories depended on their political power at the time. These possessions were never fixed, but their boundaries were always fluctuating and controversial. However, colonial

power created an administrative structure of chiefs (Baganwa) and sub-chiefs (Batware) hierarchically structured per a universalized criterion.²⁰ A completely “bureaucratized” staff, fully integrated into the state sector, was assigned to the sub-chief such that he could efficiently administer his territory, extended by several hills. The essential tasks of the sub-chiefs and their auxiliaries were now to summon the population to forced labor and the *corvées* (*guhimiriza*) and collect the tributes in kind (*gutôza imizigo*) prescribed in detail to supervise the introduction of new crops, ensure the maintenance of obligatory cash crops (especially coffee), and maintain order and peace. Auxiliary personnel comprised *Bahamagazi* criers, each responsible for proclaiming the orders of public power on his hill and mobilizing the tributes and *Barongozi* guides, who clerked to the execution of colonial works and led the columns of porters and laborers. The consolidation of the administrative apparatus included a multiplication of tasks for the local political authorities and their new auxiliaries, who had increasingly become coercive bodies under the colonial regime. This administrative reform led to the invasion of state-appointed civil servants at the local level, for which previously the Bashingantahe had been largely responsible. Under the pre-colonial system of domination, with a coherent ideological basis, the subordinates and subjects had to address the higher authorities. Now it was the other way around: It was the peasants who, on the hills, were solicited by the multiple representatives of the public authority. The central power interfered progressively in the “hill affairs.” Every peasant began to feel it in their life.

The colonial seizure of power, political and economic, led by political forces, was accompanied by a gradual disintegration of the local level. Bushingantahe was under increasing multifaceted state control. Each *kwâtirwa* nomination requires written authorization from the local political authority. There was a clear reduction in the competencies and functions of local non-governmental agencies. The state tried to keep the functions assumed by the Bashingantahe under more firm control. Two complementary strategies can be discerned: The central power tended to attach the Bashingantahe more directly to itself and make them properly state officials; and the state tried to restrict the extent of their competence by creating new local auxiliary administrative agents (*bahamagazi* criers and *Barongozi* guides). They assumed some of the duties and responsibilities formerly entrusted to the Bashingantahe. Despite the limitations, the Bushingantahe as a system of authority remained strong at the local level, and the Bashingantahe enjoyed the highest esteem in the community. In the later colonization phase after the Second World War, any official was systematically invested as Mushingantahe. This change increasingly induced Bushingantahe aspirants to circumvent the lengthy probation period by courting the local (*sous*) *chef* with alcoholic gifts (beer), inducing corruption, indebtedness, and dependencies (Delacauw 1936: 511). While the Bushingantahe used to be primarily based on the capability of mobilization and organization given high social integration, it now threatened to become completely venal.

3.3 Post-colonial Transformations: A History of Gradual Appropriation

As far as political developments are concerned, it is interesting to note that the colonial

changes anticipated at the local level became even more pronounced in the post-colonial state, especially under the Second Republic (1976–1987). The post-colonial state, which transformed into a republic after only a few years because this form promised to better meet its goals and needs to legitimize new elites and exclude old ones, initially induced greater state capture of the Bashingantahe in various steps.

The institution of the Bashingantahe was progressively placed in the sphere of influence of the newly created single-party UPRONA (Union pour le Progrès National), the new ideological and mobilization apparatus in the hands of the state. Under the First Republic (1966–1976), the Bashingantahe investiture was organized by the new “Administrateurs de Communes,” officials appointed from above, and was now conducted in the “party palaces” (*ingoro y’umugambwe*) created in each municipality rather than on the candidates’ residential hills, a significant local shift. Under the aegis of the state, the *kwâtirwa* was standardized throughout the entire national territory, and the previously pronounced regional disparities progressively disappeared (Hakizimana 1976: 58; 91). The candidates were invested in groups and presented themselves in a row in front of the Party house. At the end of the festivities, organized and supervised by the municipal administration, they had to contribute two jugs of beer and some cash to cover other expenses, sometimes even donating a cow whose meat was shared. Relative to earlier periods, *kwâtirwa* was now accessible to more men.

Under the First Republic, in the context of the creation of a centralized and bureaucratized local administration, the hill Bashingantahe faced competition from new (proto-) civil servants and their auxiliaries. The administration set up new organs with the “hill chief” (*chef de colline*)²¹ and with the *Nyumbakumi* or *Nzezwamihana* (at the neighborhood or “borough” of the local community level) administering about ten households. While the former, as direct delegates of the municipal office, had obligations ranging from tax collection to conducting development tasks, the *Nyumbakumi* was control and policing body, conceived as the state’s most advanced bridgehead in the neighborhood—tasks that were not very popular and of dubious efficiency.

With the regime change in the mid-1970s, when the “post-monarchical” transition period ended, and the republican order began to take root, the state pursued a much more active policy in these areas. The innovator lieutenant-colonel Jean-Baptiste Bagaza, who had seized power in 1976, strove for a fundamental transformation of traditional society and its reorientation through reforms in various areas. While the late 1970s were marked by far-reaching financial, fiscal, and land reforms, the 1980s were increasingly dominated by police measures in a progressively autocratic regime (Chrétien and Guichaoua 1988; Reyntjens 1989). The first instrument for implementing state policy was the restructured single-party UPRONA, whose agencies were expanded, upgraded, and given additional tasks and powers, primarily at the local level. For the peasants on the hill, this meant primarily increasing bureaucratic pressure and not democratization by introducing “modern state” institutions, as Chrétien and Le Jeune suggested (1986; cf. Chrétien and Guichaoua 1988). The old-stock Bashingantahe proved to be unfit in achieving the objectives conceived by the central power. The republican state subsequently opted for the second strategy: A whole series of new state and para-state bodies were created or

expanded at the hill level to take over the traditional tasks and competencies of Bashingantahe and make them superfluous. As they would have represented an undesirable competition, they were unceremoniously “abolished” by prohibiting any previous *kwâtirwa* ceremony: In 1978, any installation on the hill outside the party framework was banned. The official reason was to put an end to the prodigality and possible indebtedness associated with the old form of investiture.

However, destruction and prohibition were not enough; a substitute was needed to make these measures and desired stronger state control effective. It was achieved via the significantly incremented density of civil servants and agencies in the local area down to the neighborhood (*imihana*) level. What interests us more than the territorial administration cadres in this context are the somewhat parallel bodies of the unitary party UPRONA, structured per the model of socialist states of that period. In the countryside, where more than 90% of the adult population adhered to the Party at that time, each geographical hill was promoted to “Party Section,” comprising different small “Party Cells” (*agacimbiri*). A committee of ten and five members led them under the chairmanship of the first and second secretaries, respectively. In May 1988, these committees were elected for the first time by local party members, each time on the proposal of the higher level.

The election and expansion of the party committees changed almost nothing in their composition, even in agricultural areas, where almost all members are farmers; non-peasants, especially those holding state office had every chance of being elected (Guichaoua 1989: 69, 76, n.10; Le Jeune 1989: 83ff, 93ff). Party committees were still perceived more as organs of the state than the local group. As a new regulatory body for conflicts and disputes on the hill, they were the ones who now gathered every Thursday instead of the Bashingantahe. All local problems were now within their competence. Only members of these committees had the right and duty to chair the juridical bodies and send a written report containing proposed solutions, decisions, and, if necessary, case references to higher offices.

The state chose an offensive strategy to make this transfer of competence clear to everyone and find the necessary support: Various elements of the outer appearance of the Bashingantahe were transferred directly to these new bodies. In view of the strong roots and the continuing high reputation of this institution on Burundi’s hills, the state refrained from abolishing it in any form. It must have seemed more promising to occupy and “nationalize” its territory and to link it more than ever directly to the civil service. Hereafter, only committee members were officially called “Bashingantahe.” Several features of the old mode of appointment were retained. The investiture of the committee members (Bashingantahe of the Party) after their respective designation and election was sealed by an oath to the party and its ideals, during which all held the national flag with their left hand, the right raised for the party salute. Thenceforth, only this new officially recognized “*kwâtirwa*” led to the Bashingantahe. Given that new qualifications were required (members of party committees should be literate such that the modern administrative apparatus could rely on them), there was no more room for older people in these bodies. The functionary Bashingantahe appointed by the party had the say.

Although the traditionally invested ones may have had considerable personal, charismatic, and functional authority, they no longer held any institutional authority in the mediation and settlement of disputes beyond the narrow localized lineage and neighborhood sphere.

However, the described transformation processes should not be seen too one-sidedly. If the state sought to instrumentalize certain elements of the Bushingantahe for itself, then in a reverse movement, the agencies, with which it had equipped every hill, were in a sense occupied from below and tied back into old patterns of perception and explanatory contexts. For example, in everyday language, the members of the JRR party youth of that time (Jeunesse Révolutionnaire Rwagasore) became the new *bakungu* (or *bakungu m'imbere*). Similarly, by being elected to a Comité de Cellule, one first climbed to the next higher level, following the perceptions of the peasants (*mu mutamana* according to the old terminology), and is, thus, not yet regarded as a “full” Mushingantahe—a common parlance and view that did not correspond to official discourse, but to vernacular speech.

With the administrative-political appropriation of the institution for the regulation of local space, Bushingantahe's importance eroded. This circumstance was also expressed in a “dépréciation sémantique”, a devaluation and extension of the semantic field of the term or the title of the Mushingantahe, becoming a commonplace expression generalized for a respectful person of male—and only male—gender (Deslaurier 2003: 78). After all, the title stood and stands for a respectable person in general up to the respectful everyday address like “monsieur” or “sir”. Thus, most public speeches begin and end with “Bashingantahe,” often supplemented by “na Bapfasoni,” synonymous with “Ladies and Gentlemen.” At the local level, however, especially in rural areas, the Bushingantahe institution has retained its meaning despite the waning of the term. Especially in largely anomic situations, where there are hardly any regulated relations to (let alone services from) the political authorities, the Bushingantahe finds its meaningfulness, though possibly in modified forms relative to the old rules (Photos 4a and 4b).

In the clash of different systems of power and authority, the elderly have lost enormous ground with the growing importance of modern criteria such as literacy. However, since this modernization created countless new problems for which there are no solutions, manifesting not least in the recurrent political conflicts ethnically oriented until the last turn of the century, people have long since begun to reconsider the value of the Bushingantahe.

This situation could be observed for the first time explicitly in the aforementioned “Débat sur Unité Nationale” during the democratization phase in the years 1989–1993, a direct consequence of the massacres in the two northern municipalities of Marangara and Ntega bordering Rwanda in August 1988. Of course, it must also be seen in the broader context of the “African Perestroika,” observable in large parts of the African continent after the changes in Eastern Europe from 1989 onwards. The widely recognized traditional institution was considered a means of reconciliation and reconstruction within the local setting. These efforts intensified with international support in the second half of the 1990s, when it was necessary to overcome the consequences of the devastating civil war that followed the bloody upheaval of October 1993.²²⁾

After the coup d'état of October 1993, the 1992 constitution and the reforms of democracy "at the grassroots" were repealed. Under Buyoya's second presidency, a décret-loi was issued in 1997, providing for a "conseil consultatif (des Bashingantahe)" comprising 40 members appointed by the president, which, as its name suggests, had a consultative role.²³⁾ The Conseil National des Bashingantahe (CNB) published several recommendations and guidelines until 1998, but these did not receive much attention from politicians, security forces, or the general public.²⁴⁾

The revalorization of the Bashingantahe was finally the subject of the peace negotiations among the nineteen political parties (G19) with international support from the region (Tanzania, South Africa) at the end of the 1990s, eventually finding a prominent place in the Arusha Agreement of late August 2000. "Neo-traditional solutions," as per Deslaurier (2003: 80), aroused not least the interest of the international community.²⁵⁾ However, the official Burundian side and urban circles invoked the old Bashingantahe at every opportunity in spirit, if not in form. In earlier times, the exclusion of categories such as women, Batwa, and less-performing men in traditional monarchical society was "politically correct" insofar as it was inscribed in a system according to which each social category, group, and (sub-) clan was assigned specific tasks, duties, and rights and the corresponding position within a rough ranking system. This system had largely dissolved with social and political changes which also had an impact on the Bashingantahe and the attempts to revive it. Thus, it was clearly stipulated that everyone, especially women and Batwa, should henceforth have access to the Bashingantahe. This stipulation of the new "politically correct" views by the central authorities proved to be ineffective in the rural context and were hardly implemented (Deslaurier 2003: 91).

As this anthology addresses the circumstances and fates of intangible cultural heritage, it is worth noting here that it was probably the vicissitudes of (local) political history, among other things, that contributed to the fact that Burundi has not yet developed the idea or has refrained from having the Bashingantahe recognized by UNESCO as an intangible cultural heritage. Accordingly, the criteria set by UNESCO (e.g., general democratic access and gender equality) would hardly have been fully met; however, the institution of the Bashingantahe was and still is far too controversial and insufficiently settled regarding (local) politics in the fierce squabbling among various stakeholders. This situation may account for some differences relative to other juridical systems operating primarily at the local level included in UNESCO's Representative List of the Intangible Cultural Heritage of Humanity. For example, this applies to the *Council of Wise Men* of the plains of Murcia and Valencia, Spain, inscribed in 2009,²⁶⁾ or the *Gada'a* system in Ethiopia, inscribed in 2016.²⁷⁾ However, these two are distinctly different in other respects. The centuries-old Spanish council system specializes in the allocation of water rights and involves local authorities directly, while the Ethiopian *Gada'a* system is much more comprehensive, affecting all areas of society. It is to be regarded as a generation-grading system in its own right, not based on (biological) age but rather on genealogical generation and descent, comprising any male member of the society (cf. Hallpike 1976: 48ff). Relative to the latter, the Burundian Bashingantahe is again more specialized and focused on the juridical and moral spheres, far from being

inclusive of the general male population. Certain permanence and determinacy are necessary for inclusion in UNESCO's Intangible Cultural Heritage Register. Whether such registration with all involved conditions would be conducive to the further significance of the institution in Burundian society seems doubtful; that certain sclerosis and "museumization" can be associated with it has been shown by other examples from the African continent (see the contributions in this anthology and examples by Rowlands and De Jong 2007). Notably, recall the fact that cultural heritage is not passive, existing for mere preservation, but rather a living construction, "an active process of assembling a series of objects, places and practices that we choose to hold up as a mirror to the present, associated with a particular set of values that we wish to take with us into the future," as per the heritage scholar, Rodney Harrison (2013: 4).

In 1999, the process of rehabilitating the Bashingantahe began to be steered by several international NGOs under the leadership of the Catholic *Centre de recherche sur l'inculturation et le développement* (CRID), which in retrospect led to criticism. This process was broadly formalized—municipal and provincial councils of the Bashingantahe were established, including an anthem and charter, even a national holiday of "intahe" to be celebrated annually on February 23. The national Bashingantahe Council CNB was launched for a second time in 2002, the chairmanship of which was handed over to the churchman Abbé Adrien Ntabona, who had studied and published on the Bashingantahe for many years. During the so-called rehabilitation of the institution, the UN Development Program (UNDP/PNUD) financed a broad-based project of identification of the Bashingantahe "traditionels" or "authentiques" on the hills from late 1999 to 2001, which it commissioned from several local organisms and international NGOs (Deslaurier 2003: 80, 88; Ingelaere and Kohlhagen 2012: 45). The hill-to-hill survey allowed for identifying "precisely 30,411 'traditionally' invested Bashingantahe" as Ingelaere and Kohlhagen report (2012: 45),²⁸ "whose authority is still recognized by the local population," according to a 2003 report by the International Crisis Group.²⁹ Thus "two generations" of Bashingantahe existed side by side, the "old style" alongside the "new style" (Deslaurier 2003: 84ff). The latter were accused in many cases of being appointed based on political criteria and being part of the "state aristocracy" who only sporadically left their urban surroundings to make their appearance on their hill of provenance, with largely unfamiliar circumstances, interests, and needs. This applies not least to the members of the new CNB.

Contrary to the Arusha Agreement, the Bashingantahe was not recognized as an official "transitional justice"; in the same way a "Truth and Reconciliation Commission" was not established. The politicization of the institution, which progressively fell into the hands of urban intellectual elites, led to the demise of the Bashingantahe as an official transitional justice policy. Ingelaere and Kohlhagen rightly note that this also had to do with the fact that the Hutu-dominated ruling party CNDD-FDD saw the new CNB and many civil society organizations as close to the urban Tutsi elites (2012: 45).

The official recognition of Bashingantahe has quickly come to its limits. A new law of the organization of the municipal government was enacted in 2005, creating new "Hill and Neighborhood Councils" to be appointed by universal suffrage.³⁰ Ntabona speaks of

a parallel institution, although he explicitly does not want this to be understood as a “nationalization” of the Bushingantahe. While the various revisions of the Municipal Act up to 2010 created state legal structures and courts at the level of the “grandes collines,” the “renewed Bushingantahe” initiative by the CNB focused on the “petite colline,” the small hill *agacimbiri*, to be as close as possible to the population.³¹⁾ While the new, officialized “grand-hill councils” were perceived to be staffed by people from the ruling CNDD-FDD party (and, like the former party committee members, were also figuratively referred to as “elected Bushingantahe”), the previously appointed Bushingantahe continued to be associated with the old unity party UPRONA (Ingelaere and Kohlhagen 2012: 46). Finally, it is crucial to mention that a law on the organization and powers of the judiciary, enacted in 2005, formally put an end to the function of (old-style) Bushingantahe as auxiliaries to the courts.³²⁾ Since the 2010 revision of the Municipal Act, the decisions of the Bushingantahe no longer have the force of law by removing the legal requirement that parties must bring their civil matters before the Bushingantahe before being heard by the municipal court.³³⁾

4. Conclusion

How must the efforts and attempts at revival and re-ordering be assessed? What have they resulted in? Efforts by the respective political regimes to use the local authority structure cannot be surprising. Evidently, the Bushingantahe dates from the time of the sacred kingship, where it helped to regulate the social life of the distinctly rural local communities characterized by scattered settlements. How should it be possible to transfer this institution to an increasingly densely populated, partly urban population under the guidance of the central government without far-reaching changes? The two attempts at modernization in this direction at the beginning of the 1990s and again from 1999 and 2002 have ultimately had little success (cf. Deslaurier 2003: 90).

From the mythical idealization of the Bushingantahe, it is often only a small step towards the thesis of the causal connection between the existence of the Bushingantahe and banishing social and ethnic conflicts—that before independence and until 1965, given the well-established existence of the Bushingantahe councils, ethnic conflicts never occurred.³⁴⁾ Although this conclusion contains correct elements (locally supported institutions legitimized from below work against instability and social conflict), it is premature to deduce, guided by an overly mechanistic-technocratic attitude, that the Bushingantahe can be revived as a ready-made set-piece to achieve reconciliation and social harmony. All recent recourse suffered from the same weakness: The Bushingantahe, mostly reanimated and installed in a dirigiste rush, were not legitimized from below but exclusively from above; they were not invested in this function bottom-up by the local community in a long, step-by-step process. Rather, they were appointed by the authorities in a decidedly top-down procedure. Crucially, they were not accountable to the local community but to the state authorities.

The rapid recourse to the Bushingantahe contrasts with the scarce knowledge about the functioning and basics of this local jurisdictional system. Unfortunately, there are

hardly any detailed scientific studies on this subject to date. Although there were considerable regional differences, the holders of Mushingantahe status in traditional society went through years of learning and probation before being appointed by the local community, intended to ensure aspirants possessed the expected qualities and remained accountable to their community as hill notables. The lack of interest in these qualities accords with the local, rural population being largely ignored, with no thought to involve them in rehabilitating the institution (Naniwe-Kaburahe 2008: 169).

What remains? Despite all the changes and instrumentalizations across the various historical periods and political regimes, the institution has not wholly lost its credibility (Naniwe-Kaburahe 2008: 160). Ingelaere and Kohlhagen argue that the underlying principles of the institution as “a social imaginary”³⁵⁾ and “an organizing principle of social existence” have been little affected (2012: 42; 46ff). Although this institution is now largely broken and no longer appears in its old form, it remains meaningful to adult Burundians. Indeed, it still determines the conception of authority in general and is at the root of the concept of authority that permeated rural life until the mid-1970s. Its importance has already emerged from the fact that the post-colonial republican state tried to capture this institution and emulate it more closely on several occasions, if only by adopting the outer attire of the Bushingantahe, its vocabulary, and some modalities for the investiture of the representatives of this grassroots authority. The continuing relevance of the institution and the social imageries associated with it is also evidenced by the common distinction between “real” and “fake” and “old” and “new” Bashingantahe, which Ingelaere and Kohlhagen note (2012: 47). Bashingantahe remain the first to be approached for advice and resolution at the level of day-to-day conflicts. According to Ingelaere and Kohlhagen, local conflict resolution is proceeding in a similarly ritualized manner nowadays: The Bashingantahe reinforce their argumentation and possibly decisions by tapping their *intahe* on the ground,³⁶⁾ often using proverbs and, at the end of the session, inviting the parties in conflict to a joint beer-drinking with straws from a gourd, offered by the party requesting the Bashingantahe. However, the Bashingantahe’s authority today is generally tarnished and no longer recognized, often inducing the fact that their intervention no longer leads to an all-around recognized solution (Ingelaere and Kohlhagen 2012: 46f).

All the values and traits of immaterial cultural heritage expressed around the Bushingantahe, or “social imaginaries,” as per Ingelaere and Kohlhagen, are part of Burundi’s cultural foundations and continue to impregnate everyday culture today in a wide range of spheres. However, the establishment of the Bushingantahe as a local authority structure has largely disintegrated or exists only in a diluted form with all possible regional differences. After repeated instrumentalizations, reinterpretations, and institutional violations, it would be presumptuous to believe that it could be brought back to life in its old form via a few decrees. After all, it has been discredited to a large extent by multiple trivializations under the Republic (see Naniwe-Kaburahe 2008: 175). Further, there are now decades-long turmoil and cycles of violence, inducing recurring regroupings and multiple expulsions with the anomic conditions associated with them, even on the most remote hills. Nevertheless, its strengths, especially the regulation of the

local space, proven in a different context, remain a powerful model that continues to exist latently in the background. In a post-conflict society, this model is important and should not be underestimated in the search for possible solutions for social life as a significant part of the intangible heritage, even if it is only a moral and cultural reference point.

Attempts to revive the Bushingantahe should be considered critically against this backdrop. Caution of too much idealization of the Bushingantahe, as found particularly in urban areas, is advised. In the countryside, farmers can hardly afford to step back from reality and indulge in wishful thinking. Their perception of the Bushingantahe has been greatly influenced by how this institution has functioned in reality since the 1970s. Through these transformations, Bushingantahe has been considerably emptied of its content. Before any re-use, the issue of which content and competencies are required to bridge the gaps is essential. However, it can only be successful if the long and changing history of Bushingantahe is examined. The answer will be determined by the broader political context and depends on the state's adherence to its dirigiste and autocratic claims, especially at the local level, and the scope for democratizing political life at the grassroots level. In any case, it is reasonable to conclude that the reissue of the pre-colonial Bushingantahe will certainly not be pure and simple.

Notes

- 1) The study data are drawn from field research in Burundi conducted from June 1988 to July 1989 and subsequent visits in 1994, 2013 and 2016. The study was funded by the Swiss Agency for Development and Cooperation and by the Swiss National Science Foundation. Many thanks to these two institutions and to the University of Burundi for their assistance and intellectual support to the research. The article resumes and extends my earlier publications from 1992 and 1995. Without the exchange with the numerous interlocutors in Burundi, in the city and countryside, this work would not have materialized. This gratitude goes along with the usual disclaimer: The responsibility for what has been stated remains mine alone. Finally, my very special thanks go to Taku Iida of Osaka's National Museum of Ethnology, Japan (Minpaku) and its Center for Cultural Resource Studies for all the valuable feedback, numerous comments, and guidance through the entire editorial process and the anonymous peer reviewers and copy editors for rendering the text to be much more reader-friendly.
- 2) At this point, it is worth recalling the terminology in Kirundi, the local language. While the Kirundi prefix (*u*)*Bu*-[shingantahe] denotes the institution and the values associated with it, the prefix (*a*)*Ba*-[shingantahe] designates the people who hold or represent it (sing (*u*)*Mu*-[shingantahe]).
- 3) S. Deslauriers 2003: 79; Naniwe-Kaburahe 2008: 170.
- 4) Thus, article 178 of the 1992 constitution stipulated: "La commune est administrée par l'Assemblée communale, le Conseil communal et l'Administrateur communal élu par l'Assemblée communale. Ces institutions sont élues dans les conditions prévues par la loi. L'élection de ces organes se fonde sur *Ubushingantahe*, en dehors de la compétition des partis

politiques” (*The Municipality is administered by the Municipal Assembly, the Municipal Council and the Municipal Administrator elected by the Municipal Assembly. These institutions are elected in accordance with the law. The election of these bodies is based on Ubushingantahe, apart from the competition of political parties.* translation by the author).

- 5) “(...) l’omniprésence des partis politiques peut être un danger réel pour l’entente quotidienne des gens sur les collines. En introduisant l’esprit partisan qui est contraire à la convivialité coutumière, il y a risque que le voisin qui appartient à un parti concurrent soit perçu et traité comme un ennemi au lieu de le considérer comme un simple adversaire politique avec lequel il faut mener une compétition loyale. L’omniprésence des partis risque de compromettre un certain nombre de valeurs que devrait fonder la démocratie, notamment la paix sociale et l’unité nationale. (...) Dans la mesure où elle risque d’entretenir une agitation sur les collines, l’omniprésence des partis peut exercer un rôle de diversion sur la population en la détournant de ses véritables problèmes (...). (...) Dans notre pays [le] système [des partis] constitue une expérience nouvelle. Les réalités sociales et la tradition du Burundi nous commandent de choisir à la fois un système de représentation inspiré de l’âme et de la culture burundaises et compatible avec l’exigence d’institutions modernes. C’est pourquoi la Commission Constitutionnelle propose que la démocratisation à la base se fonde sur l’institution d’Ubushingantahe qui, pendant des siècles, a servi de socle à la paix sociale, à la justice, à l’entente et à la convivialité des Burundais sur nos collines” (République du Burundi. Commission constitutionnelle. août 1991: 120f; cf. décembre 1991: 17).
- 6) The political capital was returned to Gitega at the center of the country in 2019 under the Nkurunziza regime. Gitega was the capital under German colonial administration from 1912 until 1916.
- 7) According to UN statistics, Burundi’s urbanization rate of 13% in 2018 was one of the lowest in the world; see <https://population.un.org/wup/Country-Profiles> (retrieved 30 November 2020)
- 8) Therefore, it is not quite adequate to speak of a “hill-level tribunal,” as Dexter and Ntahombaye (2005: 15) do; to call it “informal” (Dexter and Ntahombaye 2005: 15) is at most justified by the fact that it is not (anymore) recognized as part of the official, state judicial system.
- 9) In Rwanda, another common grass-roots local jurisdiction is called *gacaca* (lit.: “meadow, lawn,” and figuratively “gathering of neighbors [sitting on the grass]”), a “people’s forum for dispute resolution” (see Reyntjens 1990; Rettig 2008). Of particular interest to us is the point that “although *gacaca* (...) is a traditional conflict-solving process, these [the councils revived and updated after the 1994 genocide] are in reality newly created institutions without effective links to the past” (Reyntjens 2001: 11; n30).
- 10) According to recent research in oral traditions, there are indications that the term Bu-/Bashingantahe has only been known since the period of Mwezi Gisabo, who ruled in the second half of the 19th century.
- 11) *Imvúgakuri*, “a sincere, truthful and loyal person, a man of honour” (Rodegem 1970: 354).
- 12) (*U*)*mugabo*, “man, the adult male, in the full sense of the word; the husband; the warrior, and also the arbitrator in charge of settling disputes; i.e. any man who is respected” (Rodegem 1970: 95).
- 13) Sing.: *umukungu*, probably derived from *inkungu* (sometimes also *igikungu*), “hornless adult

bovide/heifer that has not yet been covered by a bull,” and from the verb *gukungera*, “to put in a state of waiting, of latency; to observe while waiting for something to happen” (cf. Rodegem 1966: 8f, 1970: 247). Thus, *umukungu* denotes someone who is in a state of waiting or, more precisely, is waiting to reach a higher social rank. This connotation of latency implies that an *umukungu* is generally a person lacking something and has not yet found it while living in a non-stabilized situation (cf. Ntabona 1985: 300, who speaks of a “very pejorative connotation in common parlance”).

- 14) *Gusohora umwāna*.
- 15) Derived from the verb *guheka*; the verb is mainly used for the woman carrying an infant on her back; in some places the expressions *umuvyeyi w'intahe* or *sé w'intahe*, procreator/genitor (also “patron”) or father of the *intahe* stick were also used.
- 16) In Ntabona’s words, this was “a way of soliciting popular support, since, from that day on, he [the invested] became the father (*umuvyeyi*) of his fellow men in the community” (1985: 280).
- 17) It is not enough to say that the Bushingantahe, as a reflection of the asymmetries and social hierarchies that characterized the pre-colonial society, also included a certain ethnic dimension; these inequalities of access opportunities were determined by elements such as clan or even lineage membership.
- 18) Sometimes also called *abashingantahe babunyoye* (those who have been drinking for a long time).
- 19) The information given here is taken from the interviews during my field research in 1988/1989.
- 20) On the subject of administrative transformations during the first phase of Belgian colonization, see Gahama 1983: “From a Burundi with very fragmented units and imprecise boundaries, one passes in less than five years to a country with solid constituencies” (p.73, cf. pp.64f; translation by the author, TL).
- 21) His name and the extent of the territory under his charge underwent continuous changes per the successive provisions of the central administration. Until the Second Republic, in reference to the old system of the municipal council, he was called by his official title of “councilor,” a term still widely used in everyday language today. Since March 1988, he was officially called “chef de secteur” or “chef de collines” (*umukuru w'imitumba*), and he had oversight over two or three hills. These chefs de collines were salaried for the very first time; thus, their number was kept as low as possible.
- 22) Estimates put the death toll at around 300,000. Moreover, at the time of the Arusha Agreement, there were about 800,000 refugees, primarily in neighboring countries, especially Tanzania, and about 300,000 internally displaced persons (e.g., Lemarchand 2009: 153; 162).
- 23) The décret-loi n° 1/001/97 of 3 January 1997 established the organization, composition, and functioning of a “Bashingantahe Council for National Unity and Reconciliation” (CNB). The decree of 21 March 1997 (No.100/050/97) appointed the members of this council. The CNB had 40 members, including eight women (Deslaurier 2003: 93, n47).
- 24) The study draws primarily from information by Christine Deslaurier, who distinguishes three phases of the revaluation of the Bushingantahe between 1988/89 and 2003 (Deslaurier 2003: 78ff).
- 25) It included multilateral organizations such as UNDP/PNUD, UNHCR, and non-governmental organizations.

- 26) *Consejo de Hombres Buenos*, 4.COM 13.70, <https://ich.unesco.org/en/RL/irrigators-tribunals-of-the-spanish-mediterranean-coast-the-council-of-wise-men-of-the-plain-of-murcia-and-the-water-tribunal-of-the-plain-of-valencia-00171> (retrieved 18 August 2021)
- 27) 11.COM 10.B.11, <https://ich.unesco.org/en/RL/gada-system-an-indigenous-democratic-socio-political-system-of-the-oromo-01164> (retrieved 20 August 2021)
- 28) They refer to Weiss et al (2003).
- 29) The report of the International Crisis Group noted the number of 34,000 “traditionally invested” Bashingantahe. ICG, Rapport Afrique n° 70, 7 octobre 2003, pp. 12–13, quoted in Deslaurier (2003: 88).
- 30) Municipal Law 1/016 from 20 April 2005, in particular Article 37, revised 2010.
- 31) Personal communication Adrien Ntabona, 29 April 2021 and 18 June 2021; cf. Sibomana 2021.
- 32) Law 1/08, March 17, 2005, cited in Ingelaere and Kohlhagen (2012: 41; 46).
- 33) Law 1/02 of January 25, 2010, see Ingelaere and Kohlhagen (2012: 41).
- 34) This thesis was also directly included in the “Accord d’Arusha pour la Paix et la Réconciliation au Burundi” of 2000, p.15 (cf. Nindorera 2003: 2; 12).
- 35) A “social imaginary is closely related to what Pierre Bourdieu calls habitus,” something “carried in images, stories, and legends” (Ingelaere and Kohlhagen 2021: 49, n37; here they refer to Charles Taylor “Two Theories of Modernity”, in Gaonkar 2001).
- 36) Interestingly, elected hill councils do not do so, as reported by Ingelaere and Kohlhagen (2012: 47, n32).

References

- Accord d’Arusha pour la paix et la réconciliation au Burundi (AAPRB)
2000 Protocoles I et II, 28 août, Arusha, Tanzanie.
- Baranyanka, C.
2009 *Le Burundi face à la Croix et la Bannière*. Belgique, s.l.
- Chrétien, J.-P. and A. Guichaoua
1988 Burundi, d’une République à l’autre: bilans et enjeux. *Politique Africaine* (29): 87–94.
- Chrétien, J.-P. and G. Le Jeune
1986 Élections et sociologie politique. Note sur les législatives de 1981 et 1982 au Rwanda et au Burundi. *Revue Tiers-Monde* 27(106): 331–338.
- Delacauw, A.
1936 Droit coutumier des Barundi. *CONGO. Revue générale de la colonie belge*. Tome 1. n°4 (2^{ème} partie), pp. 481–522. Bruxelles: J. Goemaere.
- Deslaurier, C.
2003 Le «bushingantahe» peut-il réconcilier le Burundi? *Politique Africaine* (92): 76–96.
- Dexter, T. and P. Ntahombaye
2005 *The Role of Informal Justice Systems in Fostering the Rule of Law in Post-Conflict Situations: The Case of Burundi*. Geneva: Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue.
- Gahama, J.
1983 *Le Burundi sous administration belge. La période du mandat, 1919–1939*. Paris: C. R. A. / Karthala/A. C. C. T.

- Gaonkar, D. P. (ed.)
2001 *Alternative Modernities*, vol. 11. Durham, NC: Duke University Press.
- Guichaoua, A.
1989 Ordre social et “regression” ethnique: la crise de la société paysanne. In J.-P. Chrétien, A. Guichaoua, and G. Le Jeune. *La crise d’août 1988 au Burundi* (Cahiers du C.R.A., no 6), pp. 59–76. Paris: Editions Afera/distribution Karthala.
- Hakizimana, I.
1976 *L’institution des “Bashingantahe” au Burundi*. Bujumbura: Université du Burundi/École Normale Supérieure, Mémoire.
- Hallpike, C. R.
1976 The origins of the Borana Gada system (book review). *Africa: Journal of the International African Institute* 46(1): 48–56.
- Harrison, R.
2013 *Heritage: Critical Approaches*. London: Routledge.
- Ingelaere, B. and D. Kohlhaagen
2012 Situating Social Imaginaries in Transitional Justice: The *Bushingantahe* in Burundi, *The International Journal of Transitional Justice* 6(1): 40–59.
- International Crisis Group
2003 Réfugiés et déplacés au Burundi: désamorcer la bombe foncière, Nairobi, Bruxelles, ICG, Rapport Afrique n° 70, 7 octobre.
- Laely, T.
1995 *Autorität und Staat in Burundi*. Berlin: Reimer.
1992 Le destin du Bushingantahe. Transformations d’une structure locale d’autorité au Burundi. *Genève-Afrique* 30(2): 75–98.
- Le Jeune, G.
1989 L’UPRONA dans la crise d’août 1988. In J.-P. Chrétien, A. Guichaoua, and G. Le Jeune. *La crise d’août 1988 au Burundi* (Cahiers du C. R. A., no 6), pp. 77–89. Paris: Editions Afera/distribution Karthala.
- Lemarchand, R.
2009 *The Dynamics of Violence in Central Africa*. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press.
- Manirakiza, M.
1990 *La fin de la monarchie burundaise (1962–1966)*. Paris and Bruxelles: Le Mât de Misaine.
- Mworoha, E.
1977 *Peuples et rois de l’Afrique des lacs. Le Burundi et les royaumes voisins au XIXe siècle*. Dakar and Abidjan: Les Nouvelles Editions Africaines.
- Mworoha, E. (ed.)
1987 *Histoire du Burundi des origines à la fin du XIXe siècle*. Paris: Hatier.
- Naniwe-Kaburahe, A.
2008 The Institution of Bashingantahe in Burundi. In L. Huyse and M. Salter (eds.) *Traditional Justice and Reconciliation after Violent Conflict: Learning from African Experiences*, pp. 149–179 (print pp. 165–195). Stockholm: International Institute for

- Democracy and Electoral Assistance. http://www.idea.int/publications/traditional_justice/upload/Traditional_Justice_and_Reconciliation_after_Violent_Conflict.pdf (retrieved 30 July 2020)
- Nindorera, A.
2003 Ubushingantahe as a Base for Political Transformation in Burundi. Working Paper No.102, p. 32. Consortium on Gender, Security, and Human Rights, Boston.
- Ntabona, A.
1985 Le concept d'Umushingantahe et ses implications sur l'éducation de la jeunesse d'aujourd'hui au Burundi. *Au Coeur de l'Afrique*, 25(5): 263–301.
1999 *Itinéraire de la sagesse: Les Bashingantahe hier, aujourd'hui et demain au Burundi*, p. 303. Bujumbura: Ed. Centre de Recherches pour l'Inculturation et le Développement.
- République du Burundi, Commission constitutionnelle
1991 Rapport sur la démocratisation des institutions et de la vie politique au Burundi, Bujumbura, p. 43, 121. Bujumbura, Burundi.
- Rettig, M.
2008 Gacaca: Truth, Justice, and Reconciliation in Postconflict Rwanda? *African Studies Review* 51(3): 25–50. DOI: 10.1353/arw.0.0091
- Reyntjens, F.
1989 *Burundi 1972–1988. Continuité et changement* (Les Cahiers du CEDAF No.5). Bruxelles: Centre d'étude et de documentation africaines.
1990 Le gacaca ou la justice du gazon au Rwanda. *Politique Africaine* 40: 31–41.
2001 *Again at the Crossroads: Rwanda and Burundi, 2000–2001*. (Current African Issues 24), p. 25. Uppsala: Nordiska Afrikainstitutet.
- Rodegem, F. M.
1966 Structures judiciaires traditionnelles au Burundi. *Revue juridique de Droit écrit et coutumier du Rwanda et du Burundi* VI(1): 3–27.
1970 *Dictionnaire Rundi–Français*. Tervuren: Annales du Musée royale de l'Afrique centrale.
- Rowlands, M. and D. J. Ferdinand (eds.)
2007 Reconsidering Heritage and Memory. *Reclaiming Heritage. Alternative Imaginaries of Memory in West Africa*, pp. 13–29. New York: Routledge.
- Rutake, P.
1986 *Administration et développement communal. Le cas de la Commune Isale*. Bujumbura: CURDES.
- Sibomana, A.
2021 Ijambo inama nkuru y'abashingantahe... Ndongozo y'Uburundi, nos 739 et 740, 15 mars et 1^{er} avril 2021, Burundi.
- Spencer, P.
1985 Homo ascendens et homo hierarchicus. In M. Abélès and Ch. Collard (eds.) *Age, pouvoir et société en Afrique noire*, pp. 171–195. Paris: Karthala.
- Trouwborst, A. A.
1962 Burundi. In M. d' Hertefeldt, A. A. Trouwborst, and J. H. Scherer. *Les anciens royaumes de la zone interlacustre méridionale* (Rwanda, Burundi, Buha), pp. 113–169. London:

International African Institute (Part XIV of "Ethnographic Survey of Africa", edited by Daryll Forde). Tervuren, Belgique: Musée Royal de l'Afrique Centrale.

Weiss, P., C. Ntampaka, and R. Nzobambona

2003 Rapport de la mission indépendante d'évaluation du projet 'appui à la réhabilitation de l'institution d'Ubushingantaha', BDI/02/B01. Bujumbura, Schlumberger.

Burial Communities and the Undermining of Royalty in Colonial Africa¹⁾

John Mack

University of East Anglia

Funerary processes are a central part of the formation and sustaining of ideas of community and, thus, integral to ideas of shared “heritage,” which is among the concerns of this volume. Some of the reasons for this situation are fairly obvious and well-rehearsed in the anthropological literature. Death challenges the ideal of a continuous and unchanging order where ideas of community are forged. It occurs at unpredictable moments and introduces individual biological discontinuities that funerary processes seek to negate (e.g., as discussed by Bloch and Parry 1982: 223). In mortuary practices, the idea of society is partly in question. Establishing continuity at times of disjunction may not be straightforward; it may lead to protracted and conflictual situations, especially where questions of succession and inheritance are concerned. Nonetheless, funerary practice arguably contributes to forging and reaffirming a sense of common orientation in the face of challenging circumstances.

1. The Death of Rulers

Such contribution is especially true in the case of the demise of rulers where the stakes are the largest.²⁾ Since the dissemination of the influential writings of James Frazer, whose classic study, *The Golden Bough: A Study in Magic and Religion* (Frazer 1911–1918), was originally published in two volumes in 1890, the elaboration of the funerary rites of rulers has been considered critical to determining, reasserting, or reshaping the spiritual and political positioning of communities thrown into potential turmoil by royal death. For Frazer, the example of kings or chiefs to whom some special, often supernatural (or, in Frazer’s terms, “divine”) status is attributed was central. Particular attention was reserved in *The Golden Bough* for the role of human sacrifice in kingly funerary procedures, especially the murder or suicide of rulers, with numerous examples drawn from sub-Saharan African practice as it was understood at the end of the 19th century. Where the Classical examples that had first inspired Frazer’s interest had died out, the recent and, as it were, ongoing relationship between the death of rulers and sacrifice continued to be evident in accounts in different parts of Africa and provided a powerful contemporaneous trope in scholarly contexts and in justifying colonial interventions.

In the case of rulers, death itself is sometimes denied. Euphemism replaces blunt statements. Thus, a person’s death is not discussed directly, and names can be changed

such that the deceased is no longer referenced by the name they had in life. Care is exercised over such matters in many African societies where circumlocution often replaces the blunt assertion of the fact of a person's death, especially in the case of the "passing" (as expressed less harshly in English) of a ruler or chief. Thus, in the Akan language (of Ghana),

... the very act of dying is expressed by the verb *wu*. The substantive of *wu* is *owu*, indicating death, decease, demise. Thus it is linguistically correct to announce the death of a person with the blunt statement *wawu*, he is dead. But the verb *wu* is scarcely used in specific instances with reference to persons of rank, nobility, and close relations. (Bookman-Amisshah 1986: 77)

A significant number of the proverbs for which the Asante are renowned concern the death of significant people. Indeed, in the past, it was potentially a capital offense to announce directly that the king was dead. I recall being in the United States when the Asantehene Otumfo Opoku Ware II (the ruler of a major Akan people) died in 1999. Some Ghanaian acquaintances felt considerable unease at the prominence given to his obituary in the *New York Times* and other major newspapers. Traditionally, the news should be passed round in an indirect format, such as "the great tree has fallen or been uprooted," "a large umbrella [is] gone," "he is absent elsewhere," or "he has departed or gone out" (Rattray 1927: 108). Other aphorisms refer to funerary processes. Thus, the implications of the phrase "a stool has fallen" would be widely understood as referring to the practice where the body of the deceased ruler was washed on a stool before burial; the stool would then be turned on its side and blackened by offerings (including, historically, human blood) and smoked. Thereafter, it acted as a memorial shrine. Other euphemisms deploy the same symbolic significance implicit in referencing trees and umbrellas; that is, the cooling protection afforded the people by their ruler and, by contrast, the heat and desiccation induced by his absence. The historian, Thomas C. McCaskie, reports an Asante funerary dirge that includes the following lines:

Nana [the Asantehene] has removed his umbrella
We shall be scorched by the sun.
(McCaskie 1989: 425)

Other practices found elsewhere in Africa include referencing the deceased by names they did not have in life. Thus, each stage in the life cycle of the ruler is marked by a name change: his birth name is altered when he is installed as chief or king, and, at his death, he is given another name, potentially confusing field anthropologists seeking to study kinship systems and rules of succession. This practice occurs, for instance, among the Antaisaka in the southeast of Madagascar, suggesting that such authority is regarded as enduring—hence the effort to suppress death, even in linguistic etiquette.

In the past, when the Asantehene died, the Queen Mother would send a message to several wives from the royal harem to prepare themselves to accompany the king to the

spirit world. It was considered an honor to be identified for this role, and others might offer themselves to join those selected, compelling their relatives to assist by killing them. The dispatch of royalty was achieved through strangulation to avoid spilling blood (a method practiced in other parts of the continent). 27 wives of one 19th century Asantehene accompanied him in death (Rattray 1927: 432). Attendants, from caterers to those caring for substantive requirements or merely providing minor domestic conveniences (e.g., carrying a bathmat or sponge), also died to care for the needs of the Asantehene in the netherworld (Rattray 1927: 107).

However, the first thing is to ensure that the powers to be passed on are intact. Thus, many kingdoms seek to ensure that the ruler is not enfeebled in any way, thereby impairing his spiritual constitution. Hence, to achieve this, some in the past have practiced regicides. In Frazer's words, "The least relaxation of his vigilance, the smallest abatement of [a ruler's] strength of limb or skill, put him in jeopardy; grey hairs might seal his death warrant" (quoted in Arens 1984: 355). It is reported that the Kuba king in what is now the Democratic Republic of Congo would once have been killed if he showed any physical weakness, though a crippled king in the 20th century posed a particular challenge when faced with expectations that were changing under the influence of colonial rule. Among the Jukun in northern Nigeria, nothing was left to chance: chiefs were appointed for seven years and, thereafter, killed. The neighboring Rukuba saw the seven years as a probationary period and would depose (though not kill) chiefs who did not measure up (De Heusch 1969: 99).

Elsewhere, precautions are taken that, as the ruler ceases to breathe, his powers are not inadvertently expelled at the same time. Blocking orifices is a relatively common practice. Among the Bari in modern-day South Sudan, C. G. Seligman recorded a particularly rigorous process. The body of a rain-maker was sealed up when he died with the explicit intention of ensuring that his spirit did not escape, potentially bringing sickness to his people. This act was done by plugging all possible points through which the spirit might escape. One of Seligman's correspondents reported:

When the rain-maker is dead, he is plugged, his ears are plugged, his nose is plugged, his eye is plugged, his mouth is plugged, he is plugged, his fingers are plugged. And then he is buried. It is done thus so that ... the spirits may not go out, so the son may manage the father so that he obeys (him), so that the spirits obey the son. (Seligman 1932: 292)

Among the Shilluk (also in South Sudan), if the king should become infirm, he is sealed up, literally, by walling in his body while still alive so that he is never seen again. Among the Bemba in northern Zambia, the ruler, the Chitimukulu, was strangled so that his last breath should not dispel the spirits that sustain the chieftaincy (see Richards 1968; Vaughan 2008). The medieval phrase found in English, French, Spanish, and Italian, "The king is dead, long live the king," is apposite. The common idea focuses less on the fact that the king is dead and more on the requirement that the kingship must be preserved. Regicides remove uncertainty and unpredictability from the process and are, historically, among the methods of ensuring continuity.

2. Colonial Intervention

Frazer, of course, was forming his ideas against the background of developing colonial ambitions, especially in Africa. The last decade of the 19th century saw a surge in efforts by several European nations to establish hegemony in Africa, directly or indirectly. The central question here is, what happens when an external authority intervenes? How has the sense of communal purpose fared before such tampering with indigenous practices, the imposed discontinuities of the colonial era, leading to subsequent globalizing tendencies and new expectations? It is partly a question of how colonial authorities sought to manipulate practices they purported to find disagreeable—indeed, seeking to eradicate practices such as sacrifice was one justification for the colonial process. Beyond that, it is also a matter of what happened when rulers were exiled, not least when they returned, whether alive but with diminished authority, or for reburial after dying in exile. How did ideas of community and “heritage” stand in that context? This study focuses on two examples involving the exile of rulers: the deportation of the Merina Queen from Madagascar and the Asantehene from Ghana; one at the behest of French colonial authorities and the other, British; one where the Queen died and was buried abroad, her body only subsequently returning much later for reburial, and the other where the live monarch returned from exile and, when he ultimately died, his mortuary processes were conducted in Ghana.

As elsewhere, the emergence of colonialism profoundly restructured the geography and politics of sub-Saharan Africa. The effects are evident from at least the deliberations of the Berlin Conference of the 1884–1885 period onward and, in some regions, arguably from way before that date. It led to the drawing of lines on European maps of Africa, reifying definitions of territorial boundaries where previously indigenous understandings of the geographical reach of states and chieftaincies had been constantly in flux. It dismantled local systems of authority, imposing external governance or manipulating political or religious systems of leadership so they were no longer autonomous. Thus, it also affected fundamental changes in mortuary practice, sometimes deliberately as an attempt to impose Christian values and practice in line with missionary perceptions of “correct” behavior, sometimes as a deliberate act of suppression, and sometimes as unintended consequence. The exiling of traditional rulers was one element in the advent of colonialism. Among the first to suffer exile was the deposed Zulu ruler Cetshwayo, dispatched first to Cape Town and subsequently to London in 1879. For the late 19th century, especially the late 1890s, the list grew longer. In Ghana, Otumfo Nana Prempeh I was exiled first to Cape Coast Castle in 1896, then along the coast to Elmina before being deported to Sierra Leone; eventually, in 1900, he was moved to the Seychelles in the Indian Ocean (Figure 1). There, accompanied by his exiled mother, father, close family, and entourage, a so-called Asante camp, comprising approximately 75 persons, was established on the main island of Mahe. Also on the Seychelles by then were the Kabaka of Buganda and his neighbor in Uganda, the Kabarega of Bunyoro, both sent into exile from East Africa in 1899. For his part, the Oba of Benin in southern Nigeria was exiled to Calabar on the Niger Delta after the British Punitive Expedition of 1897.




Figure 1 The Asantehene, Otumfo Nana Prempeh I, being boarded onto a ship in 1896 on the coast of what is now Ghana to be taken into exile. From R.S.S. Baden-Powell, *The Downfall of Prempeh* (1898), p. 149.

The French likewise used the instrument of exile when faced with what they perceived to be unfavorable responses to colonial intentions. Béhanzin, the King of Abomey in what is now the Republic of Benin (formerly Dahomey), was exiled by the French to Martinique in 1894. Samory Touré, the founder of the Wassoulou (or Mandinka) Empire, extending from what is now Sierra Leone through Guinea and Mali to northern Ivory Coast, was captured and exiled to Gabon in 1898. Gabon was also the first place of exile of Sheikh Amadu Bamba, who established the influential, but essentially pacifist, Mouride brotherhood in Senegal. He was subsequently moved to Mauritania in 1903. In Madagascar, resistance to French colonization led to the exile of Queen Ranaivalona III and her husband, Prime Minister Rainilaiarivony, first to Réunion in 1897 and then in 1899 to Algeria.

Some of those dispatched overseas died in exile; others eventually returned to resume a diminished role in the political and ritual life of their former kingdoms. Colonial attempts to wrest authority from exiled rulers involved restricting and sometimes fracturing former hierarchies. However, royal authority was always invested in more than a simple political process, and governance was a matter of ritual procedure, the inherent “power” of certain types of proclamation, and the means by which continuities with ancestral authority were asserted. Therefore, mere exile was not necessarily the end of an indigenous sense of community focused on the ruler. The critical issue from an indigenous perspective was to ensure the continuity of royal powers. From a colonial perspective, it was to rein them in and, where the model of indirect rule was the preferred strategy, to manipulate them to colonial advantage. The emergent question surrounded the issue of what to do about the repatriation of rulers, whether alive or dead. If ideas of common heritage were invested in the kingship, then managing the fate of the person or body of the ruler and the method of their burial provided a critical moment in

determining the idea of community and heritage that might be engendered under colonial rule and beyond.

3. The Exile of Queen Ranavalona III

General Galliéni arrived in Madagascar in 1896 as Governor-General with instructions to rule through the existing structures of monarchy and aristocracy established by the Merina in their conquest of much of the island in the 19th century. However, he was determined to do otherwise. By February 1897, in direct contradiction of his orders from Paris to maintain the monarchy but restrict its influence to Imerina, he decided to depose and exile the Queen. A letter was sent to her to that effect. In the middle of the night, she left, spirited away on a palanquin on the arduous journey to the coast and thence by ship to the neighboring island of La Réunion. She was permitted to take her personal belongings and jewelry with her but was obliged to leave behind her crown, scepter, and, ironically, the Grand Cross of the Legion d'Honneur, which she had previously been awarded by the French government. She was in Réunion for two years before being transferred to Algiers, where she lived in a large villa overlooking the town, receiving occasional visits from well-disposed British missionaries from the London Missionary Society. She died there in 1917.

However, this was only a part of Galliéni's strategy. The ritual of the royal bath (*fandroana*), an annual rite during which royalty dispersed blessings to the citizenry, which was repeated by heads of cantons throughout the kingdom, was suspended (Molet 1956; Bloch 1992). The annual festival introduced in its place was the French national celebration of Bastille Day on July 14. However, most radically of all, Galliéni moved to de-sacralize Ambohimanga, the principal necropolis of the Merina royalty outside the capital, by removing the remains of the kings and queens from their traditional resting place and re-entombing them at the Rova (palace) of Antananarivo. Below is an eye-witness account:

On the night of Monday, the 15th of March 1897, the residents in the northern quarter of the Capital were startled from their sleep at a little after midnight by the unusual sound of bands of music and a great concourse of people passing by their houses... numbers of people being in palanquins or on horseback, and a very much larger number on foot; at intervals were bearers carrying some large and evidently weighty articles, while smaller things were being borne in the hands or on the shoulders of a large proportion of the crowd. Bands of music headed and closed and were in the midst of the procession, which extended for at least a mile first to last. We wondered what it could all mean, but we soon heard that the weighty objects were the huge silver coffins of some of the old Hova [that is, Merina] kings and queens, containing their corpses; that the numerous articles carried by so many were the various kinds of property buried in the royal tombs; and that the large number of people in palanquins or on horseback were the chief people of the country (at least of the Hova tribe), who were escorting with all respect the remains of their ancient sovereigns to their new resting-place in Antananarivo." (Sibree 1898)



Photo 1 The remains of Queen Ranavalona III being returned to Madagascar in 1938, 21 years after she died in exile in Algiers. (Photograph courtesy of the late the Revd. J. Hardyman)

Two 19th century rulers were already buried at the Rova in Antananarivo.³⁾ When their graves were opened to admit the new corpses, their burial goods were removed. The grave goods were then added to those of all the rulers brought from the countryside and subsequently displayed in public view in what was described as the new national museum. Thus, an astonishing act of colonial grave-robbing was effected. In 1938, over twenty years after her death, the remains of Ranavalona III were returned to Madagascar and reburied in Antananarivo (Photo 1).

Tampering with the royal dead in these ways was a hegemonic act with profound implications hard to imagine being countenanced were the ruler still in place. Royal burial practices differed from those of ordinary villagers. Traditionally, no form of secondary burial was practiced for royalty. Andrianampoinimerina, the founder of the Merina kingdom, died in 1810. He was buried in a silver coffin made from melted-down Maria Theresa dollars, placed in a wooden canoe-like container formerly used for the burial of rulers. Such royal burial was a one-off event, concluded within weeks.

Another difference from the practice customary for the burial of commoners was that the bodies of the deceased Merina royalty were buried individually rather than in a communal vault. As a royal burial place and the center of Andrianampoinimerina's original kingdom, Ambohimanga's significance as the principal ritual center of the kingdom was powerfully affirmed. In principle, once entombed, the bodies of royalty remained individuated rather than mingled with others, as in the practice of communal burial for everyone else. They were not to be disturbed; there was no secondary reburial

process, as was otherwise the norm (Bloch 1971). In the case of commoners, the deceased is buried once, but some years later, the body is removed from its resting place and, amid great celebration, is rewrapped and paraded around the tomb or sometimes the wider district before being re-entombed in its final resting place. The process is called *famadihana* and ensures the flow of blessings from deceased ancestors, considered as central to sustaining the vitality of the living (Mack 1986: pt. 2).

Thus, reassembling the dead in tombs, albeit at the royal site of the Rova of Antananarivo, was in effect to subject royalty to the procedures of ordinary citizens and symbolically dismantle statehood by grouping like common people those who should be kept separate. Furthermore, to subject the belongings buried with royalty to the sight of the early 20th century “museum visitor” was to expose the sacred to the secular gaze as a further act of desecration.

Galliéni exiled the Queen and effectively dissolved the monarchy. He also dismantled the supporting symbolic system, which sustained the authority of the royalty and aristocracy, though the “Hova” (the aristocracy) are reported as going along with the arrangements. The return of Ranaivalona’s remains when it was permitted 21 years after her death was at the behest of the colonial authority. Again, in defiance of customary practice, her remains were placed together with those of an earlier Queen, Rasoherina, rather than buried in a personal tomb (Photo 2). Her body had been appropriated for purposes other than maintaining royal suzerainty, as had those of her predecessors. A Republic ensued where monarchy was erased as effectively as in the French Revolution. There are now no publicly recognized members of the Merina royal dynasty.



Photo 2 The royal tombs with the remains of the late 18th and 19th century Merina rulers reassembled at the Rova (royal palace) in Antananarivo, Madagascar. A fire in 1995 destroyed most of the tombs and only the remains of Ranaivalona III were saved. They have since been reburied in the traditional royal burial site at Ambohimanga.
(Photograph courtesy of the late the Revd. J. Hardyman)

However, with the monarchy disbanded and the court effectively neutralized, it is notable that the scale and elaboration of the *famadihana* process escalated for commoners as for members of the former court. The practice of *hira gasy*, popular musical entertainment with satirical and moralizing themes, was developed in the context of the second burial process. It is tempting to suggest that this intensification of burial and reburial practices emerged at a time when the practices associated with royalty were suspended. Although an anti-colonial movement emerged in the immediate wake of the colonial takeover (and was one of the principal factors that led to the exile of the Queen),⁴⁾ *hira gasy*, with a focus on burial practice, contributed to recreating a sense of community at a time when the flow of blessings traditionally passed from the ruler to the populace through the *fandroana* and other processes was threatened. It may also in part be related to the effects of labor movements in the colonial era, with people often dying far from their communal tomb and their bodies needing to be repatriated later, adding emphasis and significance to the secondary phase of the complete funerary cycle. However, in the context of the attempts to impose colonial government and remove the focus of the Merina state on the ruler and the court system, such elaboration of funerary practice acted to reinvigorate ideas of commonality, as they continue to do until the present day.

4. The Exile and Return of Prempeh I

In Ghana, the British took the Asante capital of Kumase in 1874 and burned the royal palace to the ground. The Asantehene, Prempeh I, was detained by the British in 1896 at the behest of Major Baden-Powell (better known these days as the founder of the international scouting movement) and sent into exile overseas, where he remained for 27 years (Figure 2). When he returned to Ghana in November 1924, he appeared to have changed. He was literate, an Anglican convert, and monogamous. He returned as a private citizen. However, his status was ambiguous. After all, he returned to Kumase, the Asante capital, and (to all intents and purposes) was regarded by traditionalists as ready to resume the role of Asantehene within the context of colonial rule. Further, to educated Asante people, his conversion to Christianity might have seemed to portend a move they would welcome toward modernity (Akyeampong 1999). Either way, the fact that the British had finally agreed to his return implied that his authority would have to be acknowledged, and his status as *Mr. Edward Prempeh* would become unsustainable (Photo 3). The problem was confronted gradually; by March 1926, a diplomatic compromise was in place. Prempeh was appointed Kumasihene, the ruler of his capital at Kumase—a title he had previously held at the same time as being Asantehene. Without formally acceding to full entitlement, his position at the center of the Asante life was effectively restored.

Among the tasks Prempeh set for himself in this new role was to restore the unity of the kingdom by attending to the disposition of the royal dead. In a letter from 1927, Prempeh bemoans the state of the royal graves under colonial rule in terms that are very redolent of contemporary understandings of ideas of heritage. In a letter he sent to the




Figure 2 An illustration from the colonial perspective of the Asantehene's acquiescence in British rule shortly before being sent into exile. From R.S.S. Baden-Powell, *The Downfall of Prempeh* (1898), p. 126.



Photo 3 A historic photograph of the Asantehene returning from exile as 'Mr.' Prempeh. *West Africa* VII 406 (November 8, 1924), p. 1243.

colonial authorities, we read: "I find now as I wrote to you that cemeteries at Hamanho and Adjwama burial grove are unsuitable by reason [of] long years of ... [neglect]. The Hemanho in particular is encroached by the Court Building and is not suitable at all. It is a shaming thing ... that our Hallowed Dead are overlooked. We CANNOT FORGET them. They are our HEROES and HEROINES of Ashanti" (Otumfuo 2003: 182; capitalization original). He goes on to request permission to exhume the royal bodies buried at these sites and rebury them at more suitable places (which was done that same year). Next, his thoughts turned to those who had died and were buried in exile in the Seychelles. He started the process in 1928. Eventually, the remains were repatriated to Ghana in 1930, allowing for a "General Funeral Custom," a version of traditional royal burial procedures extending over fifteen days.

Furthermore, Prempeh began a campaign to restore the remains of the Asantehenes, taken to a temporary shelter before the destruction of the traditional royal burial site at Bantama and for the mausoleum to be rebuilt. He wrote in 1929 to the District Commissioner for Kumase on the issue, saying that "Today we are finding that our own houses are improved but these sacred places (the royal burial places) are in disrepair. They are no longer an honour but are a source of shame instead. In these days elaborate tombstones for the deceased relatives are rising up all over the countryside; not a village but has some special reminder of the dead. Our dead Kings deserve no less of us and we want now to restore these holy places" (Otumfuo 2003: 182). What was involved was not only the rebuilding of the structures and rooms that had formerly housed the royal dead but also the return of a central symbolic object: a vast brass pan that had been removed from the mausoleum's environs at Bantama and resided at the time in the




Figure 3 An imaginative reconstruction of the purported use of the large brass plate which was once kept at the royal mausoleum in Kumase. From R.S.S. Baden-Powell, *The Downfall of Prempeh* (1898), p. 126.

United Service Museum in Whitehall, London, the center of the colonial government. The brass pan was documented by T. E. Bowditch in 1817 when he visited Kumase as a British emissary in 1817. He thought it was an object associated with human sacrifice, a view sustained by a drawing in Baden-Powell's notes recently found in archives in Accra, a version of which appeared redrawn in his account of his time in Asante (Figure 3).⁵ This understanding of its significance as a place of human sacrifice was subsequently challenged by the government anthropologist R. S. Rattray. Prempeh himself recounted traditional accounts of its mythic origins as either descended from heaven on a gold chain or taken from the Denkyira, who originally held dominion over Asante. "It is," he insisted, "a very important thing for the Ashanti—and all the souls of the Ashanti are within it" (Otumfuo 2003: 53, 182). The pan was an *omnium gatherum*, whose cargo was nothing less than that of the Asante people. The royal mausoleum itself was called Aya Keseho, taking its name from *Aya Kesse*, the large brass pan. The place, the burial site of royalty, and the very origins of the Asante people were thus localized in a large flat brass bowl held, not at the center of the Asante people but in Whitehall, the center of the colonial government in London. The Bantama Mausoleum was rebuilt, and the Chief Commissioner formally reopened it at the end of the "Great Funeral Custom." However, it remained empty, and the Asantehenes were not relocated as the large brass pan had not been returned. It remains empty today, and the pan is currently in the care of the National Army Museum in London.

Prempeh died in May 1931, seven years after his return from exile. Significantly, arrangements for his funeral were made by his family and the Kumase chiefs rather than (as in the case of Ranavalona III's return to Madagascar) the administration. From the Asante perspective, the fact that elements of the funerary arrangements were a version of

the process for Asantehenes was a tacit admission that, although Nana Prempeh was only ever formally acknowledged as the Kumasihene on his return to Ghana, the position of Asantehene had been restored. However, some concerns arose from adopting this procedure over 40 years after his predecessor's mortuary rites. The main strictures of the colonial government concerned the protection of the many foreigners in Kumase. It was feared that the atrocities that notoriously followed the death of an Asantehene might have been repeated. The market and the palace at Manhyia, where large crowds gathered, had a police guard and several foreigners fearing the worst applied for police protection. There were rumors that several people were killed, though unconfirmed as being associated with funerary procedures. Proceedings went along peacefully and, hence, the preferred colonial version of the customary process was followed. The special arrangements to ensure public order were revoked in little more than 24 hours (Tordoff 1965: 281).

The burial began with the funerary procession, winding its way from Manhyia to the Anglian Church of St. Cyprian. On arrival and at the request of his family, the band of the Gold Coast regiment played in his honor. The priest-in-charge conducted the burial service, after which the ornate coffin was taken to Bantama as a gesture toward tradition before being carried to Breman for interment. A year later, the traditional secondary process was conducted under the auspices of his successor, Prempeh II, who opened the proceedings wearing a war dress exclusive to Asantehene, with reference to Osei Tutu I (the founder of the Asante kingdom) (Otumfuo 2003: 182–185). The Golden Stool was transferred to his care, along with other national properties. The kingdom had been restored largely through a choreographed series of actions surrounding burial practices and the disposition of royal remains.

5. Conclusion

The most obvious difference between the two cases discussed here is that Ranavalona III died in exile and had no identified successors, while Prempeh I returned after many years as a deportee and could oversee the restoration of a modernized monarchy by careful diplomacy. In both cases, burial procedures (where, when, and following which protocols) were central to the kind of community that emerged and the sense of history and heritage it engaged. Victor Turner's well-patinated idea of "communitas" as the social bond cemented through participation in sacralized rites of passage emphasized the indissoluble links between ritual, collectivity, and the production of common memory (Turner 1969). To the extent that it has been criticized it is in its insistence on the overriding primacy of the ritual process. Interpretations of ritual process can readily become reductive. Ritual slips easily into being presented as unchanging, unresponsive to historical circumstances, paradigmatic, and locked into an ethnographic present. The idea of society itself is reified. Nonetheless, whatever the viability of that characterization, the predatory intentions of colonialism provoked change. The logic of sacred power had to be renegotiated. Ritual (explicitly and implicitly) embodied transformations.

Another crucial difference between the two case studies is that the actions of the

French colonial regime regarding the Merina royalty historicized one form of monarchic power, turning it effectively into a “heritage” phenomenon in its modern sense, exposing and commodifying what had been concealed and mystical. However, *famadihana* became ever more elaborate, and the concept of “burial communities” remains real in contemporary times, even if (as with virtual Internet communities) people buried together or attending funerals in an ancestral village have long since moved away and may not now actually know each other personally or retain the ambition to be buried together. In the case of the Asante, we can see a much subtler process by which the sites and remains (literally) of royalty were ritually transformed to accommodate external circumstances. When the last Asantehene, Otumfo Opoku Ware II, died in 1999, his funerary rites followed the new dispensation.

Arguably, where heritage-related discourses *assert* ideas of commonality through processes of objectification in monuments and narratives, funerary practices *create* communities through their primary role in overcoming the dislocations of individual death. Death threatens social cohesion. The funerary process is an occasion for recalibration. Further, this is not a reified process but a responsive one. In that light it provides a model of processes more widely evident in contemporary ritual practices.

Notes

- 1) The author would like to thank Taku Iida and the other invited participants for their constructive comments on the paper presented at the conference on which this volume is based. A book published subsequent to the conference, John Mack, *The Artfulness of Death in Africa* (2019), explores some of its themes in an expanded continental perspective.
- 2) For an excellent review of the topic see Gillian Feeley-Harnik (1985).
- 3) The bodies removed from Ambohimanga and the nearby site of Ilafy were those of Andrianampoinimerina, Ranavalona I, Ranavalona II, and Radama II. On arrival in Antananarivo they joined the remains of Radama I and Rasoherina, which were already buried separately at the Rova.
- 4) For an authoritative account of the events see Ellis 1985.
- 5) The original was discovered by Fiona Savage whilst undertaking research in the national archives in Accra for her doctoral thesis at the University of East Anglia.

References

- Akyeampong, E.
 1999 Christianity, Modernity and the Weight of Tradition in the Life of “Asantehene” Agyeman Prempeh I, c. 1888–1931. *Africa* 69(2): 279–311.
- Arens, W
 1984 The Demise of Kings and the Meaning of Kingship: Royal Funerary Ceremony in the Contemporary Southern Sudan and Renaissance France. *Anthropos* 79(4/6): 355–367.

- Baden-Powell, R. S. S.
1898 *The Downfall of Prempeh: A Diary of Life with the Native Levy in Ashanti, 1895–96*. London: Methuen.
- Bloch, M.
1971 *Placing the Dead: Tombs, Ancestral Villages, and Kinship Organization in Madagascar*. London: London Seminar Press.
1992 The Ritual of the Royal Bath in Madagascar: The Dissolution of Death, Birth and Fertility into Authority. In D. Cannadine and S. Price (eds.) *Rituals of Royalty: Power and Ceremonial in Traditional Societies*, pp. 271–297. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Bloch, M. and J. Parry (eds.)
1982 *Death & the Regeneration of Life*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Bookman-Amisshah, J.
1986 Akan Proverbs about Death. *Anthropos* 81: 77.
- De Heusch, L.
1969 *Sacrifice in Africa, A Structural Approach*. Manchester: Manchester University Press.
- Ellis, S.
1985 *The Rising of the Red Shaws: A Revolt in Madagascar 1895–1899*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Feeley-Harnik, G.
1985 Issues in Divine Kingship. *Annual Review of Anthropology* 14: 273–313.
- Frazer, J. G.
1911–1918 *The Golden Bough: A Study in Magic and Religion* (12 vols). London: Macmillan and Co.
- Mack, J.
1986 *Madagascar: Island of the Ancestors*. London: British Museum Press.
2019 *Artfulness and Death in Africa*. London: Reaktion Books.
- McCaskie, T. C.
1989 Death and the Asantehene: A Historical Meditation. *The Journal of African History* 30 (3): 417–77.
- Molet, L.
1956 *Le bain royal à Madagascar: Explication de la Fête Malgache du Fandroana par la coutume disparue de la manducation des morts*. Tananarive: Imprimeur lutérienne.
- Otumfuo, Nana Agyeman Prempeh I
2003 *The History of Ashanti Kings and the Whole Country Itself, and Other Writings* (Fontes historiae Africanae, new series, Sources of African History 6). In A. Boahen, E. Akyeampong, N. Lawler, T. C. McCaskie, and I. Wilkes (eds.) Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Rattray, Capt. R. S.
1927 *Religion and Art in Ashanti*. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
- Richards, A.
1968 Keeping the King Divine. In Royal Anthropological Institute of Great Britain and Ireland (ed.) *Proceedings of the Royal Anthropological Institute of Great Britain and*

- Ireland*, pp. 23–35. London: Royal Anthropological Institute of Great Britain and Ireland.
- Seligman, C. G. and B. Z. Seligman
1932 *Pagan Peoples of the Nilotic Sudan*. London: Routledge.
- Sibree, J.
1898 The National Museum at Anatananarivo. *The Anatananarivo Annual* 22: 167–175.
- Tordoff, W.
1965 *Ashanti under the Prempehs 1888–1935*. London: Oxford University Press.
- Turner, V.
1969 *The Ritual Process: Structure and Anti-Structure*. London: Routledge and Kegan Paul.
- Vaughan, M.
2008 ‘Divine Kings’: Sex, Death and Anthropology in Inter-War East/central Africa. *The Journal of African History* 49(3): 383–401.

Creating Festivals, Revitalizing Communities: Ongoing Cultural Movements in Zambia

Kenji Yoshida

National Museum of Ethnology

Today, in many regions of the world, the construction of museums dedicated to specific local communities, ethnic groups, or kingdoms is underway to preserve and present their cultural heritage. There is also a movement for people to create or recreate their own cultures based on cultural legacies.

For example, in Zambia, in the 1980s, many ethnic groups revived or created festivals under slogans such as “let’s start our tradition.” In the 1990s, when the festivals were created, each group started planning to build its own museum to exhibit its cultural heritage. Some of the planned museums have already been established. The festival and museums are now important instruments for groups to construct their local or ethnic identity.

1. Safeguarding the Intangible Cultural Heritage

Since October 2003, when the UNESCO Convention for the Safeguarding of the Intangible Cultural Heritage was adopted, great interest in intangible cultural heritage has developed worldwide. Meanwhile, the World Cultural and Natural Heritage List has attracted much attention in every country.

As of September 2021, the World Heritage List includes 897 cultural, 218 natural, and 39 mixed properties in 167 state parties. From the program’s inception, there has been (and continues to be) a strong imbalance between the North and South. In terms of cultural heritage, almost half the total number of inscribed properties has always been occupied by Western European countries. In contrast, of 1,154 properties inscribed in the “World” Heritage List (897 cultural, 218 natural, and 39 mixed properties), only 98 properties are from Africa: 54 cultural, 39 natural, and five mixed properties. Needless to say, Africa is extremely rich in culture and civilization. The richness and significance of African cultural heritage cannot be dismissed. What is at issue is the validity of the so-called universal standard of “heritage.”

The adoption of the Convention for the Safeguarding of the Intangible Cultural Heritage by the 32nd session of UNESCO’s 2003 General Conference is more than welcome. It demonstrates global awareness of the importance of intangible cultural heritage in the history of human beings. The Convention can also be appreciated for the potential to revise the ongoing unbalanced recognition of heritage between the North and

South, and Europe and other parts of the world.

The notion of intangible cultural heritage is yet to be explored. According to the Convention, it refers to the practices, representations, expressions, knowledge, skills, instruments, objects, artifacts, and cultural spaces that communities, groups and, in some cases, individuals recognize as part of their cultural heritage (UNESCO 2003). The Convention also acknowledges that “the ‘intangible cultural heritage’ is constantly recreated by communities and groups in response to their environment, their interaction with nature, and their history, and provide them with a sense of identity and continuity, thus promoting respect for cultural diversity and human creativity.” The intangible cultural heritage is manifested in domains such as oral traditions, including language as its vehicle, performing arts, social practices, rituals and festive events, knowledge and practices concerning nature and the universe, and traditional craftsmanship (*Article 2*). Thus, intangible cultural heritage is the basis of human existence and may well be called the bodily or tacit knowledge held by human beings, which continuously constructs and reconstructs people’s sense of identity through various social interactions. While carrying a sense of continuity, bodily knowledge is dynamic, changing with changing life. Once the dynamism of bodily knowledge is ignored, the notion of intangible cultural heritage is also denied. Hence, the “Safeguarding” of Intangible Cultural Heritage should not be taken as its “preservation” in the sense of maintaining the heritage in an unchanged condition. It should read as “safeguarding” or ensuring “dynamism” of the Intangible Cultural Heritage (Yoshida 2004).

2. Creating Festivals

This study introduces ongoing cultural movements in Zambia, where I have had close contact for the last 40 years, to illustrate the dynamism of intangible cultural heritage.

In Zambia, there are few festivals organized based on the entire ethnic group. One of the few examples of this sort is *kuomboka*, a royal barge festival for the Lodzi people. “*Kuomboka*” literally means “to move out of the water.” At the end of the rainy season, when the water level of the Zambezi River rises, the Lodzi King, Litunga, travels in a large barge paddled by approximately one hundred paddlers from his rainy season palace called “*Lealui*” at the middle of the floodplain of the river to his dry season palace “*Limulunga*” located on the bank (Photo 1). The royal barge, called *nalikwanda*, is followed by hundreds of small boats and canoes. The *kuomboka* ceremony is quite important.

Having been stimulated by such a large-scale festival, in 1980, the *nchwala* ceremony, where the first harvest of the year was brought to King Mpezeni, was revived among the Ngoni people.



Photo 1 *Kuomboka*, a royal barge festival of the Lodzi people. Mongu. Western Province of Zambia. 1984. (Photo by the author)

The Ngoni people are a subgroup of the Zulu, who reside in the present Natal Province of South Africa. At the beginning of the 19th century, King Shaka of the Zulu brought a hundred Ngoni-speaking chiefdoms in the region under his control and established a powerful kingdom. In the 1830s, escaping from Shaka, a Ngoni leader, Zwengendaba led a small group of his warriors north through Mozambique, Zimbabwe, and Tanzania. After Zwebgendaba's death, Mpezeni became the leader, and the warrior group finally settled in the eastern corner of present-day Zambia, where they married local Chewa women. Even after the settlement, the warriors raided surrounding ethnic groups while leaving their children under the care of their Chewa wives. Thus, in a couple of generations, the Ngoni people lost their language and now speak the Chewa language. After the settlement, in 1887, Mpezeni rose up against the British, who took control of Nyasaland and Northern Rhodesia, and was defeated. The Ngoni came under British colonial rule, and the custom of the *nchwala* ceremony, where the first harvest of the year was brought to King Mpezeni, was banned by the colonial government in 1898.

Meanwhile, the custom was maintained under the name of *incwala* by the Swazi people, an offshoot of the Zulu kingdom. In 1979, the present king, Mpezeni IV, was invited to the *incwala* in Swaziland and observed the ritual. Mpezeni was inspired to revive the ritual in his region, and the *nchwala* ceremony was revived in 1980 (Photo 2).

The creation of the *nchwala* acted as a stimulus to a neighboring ethnic group called Chewa. They created a harvest festival, *kulamba*, in 1984, based on an old custom of an annual tribute to their King. Here again, the festival was said to have been revived. I started my fieldwork in the region in 1984, and attended the first *kulamba*. Under the slogan "Ti yambile mwambo" meaning "Let's start our tradition," a ceremony was created, where each Chewa regional chief brings a bundle of the year's harvest to the King, Gawa Undi, as dancers in his region dance in front of the King (Photo 3). The performance always comprises two types of dances: men's *nyau* masked dance, usually performed for funerals, and women's *chinamwali* dance, usually performed during the



Photo 2 *Nchwala* ceremony conducted annually by the Ngoni people at Mtenguleni village, Eastern Province of Zambia, 1999. (Photo by the author)



Photo 3 The first *kulamba* ceremony created by Chewa people in 1984, Mkaika, Eastern Province of Zambia. Nyau masked dancers perform dances in front of the Chewa King and chiefs. (Photo by the author)



Photo 4 Girls performing *chinamwali* dances in the 2004 *kulamba* ceremony, Mkaika, Eastern Province of Zambia. (Photo by the author)

puberty ceremony of girls called *chinamwali* (Photo 4) (Yoshida 1992; 1993). In 1984, while observing the dance, I said to the Chewa villagers, “After 50 years, anthropologists might well believe that this is a traditional ceremony of the Chewa.” Over 35 years have passed since then, and the ceremony called “*kulamba*, the traditional ceremony of the Chewa,” is held on the last weekend of August every year.

Following the Chewa, a rain-calling ceremony called *twimba* was started in 1988 by the Nsenga people, another neighboring people of the Chewa (Photo 5). *Twimba* is a pure invention by the Nsenga King, Kalindawalo. He delegated several research teams to every corner of the region to collect songs, old customs, and oral traditions related to rain calling. Based on the results, he composed the entire program of the ceremony. However, even the start of this ceremony appealed to outsiders as a revival of the “old tradition.”

Since then, the trend of creating ethnic festivals has spread throughout the country.



Photo 5 The King, Kalindawalo, is parading in the *twimba* ceremony conducted by the Nsenga people at Petauke, Eastern Province of Zambia, 1999. (Photo by the author)



Photo 6 A calendar of annual traditional ceremonies of Zambia. Published by the Ministry of Community Development and Social Services of Zambia. (Photo by the author)

Almost all major ethnic groups, 73 in total, now have annual festivals (Photo 6).

The annual festivals of ethnic groups were “revived” (actually “created”) within a short period in the 1980s. What was the background of this movement? The second half of the 1970s was when the Zambian economy started to decline drastically, and the government was obliged to reorganize the national policy. Since independence, the Zambian economy has been heavily dependent on the copper industry, neglecting agriculture. After the oil crisis in 1973 and the cessation of the Vietnam War in 1975, the price of copper dropped drastically, resulting in an economic crisis. Even maize, the staple crop of the country, ran short. Suddenly, agricultural development became a top priority for the government. The involvement of local authorities (i.e., the kings and chiefs of each ethnic group) was indispensable to implement the policy. However, the stagnation of copper mines accelerated migrant workers’ return to their homeland. Many men who had experienced multi-ethnic urban life in mining towns and become aware of their ethnic identity resettled in rural societies. Thus, ethnic consciousness rooted in the bond with the land spread throughout the country during this period. The revival or creation of ethnic festivals in the 1980s cannot be understood without considering this social context.

A festival is an effective medium for visualizing ethnic unity and strengthening

ethnic identity. However, it should not run counter to the national unity Zambia seeks to form as a nation-state. The tactics local chiefs and kings adopted was to declare the movement a “revival” of old traditions banned by the colonial government rather than the “creation” of new festivals. Thus, holding ethnic festivals can be conceived as one of the benefits from the end of colonial rule or a product achieved by the nation-state established by independence. Hence, newly created festivals should be described as a “revival” of old traditions.

Notably, the purposes and dates of the festivals and ceremonies are well-differentiated such that they may not overlap with each other. Ngoni’s *nchwala* is a ceremony to celebrate the first harvest of the year and is, thus, held in the mid-rainy season. *The Kulamba* of the Chewa is a harvest festival held during the dry season. Nsenga’s *twimba* is a rain-calling ceremony held at the beginning of the rainy season. Why are they differentiated in terms of dates and meaning? Chiefs and kings have unanimously explained: “Otherwise, our own ceremony is not covered well by television, and we also lose important occasion for logging appeals to the President and Ministers.” The central government supports these movements by transporting people and sending government representatives, even the president himself, to each festival.

Given various circumstances, there seem to be few options for many ethnic groups to make their identity appealing through festivals while getting along in harmony with others than to “revive” each group’s festivals in a short period. It is indeed a way of avoiding particular groups becoming prominent in the nation-state of Zambia.

3. Establishing Community Museums

In the 1990s, having created such festivals, each group began plans to build a museum to preserve and display cultural heritage. Some museums have already opened, most of which are located at sites of annual festivals. The Nayuma Museum, built by the Lodzi



Photo 7 Nayuma Museum, established by the people of the Lodzi kingdom in the Western Province of Zambia.
(Photo by the author, 2005)



Photo 8 One of the galleries of the Choma Museum, dedicated to the cultures of the Tonga people, Choma, Southern Province of Zambia. (Photo by the author, 2008)

people in 1986, is a pioneering museum in the movement (Photo 7). The Choma Museum in Choma in the Southern Province, dedicated to the Tonga community, can also be mentioned in this context (Photo 8).

Another example is the Motomoto Museum, originally established by the French Canadian Catholic Priest Jean Jacques Corbeil of the White Fathers in the 1950s (Photo 9). He made a natural history collection, including an ethnographic one containing many objects used in the initiation ceremony for girls called *chisungu*, while working in Bemba land (Photo 10). The collection was donated to the national government, and the museum became a national museum in 1974. Given the character of its collection, the museum currently plays the role of a community museum of the Bemba people.

The most recent achievement is the Nsingo Community Museum, which opened last year in Ngoni land. The Ngoni people have converted the former municipal hall into their community museum (Photo 11).

As for the Chewa people, among whom I have been working for the last 40 years, their masquerades called *nyau* or *gule wamukulu*, together with another masked dance in Zamia, the *makishi* dance of the Luvale people, was proclaimed a Masterpiece of the Oral and Intangible Heritage of Humanity by UNESCO in 2005 and was inscribed on the UNESCO's Representative List of the Intangible Cultural Heritage of Humanity in 2008. Afterward, the Chewa people, or more precisely the Chewa Traditional Counsel, established at the time of the first *kulamba* ceremony in 1984, decided to create a museum at the site of the *kulamba* ceremony. Although the building is not yet complete, the plan is well underway (Photo 12). A similar movement is also underway among the Luvale people.

One concern is that only two ethnic groups in Zambia have a masked tradition: *nyau* of the Chewa and *makishi* of the Luvale. However, only those two dances were in UNESCO's Representative List of the Intangible Cultural Heritage of Humanity and became representatives of Zambian cultural heritage. How will it affect the performance of other groups in Zambia? Are people from some ethnic groups without a masked tradition likely to start dancing with masks? Events in cultural scenes in Zambia after introducing the ranking system created by UNESCO are worth monitoring.

Thus far, there has been little impact of the system on local cultures because most villagers do not know UNESCO and, thus, are unaware of the inclusion of the two performances by UNESCO. However, 2007 saw an epoch-making event. In that year, three presidents of the countries where the Chewa people live (Levy Mwanawasa, the President of Zambia; Bingu wa Mutharika, the President of Malawi; and Armando Guebuza, the President of Mozambique) attended a *kulamba* ceremony and paid courtesy visits to the Paramount Chief of the Zambian Chewa, Gawa Undi (Photo 13). Chewa chiefs from Malawi and Mozambique also brought their dancing groups and allowed them to perform dances in front of Gawa Undi (Photo 14). To the best of my knowledge, this is the first instance in African history where the presidents of the states with the same ethnic group attended the ethnic group's annual festival. The speeches made by the three presidents, as if with a single voice, underline the importance of the intangible cultural heritage for any group rather than acknowledge the distinguished character of



Photo 9 The Motomoto Museum located in Mbala, Northern Province of Zambia. (Photo by the author, 2004)




Photo 10 A reconstruction of the *chisungu* girls' initiation house in the Motomoto Museum, Mbala, Northern Province of Zambia. (Photo by the author, 2004)



Photo 11 The Nsingo Hall is now being converted into a community Museum of Ngoni people, Feni, Eastern Province of Zambia. (Photo by the author, 2019)




Photo 12 The Chewa Museum plan, Mkaika, Eastern Province of Zambia. (Photo by the author, 2007)



Photo 13 Three presidents of the countries where Chewa people live, that is the President of Zambia (Center, Middle), the President of Malawi (Center, Right), and the President of Mozambique (Center, Left) attended a *kulamba* ceremony on August 25, 2007. (Photo by the author)



Photo 14 A *makanja* dancer from a Zambian chiefdom dancing in front of Gawa Undi, the Paramount Chief, in the 2007 *kulamba* ceremony, Mkaika, Eastern Province of Zambia. (Photo by the author, on August 25, 2007)

nyau and *makishi*. Surprisingly, together with the Presidents, Chewa chiefs from Malawi and Mozambique paid courtesy visits to the Paramount Chief of the Zambian Chewa. Although the Chewa people have a vague notion that they belong to one ethnic group they call Chewa, they do not consider the Paramount Chief of Zambian Chewa as the ultimate King of all Chewa, including those of Malawi and Mozambique. However, through the 2007 *kulamba* ceremony, a seed of identity that all Chewa who live in the three countries are in one group under the Paramount Chief of Zambian Chewa emerged. After the ceremony, construction of the Chewa Museum was speeded up.

Thus, festivals and museums are now important instruments for groups to construct their ethnic identity. Notably, the target audience of these museums are local people rather than tourists, and the museums seek to strengthen people's pride in their culture and transmit their traditional culture. However, the notion of the museum is rather new to most local people, as they now grope for ways to create museums.

*

This movement of self-representation is welcome and must be promoted further. However, it would result only in creating a nationalistic ideology if the identity strengthened or created by these movements is narrow-minded. Identity museums are to create should be open-minded and admit cultural diversity. Therefore, networking museums, nationally and internationally, is indispensable.

In Zambia, the National Museums Board based in Lusaka, the capital, supports the movement of establishing community museums by networking them. I too assist by connecting the network with various programs that our Museum, the National Museum of Ethnology, conducts.

The National Museum of Ethnology, jointly with the Japan International Cooperation Agency, hosts a four-month-long museology training course every year by inviting 10 museum curators from different countries worldwide. The course started in 1994, with 269 participants from 54 countries and regions by the end of 2020. As for Zambia, when nine curators had participated in the course, they started organizing a museology workshop every year since 2004, targeting those who could not come to Japan. In these workshops, people involved in building or managing community museums are invited to share their knowledge and experience in museology. Members of the National Museum of Ethnology and affiliated researchers also attended the workshop as facilitators (Photo 15). Accordingly, a database containing information on the collections of participating museums has also been constructed (Photo 16). When you use the database, apart from unique items owned by each ethnic group, cultural elements shared by many ethnic groups, regions, or countries may also be found frequently. They also demonstrate a common cultural identity. Similar workshops have been organized regularly since then as part of the endeavor to foster an open-minded identity.



Photo 15 Members of the National Museum of Ethnology and researchers affiliated to the Museum have been regularly attending the workshop on museology as facilitators, Livingstone Museum, Southern Province of Zambia. (Photo by the author, 2005)




Photo 16 A database containing information of the collections of participating museums. (Photo by the author, 2008)

Museums have long been considered a place of representation, preservation, and conservation of the tangible cultural property of the past. From this viewpoint, museums seem to have little room to contribute to “safeguarding” or ensuring the “dynamism” of the intangible cultural heritage. However, museums are a store of tangible objects of the past and a platform for accumulating and disseminating intangible cultural heritage of local or ethnic communities (i.e., knowledge, memory, and technology transmitted from one generation to another in the community) and, thus, a base for creating people’s pride in (or identity of) the community.

Museums’ role as an apparatus for constructing culture and society, rooted in the community and yet equipped with a sense of open-minded identity, will certainly become increasingly vital in the coming age.

References

UNESCO

- 2003 Convention for the Safeguarding of the Intangible Cultural Heritage, MISC/2003/CLT/CH/14. http://unesdoc.unesco.org/ark:/48223/pf0000132540_eng (viewed on 9 August 2019)

Yoshida, K.

- 1992 *Masks and Transformation among the Chewa of Zambia* (Senri Ethnological Studies 31). Osaka: National Museum of Ethnology.
- 1993 Masks and Secrecy among the Chewa. *African Arts* 24(2): 34–45, 92.
- 2004 The Museum and the Intangible Cultural Heritage. *Museum International* 56(1–2): 108–112, 221–222.

INDEX

- A**
- African continent 101
 architecture 42, 43, 44, 49-51, 92
- B**
- basic knowledge 107, 113
 belief 1, 22, 23, 32, 35-38, 60, 104, 108, 111,
 152, 156, 158
 biodiversity 59-61, 64, 69, 102, 113
 bodily knowledge 210
 burial 13, 55, 63, 151, 152, 194, 197, 199,
 201-205
- C**
- chieftaincy 195
 chiefdom 211
 citizen 201
 citizenry 198
 citizenship 11, 12, 125, 127, 130, 133, 134,
 137, 139, 141, 142
 collective identity 2, 125, 133
 common knowledge 108
 communitas 204
 court 29, 168, 170, 175, 184, 201, 202
 cultural identity 43, 78, 90, 91, 93, 111, 218
 cultural knowledge 108
 cultural practice 1, 5, 7, 10, 62, 78, 91-93,
 112, 149, 152
- D**
- dance 41, 57, 91, 152, 211, 212, 215
- decolonization 167, 169, 176
 democracy 167, 182
 democratization 167, 179, 181
 diaspora 149, 157, 158
- E**
- ethnic conflict 184
 ethnic group 25, 27, 64, 78, 171, 175, 209-
 211, 213, 214-218
 ethnic identity 209, 213, 214, 217
 ethnicity 78, 156
 ethnic society 25
 exhibition 12, 61, 69, 88, 141, 149, 151, 153,
 155-158
 exile 13, 127, 134, 141, 196-198, 200-204
- F**
- festival 3, 7, 13, 49, 64, 65, 91, 174, 198,
 209-215, 217
- G**
- group identity 7
- H**
- heritage practice 2, 3, 10, 12, 87, 111, 113
 historian 4, 58, 101, 104, 114, 194
 history 1, 4, 10, 12, 14, 21-25, 36, 41, 58, 61,
 94, 102, 149, 153, 155, 156, 158, 168-170,
 174, 182, 186, 204, 209, 210, 215

I

indigenous knowledge 102, 113
 intergenerational knowledge 107, 110

K

king 13, 62, 63, 66, 106, 168, 171, 193-195,
 197, 198, 202, 210-214, 217
 kingdom 23-25, 27, 29-31, 34, 36, 195, 197-
 199, 201, 204, 209, 211
 kingship 168, 184, 195, 197
 knowledge production 103, 112, 113
 knowledge system 11, 78, 104

L

landscape 4, 5, 11, 59, 60, 68, 89, 91, 101,
 125
 language 1, 13, 36, 41, 108, 181, 194, 210,
 211
 local community 38, 91, 167, 168, 170, 172,
 174, 177, 179, 184, 185
 local knowledge 106, 110
 local practice 5, 10, 13, 36, 37

M

masquerade 106, 150-152, 158, 215
 medicinal knowledge 102-104, 107, 108,
 110-113
 medicine knowledge 102, 112
 monument 3-6, 10-12, 27, 31, 43, 60, 92,
 125-127, 205
 museum 9, 12, 61, 66, 67, 70, 78, 82, 87, 94,
 149, 150, 155-159, 199, 200, 203, 209,
 214, 215, 217-219

P

particular lay knowledge 107, 110
 plant knowledge 106-108, 110

Q

queen 160, 194, 196-198, 200, 201

R

reburial 13, 196, 199, 201
 reburial practice 13, 201
 recolonization 134, 135, 137, 139, 142
 religion 42, 70, 105, 136, 193
 religious belief 60, 104, 108, 111
 religious practice 21, 59
 ritual practice 13, 103, 205

S

self-identity 58, 68
 Senegalese citizenship 139
 sense of citizenship 127
 sense of community 13, 197, 201
 sense of identity 13, 210
 social practice 13, 22, 104, 210
 source community 149

T

traditional knowledge 60, 62, 102, 108
 traditional practice 8, 62, 91, 110
 Tourism 1, 12, 21-23, 31, 32, 37, 38, 41, 46,
 49, 51, 69, 153-155

V

- village community 106, 110
- visual citizenship 11, 125, 127, 130, 134,
137, 141, 142

List of Contributors

Ryo Nakamura

Fukuoka University, Japan

Oussouby Sacko

Kyoto Seika University, Japan

Katsuhiko Keida

Kumamoto University, Japan

Taku Iida

National Museum of Ethnology, Japan

Jacqueline Grigo

University of Zurich, Switzerland

Allen F. Roberts

University of California, Los Angeles, USA

Mary Jo Arnoldi

National Museum of Natural History, Smithsonian Institution, USA

Thomas Laely

University of Zurich, Switzerland

John Mack

University of East Anglia, UK

Kenji Yoshida

National Museum of Ethnology, Japan

Senri Ethnological Studies

To obtain free copies, see contact details inside the front cover

No. 1	Africa 1	1978
No. 2	Miscellanea 1	1978
No. 3	Warfare among East African Herders	1979
No. 4	Alaska Native Culture and History	1980
No. 5	Music Culture in West Asia	1980
No. 6	Africa 2	1980
No. 7	The Galela of Halmahera: A Preliminary Survey	1980
No. 8	Chipewyan Ecology: Group Structure and Caribou Hunting System	1981
No. 9	Affluent Foragers: Pacific Coasts East and West	1981
No. 10	El Hombre y su Ambiente en los Andes Centrales	1982
No. 11	Religion and Family in East Asia	1984
No. 12	Under Mt. Zempoaltépetl: Highland Mixe Society and Ritual	1984
No. 13	History and Peasant Consciousness in South East Asia	1984
No. 14	Regional Differences in Japanese Rural Culture: Results of a Questionnaire	1984
No. 15	Africa 3	1984
No. 16	Japanese Civilization in the Modern World: Life and Society	1984
No. 17	Maritime Institutions in the Western Pacific	1984
No. 18	The Encounter of Persia with China: Research into Cultural Contacts Based on Fifteenth Century Persian Pictorial Materials	1986
No. 19	Japanese Civilization in the Modern World II: Cities and Urbanization	1986

No. 20	Toward a Computer Ethnology	1987
No. 21	Cultural Uniformity and Diversity in Micronesia	1987
No. 22	The Hanunoo-Mangyan: Society, Religion and Law among a Mountain People of Mindoro Island, Philippines	1988
No. 23	The Museum Conservation of Ethnographic Objects	1988
No. 24	Cinematographic Theory and New Dimensions in Ethnographic Film	1988
No. 25	Japanese Civilization in the Modern World III: Administrative Organizations	1989
No. 26	Japanese Civilization in the Modern World IV: Economic Institutions	1989
No. 27	Culture Embodied	1990
No. 28	Japanese Civilization in the Modern World V: Culturedness	1990
No. 29	Japanese Civilization in the Modern World VI: Religion	1990
No. 30	Cash, Commoditisation and Changing Foragers	1991
No. 31	Africa 4	1992
No. 32	Significance of Silk Roads in the History of Human Civilization	1992
No. 33	500 Años de Mestizaje en los Andes	1992
No. 34	Japanese Civilization in the Modern World VII: Language, Literacy, and Writing	1992
No. 35	Unity and Diversity of a People: The Search for Fulbe Identity	1993
No. 36	From Vedic Altar to Village Shrine: Towards an Interface between Indology and Anthropology	1993
No. 37	El Mundo Ceremonial Andino	1993
No. 38	Japanese Civilization in the Modern World IX: Tourism	1995
No. 39	Native Middle American Languages: An Areal-Typological Perspective	1995

No. 40	Japanese Civilization in the Modern World XI: Amusement	1995
No. 41	New Horizons in Tibeto-Burman Morphosyntax	1995
No. 42	Coastal Foragers in Transition	1996
No. 43	Essays in Northeast African Studies	1996
No. 44	Northern Minority Languages: Problems of Survival	1997
No. 45	Time, Language and Cognition	1998
No. 46	Japanese Civilization in the Modern World X: Technology	1998
No. 47	Fringe Area of Highlands in Papua New Guinea	1998
No. 48	Japanese Anthropologists and Malaysian Society: Contributions to Malaysian Ethnography	1998
No. 49	The Anthropology of Korea: East Asian Perspectives	1998
No. 50	Living with Śakti: Gender, Sexuality and Religion in South Asia	1999
No. 51	Japanese Civilization in the Modern World XVI: Nation-State and Empire	2000
No. 52	Japanese Civilization in the Modern World XIV: Comparative Studies of Information and Communication	2000
No. 53	The Social Economy of Sharing: Resource Allocation and Modern Hunter-Gatherers	2000
No. 54	Japanese Civilization in the Modern World XVII: Collection and Representation	2001
No. 55	Cultural Change in the Arab World	2001
No. 56	Identity and Gender in Hunting and Gathering Societies	2001
No. 57	The Value of the Past: Myths, Identity and Politics in Transcaucasia	2001
No. 58	Social Change and Continuity in a Village in Northern Anhui, China: A Response to Revolution and Reform	2001

No. 59	Parks, Property, and Power: Managing Hunting Practice and Identity within State Policy Regimes	2001
No. 60	Self- and Other-Images of Hunter-Gatherers	2001
No. 61	Anthropology of Untouchability: “Impurity” and “Pollution” in a Southern Indian Society	2001
No. 62	The Culture of Association and Associations in Contemporary Japanese Society	2002
No. 63	Hunter-Gatherers of the North Pacific Rim	2003
No. 64	Japanese Civilization in the Modern World XVIII: Alcoholic Beverages	2003
No. 65	Wartime Japanese Anthropology in Asia and the Pacific	2003
No. 66	Circumpolar Ethnicity and Identity	2004
No. 67	Indigenous Use and Management of Marine Resources	2005
No. 68	Usos del documento y cambios sociales en la historia de Bolivia	2005
No. 69	Pastoralists and Their Neighbors in Asia and Africa	2005
No. 70	Updating the San: Image and Reality of an African People in the 21st Century	2006
No. 71	Music and Society in South Asia: Perspectives from Japan	2008
No. 72	Human-Nature Relations and the Historical Backgrounds of Hunter-Gatherer Cultures in Northeast Asian Forests: Russian Far East and Northeast Japan	2009
No. 73	Interactions between Hunter-Gatherers and Farmers: from Prehistory to Present	2009
No. 74	Written Cultures in Mainland Southeast Asia	2009
No. 75	Issues in Tibeto-Burman Historical Linguistics	2009
No. 76	Tourism and Glocalization: Perspectives on East Asian Societies	2010

No. 77	Objectivization and Subjectivization: A Typology of Voice Systems	2012
No. 78	Irrigated Taro (<i>Colocasia esculenta</i>) in the Indo-Pacific: Biological, Social and Historical Perspectives	2012
No. 79	The Anabaptist Idea and the Way of Practicing Care: Reconsidering the Meaning of Life in the 21st Century	2012
No. 80	The Anthropology of Aging and Well-being: Searching for the Space and Time to Cultivate Life Together	2013
No. 81	The Anthropology of Europe as Seen from Japan: Considering Contemporary Forms and Meanings of the Social	2013
No. 82	Business and Anthropology: A Focus on Sacred Space	2013
No. 83	Chiefs, Hunters and San in the Creation of the Moremi Game Reserve, Okavango Delta: Multiracial Interactions and Initiatives, 1956-1979	2013
No.84	Anthropological Studies of Whaling	2013
No.85	Research on Paper and Papermaking: Proceedings of an International Workshop	2013
No.86	Oirat People: Cultural Uniformity and Diversification	2014
No.87	The Anthropology of Care and Education for Life: Searching for Resilient Communities in Multicultural Aging Societies	2014
No.88	On the Trail of Taro: An Exploration of Natural and Cultural History	2014
No.89	El Centro Ceremonial Andino: Nuevas Perspectivas para los Períodos Arcaico y Formativo	2014
No.90	Discourses on Family, Ethnicity, and State in China: Theoretical Explorations by East Asian Anthropologists (in Chinese)	2014
No.91	Social Movements and the Production of Knowledge: Body, Practice, and Society in East Asia	2015
No.92	Northeast Asian Borders: History, Politics, and Local Societies	2016
No.93	Migration and the Remaking of Ethnic/Micro-Regional Connectedness	2016

No.94	Hunter-Gatherers and their Neighbors in Asia, Africa, and South America	2017
No.95	Sedentarization among Nomadic Peoples in Asia and Africa	2017
No.96	Structural Transformation in Globalizing South Asia: Comprehensive Area Studies for Sustainable, Inclusive, and Peaceful Development	2017
No.97	Anthropological Perspectives on History, Culture and Museum: Theoretical Practice in Japan and China (in Chinese)	2018
No.98	Let's Talk about Trees: Genetic Relationships of Languages and Their Phylogenic Representation	2018
No.99	Research and Activism among the Kalahari San Today: Ideals, Challenges, and Debates	2018
No.100	The Spread of Food Cultures in Asia	2019
No.101	Minpaku Sign Language Studies 1	2019
No.102	Conservation of Cultural Heritage in a Changing World	2019
No.103	Environmental Teachings for the Anthropocene: Indigenous Peoples and Museums in the Western Pacific	2020
No.104	World Whaling: Historical and Contemporary Studies	2021
No.105	Music and Marginalisation: Beyond the Minority-Majority Paradigm	2021
No.106	Hunter-Gatherers in Asia: From Prehistory to the Present	2021
No.107	Minpaku Sign Language Studies 2	2021
No.108	Fijian Languages, Cultures, and Their Representation	2022